The History of Rome, Books 01 to 08. Livy

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threatened that they would besiege Rome itself. Which terrors, when they ought to assuage, increased still further the bad feelings of the commons: and the custom of declining the military service was now returning, not of their own accord; but Sp. Licinius, a tribune of the people, thinking that the time was come for forcing the agrarian law on the patricians by extreme necessity, had taken on him the task of obstructing the military preparations. But all the odium of the tribunitian power was turned on the author; nor did the consuls rise up against him more zealously than his own colleagues; and by their assistance the consuls hold the levy. An army is raised for the two wars at the same time; one is given to Fabius to be led against the Æqui, the other to Furius against the Veientians. And with respect to the Veientians, nothing was done worthy of mention. Fabius had much more trouble with his countrymen than with the enemy: that one man himself, as consul, sustained the commonwealth, which the army was betraying, far as in them lay, through their hatred of the consul. For when the consul, in addition to his other military talents, which he exhibited amply in his preparations for and conduct of war, had so drawn up his line that he routed the enemy's army solely by a charge of his cavalry, the infantry refused to pursue them when routed: and though the exhortation of their general, whom they hated, could not move them, neither could even their own infamy, and the present public disgrace and subsequent danger, if the enemy should recover courage, oblige them to quicken their pace, or even to stand in order of battle, if nothing else. Without orders they face about, and with a sorrowful air (you would suppose them beaten) they return to the camp, execrating at one time their general, at another time the services rendered by the cavalry. Nor were any remedies sought by the general for this so pestilent an example; so true is it that the most distinguished talents are more likely to be deficient in the tact of managing their countrymen than in that of conquering an enemy. The consul returned to Rome, not having so much increased his military glory as irritated and exasperated the hatred of his soldiers towards him. The patricians, however, succeeded in having the consulship remain in the Fabian family. They elect M. Fabius consul: Cn. Manlius is assigned as a colleague to Fabius.

      This year also had a tribune as a proposer of the agrarian law. It was Titus Pontificius: he pursuing the same course, as if it had succeeded with Sp. Licinius, obstructed the levy for a little time. The patricians being once more perplexed, Appius Claudius asserts "that the tribunitian power was put down last year: for the present by the very act, for the future by the precedent established, and since it was found that it could be rendered ineffective by its own strength; for that there never would be wanting a tribune who would both be willing to obtain a victory for himself over his colleague, and the favour of the better party by advancing the public weal. That both a plurality of tribunes, if there were need of such plurality, would be ready to assist the consuls; and that even one would be sufficient against all. Only let the consuls and leading members of the senate take care to gain over, if not all, at least some of the tribunes, to the commonwealth and the senate." The senators, convinced by the counsels of Appius, both collectively addressed the tribunes with kindness and civility, and the men of consular rank, according as each possessed personal influence over them individually, partly by conciliation, partly by authority, prevailed so far as to make them consent that the powers of the tribunitian office should be beneficial to the state; and by the aid of four tribunes against one obstructor of the public good, the consuls complete the levy. They then set out to the Veientian war, to which auxiliaries had flocked from all parts of Etruria, collected not so much for the sake of the Veientians, as because they had formed a hope that the Roman state might be destroyed by internal discord. And in the councils of all the states of Etruria the leading men openly stated, "that the Roman power was eternal, unless they were distracted by disturbances among themselves. That this was the only poison, this the bane discovered for powerful states, to render great empires mortal. That this evil, a long time retarded, partly by the wise measures of the patricians, partly by the forbearance of the commons, had now proceeded to extremities. That two states were now formed out of one: that each party had its own magistrates, its own laws. That though at first they were accustomed to be turbulent during the levies, still that these same individuals had ever been obedient to their commanders during war; that military discipline being still retained, no matter what might be the state of the city, it had been possible to withstand the evil; that now the custom of not obeying their superior followed the Roman soldier even to the camp. That in the last war in the very field, in the very heat of battle, by consent of the army the victory was voluntarily surrendered to the vanquished Æqui: that the standards were deserted, the general abandoned on the field, and that the army had returned to the camp without orders. That without doubt, if perseverance were used, Rome might be conquered by her own soldiery. That nothing else was necessary than to declare and make a show of war: that the fates and the gods would of themselves manage the rest." These hopes had armed the Etrurians, who in many vicissitudes had been vanquished and victors.

      The Roman consuls also dreaded nothing else, than their own strength, and their own arms. The recollection of the destructive precedent set in the last war, deterred them from bringing matters to such a pass as that they should have to fear two armies at the same time. Accordingly they kept within their camp, avoiding this double danger: "that delay and time itself would soften down resentment, and bring a right way of thinking to their minds." The Veientian enemy and the Etrurians proceeded with so much the greater precipitation; they provoked them to battle, first riding up to the camp and challenging them; at length, when they produced no effect by reviling as well the consuls themselves as the army, they stated, "that the pretence of internal dissension was assumed as a cloak for this cowardice; and that the consuls distrusted as much the courage as the obedience of their soldiers. That silence and inaction among men in arms were a novel form of sedition." Besides this they threw out reproaches, both true as well as false, on the upstart quality of their race and origin. Whilst they vociferated these reproaches beneath the very rampart and gates, the consuls bore them without impatience: but at one time indignation, at another time shame, distracted the breasts of the ignorant multitude, and diverted their attention from intestine evils; they were unwilling that the enemy should come off unpunished; they were unwilling that success should accrue to the patricians or the consuls; foreign and domestic hatred struggled for mastery in their breasts; at length the former prevail, so haughtily and insolently did the enemy revile them; they crowd in a body to the general's tent; they demand battle, they require that the signal be given. The consuls confer together as if to deliberate; they continue the conference for a long time; they were desirous of fighting, but that desire must be checked and concealed, that by opposition and delay they might increase the ardour of the soldiery once roused. An answer is returned, "that the matter in question was premature, that it was not yet time for fighting: that they should keep within their camp." They then issue a proclamation, "that they should abstain from fighting; that if any one fought without orders, they should punish him as an enemy." When they were thus dismissed, their eagerness for fighting increases in proportion as they think that the consuls were less disposed for it; the enemies moreover come up much more insolently, as soon as it was known that the consuls had determined not to fight. For they supposed "that they might insult them with impunity; that their arms were not intrusted to the soldiery. That the matter would explode in a violent mutiny; that a termination had come to the Roman empire." Relying on these hopes, they run up to the gates, heap reproaches on them, with difficulty refrain from assaulting the camp. Now indeed the Romans could no longer endure these insults; they crowd from every quarter of the camp to the consuls: they no longer, as formerly, make their demand with reserve, through the mediation of the centurions of the first rank; but all proceed indiscriminately with loud clamours. The affair was now ripe; still they put it off. Fabius then, his colleague giving way in consequence of his dread of mutiny being now augmented by the uproar, after he had commanded silence by sound of trumpet, says, "that these men are able to conquer, Cneius Manlius, I know; that they are willing they themselves have prevented me from knowing. It is therefore resolved and determined not to give the signal, unless they swear that they will return victorious from this battle. The soldier has once deceived the Roman consul in the field, the gods he never will deceive." There was a centurion, Marcus Flavoleius, one of the foremost in demanding battle; he says, "M. Fabius, I will return victorious from the field." If he deceived, he invokes the anger of father Jove, Mars Gradivus, and of the

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