which suggests that they are always open to doubt. Such an attitude leads to a radical scepticism about educational research which, it will be argued in Chapter 3, is untenable. However, in doing this, we need to have a clear view of the scope of the criteria that we use. We cannot assume that robust criteria are universally robust, that they apply synchronically across all contexts. We cannot assume that the criteria we employ in developed English-speaking countries to determine whether someone is functionally literate will be adequate or suitable in other contexts with different levels of economic development, different writing systems and different expectations.
The second point of difficulty relates to the inevitable differences of perspective on practices that conscientious educational research will very often reveal. These will very often be different or even alien to those held by the researcher, making them difficult to understand as educational practices, the beliefs associated with them appearing well-nigh unintelligible. How can criteria developed for certain purposes be applicable in such different circumstances? We argued in Chapter 1 that there are certain constants in human life and that preparation for adult life (either before or during adulthood) is one of those constants. This truth25 in turn yields us categorial concepts which allow us to form a bridgehead (in Hollis’ terms) into understanding such practices. Such activities have a purpose, there is learning and content to that learning, there are ways of preparation, there are resources used and criteria for success. These give us an outline framework for making sense of what we are investigating. Beyond that we are often in the realm of contestation and must rely far more on hermeneutic techniques if we are to make any progress in understanding the practices, let alone being able to provide descriptions and explanations of what is going on in them. A number of abilities may be required at this point: the ability to examine a practice in depth, the imaginative ability to relate what we observe to what we know about our own practices (see the Evans-Pritchard examples above), the ability to develop concepts and extend those that we already have to accommodate features of these practices for which we do not have ready to hand an adequate conceptual apparatus (see the comments on German vocational education above). Taking account of different perspectives is undoubtedly demanding – it is not impossible but illustrates the challenges involved in carrying our educational research.
Third, investigation may reveal not only that perspectives may differ, but that they are inconsistent with each other, or even contradict each other. From the perspective of the Indian state, for example, education may first and foremost consist in basic primary education according to the prescriptions of the Right to Education Act of 2009. From the point of view of a tribal community, such a prescription may present a mortal danger to the educational practices of the community and thus be anti-educational in nature. We have here two radically different perspectives on education, with accompanying different criteria for what is to count as an educational practice.26 But we are not here dealing with two different realities, but with different perceptions of what is to count as a worthwhile educational practice. We can understand both perspectives but only if we are able to take the kind of imaginative and hermeneutic steps necessary to comprehend each. Persuading one party of the other’s point of view is another matter and may involve a range of possibilities.
CONCLUSION
We began by offering a criterial conception of truth which preserves objectivity in educational research. The alternative of a substantive theory such as the correspondence theory which purports to explain what truth is was rejected on the grounds of circularity. A criterial conception does not explain what truth is, but invites us to consider the various ways in which truth claims are assessed, including in EER as well as in the practices which EER investigates. A criterial approach demands in turn that we rely on a ‘thin’ categorial framework which allows us to comprehend the conceptual as well as empirical diversity that is constitutive of the universal human phenomenon of education. This categorial framework does not absolve researchers of the hard work of understanding educational practices and beliefs, nor of developing concepts adequate to describe them, but it provides a foothold for beginning such investigations which, at their best, involve both hermeneutic and empirical considerations.
We considered perspectivalism involving ‘multiple realities’ relating to multiple participants in practice as an alternative point of view. Both this chapter and the previous one argued that such perspectivalism involves both acknowledgement of a perception-independent reality but also of a conception-dependent categorial framework for making sense of diverse perspectives.
We then considered whether or not the presupposition of rationality was adequate for making sense of such diversity or whether the acknowledgement of commonality in a categorial framework was able to bear the diversity of educational phenomena to be encountered. Rationality is not a monolithic concept, but its different facets, provided they are carefully respected, do allow us to comprehend diversity within a human unity.
Finally, objections to a criterial conception of truth adequate for EER were considered.
Notes
1 1 Some claim (e.g. Schoonenboom 2018) that objectivity is possible with a multiple realities perspective. I reject this view as it seems to entail multiple truths, even if there is a strong degree of convergence in truth claims from different researchers using different methods.
2 2 Peirce however sees truth as the inevitable result of converging lines of enquiry. These lines not only converge on each other but on the Real. In some respects this position is similar to the argument in this chapter if we hold that lines of enquiry require criteria for the making of assertions concerning truth and falsity.
3 3 ‘Any idea upon which we can ride …; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.’ (James 1907, p. 34).
4 4 The redundancy view does not exclude the meaningful use of such statements as ‘What you say is true’ where there is anaphoric reference to the interlocutor’s statement, or ‘All the propositions of Physics are true’, where a collectivity of propositions are referred to.
5 5 There is a separate question as to whose judgement prevails. Often, this is a question of authority or power (Alexander 1992).
6 6 This is similar to what Kölbel (2005) calls ‘soft truth’.
7 7 Here we should recognise that understanding is one of the primary tasks of the educational researcher.
8 8 See Wittgenstein (1953), II, xii.
9 9 Is storytelling a form of lying? Brice-Heath (1983), in her study of two different communities, showed that how storytelling is conceptualised (and hence encouraged or discouraged) may well vary between subcultures within the same society. What is indisputable though is that there is some practice going on, whether it be described as ‘lying’ or ‘storytelling’.
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