therefore buying time for its defenders to strengthen its defenses and prepare itself for the American assault.90
Despite the unexceptional performance of the American expeditionary force’s initial contact against Spanish colonial forces, General William R. Shafter and the officer leadership quickly adjusted tactics by employing skirmishers to flush out snipers and small-scale Spanish units in the jungle.91 In addition, they also stayed off the main roads and trails toward Santiago, using the jungle for cover and concealment and, when engaged by the enemy, employing fire and maneuver in rushes. General Shafter’s forces continued to advance toward Santiago in this manner until Spain’s colonial forces anchored themselves along the San Juan River, thus forcing the Americans to employ frontal attacks against well-entrenched defensive positions. Frank Freidel points out, “The twin battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill on July 1, 1898, decided whether the American expeditionary force in Cuba would succeed or fail. It was a close decision.”92 However, with the employment of artillery and small arms fire to suppress Spanish defensive positions, American forces broke through at El Caney and San Juan Hill and continued their push toward Santiago.93
While the U.S. Army struggled with its landings in the vicinity of Daiquiri and Siboney, the U.S. Navy continued its blockade of Cuba with the preponderance of its naval forces focused on containing the Spanish fleet in Santiago. According to Lieutenant Jose Muller Y Tejeiro, “The enemy had complete control of the sea, and from Daiquiri, where the landing was made, to Punta Cabrera, the American fleet, consisting of over seventy vessels, including both war and merchant vessels (many of the latter armed with guns), did not permit us to even think of receiving reinforcements or help of any kind, unless it were from the interior of the island.”94 However, American naval forces were prevented from engaging the Spanish navy because of the powerful naval defenses protecting Santiago Bay. Worse, American naval forces were at a disadvantage in terms of weather because they were fighting in hurricane season. In order to secure shelter for such an event, Commander Bowman H. McCalla was detached from Admiral Sampson’s blockading fleet at Santiago to secure Guantanamo Bay with a squadron composed of a battleship, three cruisers, and a gunboat. Shortly after arriving at Guantanamo Bay, Commander McCalla neutralized Spanish coastal defenses and landed a battalion of U.S. Marines under Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Huntington in order to seize the harbor facilities and their fortifications.95 Interestingly, prior to the amphibious assault against Guantanamo Bay, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington reported many lessons learned to the Commandant of the Marine Corps during his battalion’s first and only “practice” amphibious landing and the problems he encountered at Camp Sampson, Key West, Florida, prior to participating in the amphibious assault on Guantanamo Bay:
I received orders from Commander Reiter that the battalion would leave the ship at 4:15 a.m. It was necessary to knock off work at 3:45 a.m. in order that the men might get ready to go ashore. I was ordered by Commander Reiter, against my earnest pleas, to leave on board the Panther one-half of our 6-millimeter ammunition (225,000 rounds) and one-half of the 3-inch ammunition (18 boxes), the Panther having two 3-inch guns and we having four. This 6-millimeter ammunition was retained, Commander Reiter informed me, to serve as ballast, as the Panther has no 6-millimeter rifles…. Owing to the short time allowed for the removal of the stores, and notwithstanding the fact that the men worked hard and worked fast, considerable quantities of our property and part of the ten days’ rations I requested were left on board. The battalion moved from the ship shortly after 4:15 a.m., and moved out to the beach, short 2 miles from the wharf, and after we had been there some time the Panther came out of harbor and apparently lay to in the offing about two and one-half hours…. The battalion is now strung out in camp along the beach for over a half a mile…. I think that, notwithstanding the annoyance, trouble, and expense this transfer has caused, the experience will be some value to the battalion.96
While the landing at Key West was less than stellar for the Marines, the capture of Guantanamo Bay went smoothly, and the entire battalion landed under the protection of the naval squadron’s fire support. As stated in the squadron bulletin from the U.S. Flagship New York near Guantanamo Bay, “the pickets launched against Guantanamo were fired by the Spaniards near the fort, but suffered no casualties. In addition, no effort was made to dispossess the Spaniards of the upper part of the bay, as the squadron had no use for it, and the Spanish defenders must, eventually, surrender in any case for want of food.”97 Soon after the Americans took Guantanamo Bay, the Spanish colonial forces counterattacked the Marines, forcing them to improvise. Working in conjunction with Commander McCalla’s squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington coordinated not only the movement of reinforcements and additional machine gun and artillery support ashore, but also utilized naval gunfire from the American cruiser, the Marblehead, to supplement the Marine battalion’s firepower. After defeating the Spanish counterattack, Marines later attacked and seized Cuzco Well through a combined arms attack with Cuban insurgents using ground artillery, machine guns, and more naval gunfire support from the gunboat the USS Dolphin. Ship-to-shore support during the fighting was accomplished through the gunboat’s weapon systems being used with deadly effect on the Spanish defenses around Cuzco Well through use of makeshift naval signal flags from shore. This tactic prevented the American forces from being hit by the USS Dolphin’s guns and allowed them to seize control of Cuzco Well.98
The capture of Guantanamo Bay and Cuzco Well resulted in a secure naval base of operations for Admiral Sampson’s naval forces and placed American forces in an advantageous position to support Major General Shafter’s attack on Santiago. Soon afterward, the American expeditionary force, with the help of Cuban insurgents, slowly hammered away at the defenses of Santiago. After less than two weeks of siege, the Spanish defenders surrendered the city soon after the destruction of Spain’s naval forces against Admiral Sampson’s fleet in the Battle of Santiago.99 The total defeat of Spain’s ground and naval forces in Cuba was possible thanks, in part, to the United States’ use of amphibious operations to effectively terminate the Spanish-American War. This war essentially ended Spain’s role in the international system as a major power, while confirming the United States’ entry as a world power at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the end of the war and its successful use of amphibious warfare overseas had unanticipated political, social, and military ramifications that contributed to the manner in which the United States would use military force in its geopolitical strategy during the first half of the twentieth century.
The Spanish-American War and Its Impact on Amphibious Warfare
The Spanish-American War was the United States’ first use of amphibious warfare for long-term geostrategic purposes overseas. While it could be argued that amphibious warfare had been used outside the United States by American forces in the past, such as against the British in the Bahamas during the American Revolutionary War or in punishing the Barbary States during President Thomas Jefferson’s administration, these conflicts were small-scale military operations that had no long-term political or military value. The use of amphibious warfare in the Spanish-American War was different because a large American ground force was deployed overseas from the United States to seize and hold ground for geopolitical purposes. The result was not only the end of Spanish power and influence in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, but also enhanced U.S. diplomatic and military credibility throughout the world because it could employ its military far from home.
Amphibious warfare was essential to the American political and military leadership because despite quickly destroying Spain’s naval forces in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, the United States had extreme difficulty landing and supporting its ground forces from ship to shore. While the Philippines and Cuba were considered hostile territories, the Filipino and the Cuban insurgencies were vital factors in facilitating American forces as they attempted to organize themselves and attack the Spanish colonial garrisons. The United States was fortunate against Spain, because the Spanish defenders had every opportunity to stop the American landings on the beaches but did not exploit those opportunities. In addition, limited avenues of approach existed for American forces to land; with a little preparation and effort, the Spanish could have easily wreaked havoc on the American
