When American forces began to secure Manila and Luzon, the United States soon realized that hundreds of islands made up the Philippines and that it would require an extraordinary number of troops, supplies, ships, and even specialized naval support to occupy the archipelago before it collapsed into chaos.108 If these requirements were not met, it would mean either leaving the Philippines vulnerable to having other foreign powers carve out their own spheres of control there or conducting a long-term American counterinsurgency campaign against rebellious elements of the Filipino population. In addition, there were also American interests to consider in the Asia-Pacific Region in which the United States’ political and economic leadership felt that giving up the Philippines would mean eventually being locked out of China’s markets by the other major powers. In addition, from a military standpoint, an American presence in the Philippines would be a good thing in terms of protecting the indigenous population, having access to valuable ports and harbors, and being able to station a forward-deployed American force to protect U.S. interests.109
Amphibious warfare brought Spain to its knees and essentially forced the country to give up its colonial holdings in the Pacific and the Caribbean. The United States used its navy to destroy Spanish naval power and isolate key colonies in order to allow ground forces to land and seize control. Although the amphibious assaults were ad hoc operations and left much to be desired by the military leadership, the United States accomplished its war aims quickly and with few casualties. From his study of American foreign policy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Michael H. Hunt believes the United States saw establishing and managing an empire as a simple matter. According to Hunt, “Advances in military technology had lowered the cost of fixing control over peripheral peoples…. Surely Americans, tested in a running battle with Native Americans across the continent, knew how to coerce obedience as well as Europeans.”110 More importantly, the United States was also recognized as a major power in the world with the military strength to back up its global interests. The Treaty of Paris of 1898 officially ended the Spanish-American War and granted the United States control over most of Spain’s colonial territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean.111 However, the American victory had unforeseen political and social implications that did not become immediately apparent during the war or during the peace that followed afterward.
American Geopolitical Implications of Amphibious Warfare
According to Max Boot, “Few Americans paid much attention as their [military] made one overseas landing after another during the course of the nineteenth century. In part this was because most of the landings were not very large; in part because Americans were not very interested in imperialism abroad.”112 However, the Spanish-American War brought geopolitical changes both within the United States and to the international system. The American victory confirmed that Spain was no longer a world power; and as a result, Spain lost its territorial possessions and influence to the United States. The new world power now had new acquisitions that extended its power and influence to two geographic regions of the world: Asia-Pacific and South America. While American commercial and diplomatic interests had already been in place in these parts of the world, the United States now had territories where it could station and forward deploy American military forces, ready to influence geopolitical forces in these parts of the world. In addition, the American political and military leadership found itself coping with the future governmental and security concerns that changed the dynamics of the American political system and presented new challenges and responsibilities.
Commodore Dewey’s destruction of Spain’s Pacific Fleet and the capture of Manila through amphibious operations using American ground forces was necessary because the Filipino insurgents were on the verge of seizing control and plunging the entire island chain into intrastate violence and disorder. With the Spanish colonial forces ready to surrender and wanting to avoid being massacred by the Filipinos, Commodore Dewey arranged the peaceful transition of control to the Americans, thus turning over possession of the island to the United States.113 In addition, the United States did not feel comfortable with turning over control of governance of the Philippines to the Filipinos because of the possibility of another major power moving into the country and reinstating it as a colony.
The hesitation of the Americans was based on how the European powers treated the newly independent Egypt in the late nineteenth century when it broke away from the Ottoman Empire to become a sovereign nation. Anglo-French management of Egypt’s finances, while meant to help manage the country’s money in order to pay off its debts to Europe, only provoked widespread unrest. Not only did the Europeans introduce unpopular economic reforms, but they also began swarming into Egypt to begin building and investing in the country’s commercial development and public infrastructure. As a consequence, life began to take a more westernized style in Egypt as the population began to embrace new cultural practices and goods from the West. However, discontent was also brewing in the local Egyptian population, especially among Muslim religious leaders who felt that Egypt was going to become another European colony like Cyprus and Tunis.114
With the Americans in control of Manila, the repercussion was that the Filipino insurgency began targeting the American military. The deteriorating situation in the Philippines forced the United States to begin transferring troops from North America to the Philippines to begin the long-term process of occupation, counterinsurgency operations, and state building. From Manila, the American expeditionary force transitioned into an occupational force and received additional ships, manpower, and supplies to begin expanding its control across the main island of Luzon. Although the United States quickly crushed the backbone of the rebels in Luzon, American military and political leaders realized that not only would insurgents slip back into the general native population, but that they were also setting up new bases on the other, smaller, nearby islands. Russell Weigley argues that possession of the Philippines urged the construction of a system of naval bases meant to not only protect the American archipelago, but also serve to project American military power to safeguard American interests in the Asia-Pacific Region, especially in China.115 To realize this new defense posture in the Pacific, either small-scale American amphibious operations had to be used to flush out Filipino insurgents on some of the islands or, in other cases, a garrison force would have to be established to maintain law and order.
Again, just like the Spanish-American War, ad hoc amphibious operations were used through a combination of American warships and gunboats or by making do with local fishing boats or other commercial vessels for ship-to-shore troop movements. In each case, the success of amphibious operations into what became the Philippine-American War introduced the need for better military training, equipment, and supplies as the occupation dragged on and became an increasingly long, frustrating war. The fighting in the Philippines eventually led to an “us versus them” mentality between the American occupational forces and the Filipino population, resulting in terrible atrocities, especially during the disastrous Samar campaign in which amphibious operations to land and control Samar Island suffered heavy casualties and culminated in the Balangiga Massacre.116 With American and Filipino casualties mounting in an openended war for control of the Philippine Islands, the United States stubbornly held on for purposes of geopolitical interests.
Michael H. Hunt’s examination of the United States during this time is interesting because he argues that the rise of the American Empire was based on the need for U.S. security. Cable and steam made the world smaller and increased the colonial appetite of most of the major powers, as seen with the conquests of Africa, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific. From the perspective of American strategists, it looked as if these aggressive empires were hemming in the United States. Under these conditions, the United States had to fend against these possible dangers by creating a defense in depth by controlling the Pacific and the Caribbean. Not only would American outposts deter any hostile moves against the Western Hemisphere and uphold its determination to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, but they would serve as interior lines to move ground and naval forces against any attack on the U.S. perimeter.117
Meanwhile, the United States found itself in possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico
