truth is abandoned in favour of a truth that is related to a particular perspective.
Since we cannot determine whether or not a proposition corresponds with reality, the problem is solved by postulating a reality with which propositions can conform. That is reality seen from a particular perspective. Of course the perspective has to satisfy certain conditions before it can be taken seriously. There must be within that reality an objective succession (one that takes place irrespective of the point of viewer of the spectator) which can be coherently described which is ultimately based on the perceptions of the observer or the researcher. There must be some describable regularity about the phenomena observed; it must be possible to make meaningful predictions about what might happen and intervention and observance of the results of intervention must be possible. But we cannot infer from this that the educational reality thus described is the same for other observers or researchers using different approaches. Thus the satisfaction of these conditions does not entail that the reality thus described is the same for everyone.
At this point it is only necessary to summarise the problems with this view. First, it relies on a conception of truth as correspondence to reality which is almost bound to lead to scepticism, as a comprehensive and completely accurate account of reality will always elude us. If, however, the reality is what is directly presented to us phenomenologically (that is through our senses) that problem can be resolved, but at the cost of introducing multiple perception-dependent realities. But we have seen good reason to think that the correspondence conception of truth is not coherent. We also noted the very idea of multiple perspectives on reality suggested that there is one reality on which the perspectives are perspectives.
Very influential among philosophers of education is the view expressed in 2., that it is highly problematic to claim that we can know anything of general application about educational practices through activities of systematic enquiry.1 This is not a generalised scepticism about whether or not we can know anything about education, but rather a scepticism about the methods and deliverances of systematic empirical educational research. Commentators who have been most trenchant in expressing scepticism about EER include Charles Clark,2 Robin Barrow, David Carr and Andrew Davis. Although each of the three approaches the issue in a somewhat different manner, the general thrust of their scepticism is similar and can be characterised as follows:
1 EER relies on inadequate conceptualisation of key explanatory factors (variables). See Barrow (1984) on school effectiveness and Davis (2012) on the teaching of reading.
2 EER employs inappropriate methods of investigation and often poor designs (Barrow 1976).
3 EER’s approach to explanation is flawed.
4 EER fails to take account of contextual variation and (a variant on this) assumes stable forms of identity which do not in fact exist (Davis 2015, on the school).
5 Most EER findings turn out to be false (Carr, D. 2003).
All these reservations need to be taken seriously, and there is some justification in the concerns expressed. However, neither individually nor taken together are they fatal to the conduct of EER. It should first be stated, however, that successful EER is a difficult enterprise and educational practices do not yield their secrets easily. The history of EER is littered with hubristic attempts to provide grand theorising on the basis of inadequate conceptualisation and a small amount of empirical evidence. It is to be hoped that this phase of its development is coming to an end, but we cannot be completely confident about that.
Inadequate Conceptualisation
Objection 1, that EER relies on inadequate conceptualisation, indicates a major problem that affects not only EER but the social sciences more generally. It is also a fundamental problem that we will be revisiting in Chapter 4 when we consider more closely the concept of an adequate explanation. If EER is conducted in order to enable us to understand educational practices and the concepts of which they are expressive, then we need a conceptual apparatus that enables us to understand and explain why those involved in education act and think as they do. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary to understand their reasons for acting as well as those factors that impel them to act. In order to do either of these things the researcher needs to, as far as he possibly can, see the world through the conceptual framework that the research subject (teacher, parent, pupil, administrator, policymaker, public) sees it. In order to do this the researcher needs to understand the concepts relevant to reasons for acting. This in turn entails a deep engagement with the normative activities (Baker and Hacker 19853) that characterise educational practices. Concepts cannot be understood apart from the normative context of their employment. It follows that we have to understand that context in its own terms, using the concepts employed by those within the practice. Doing this involves investigating and understanding those concepts and relating them to the purposes of the investigation under way. This is why Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science (Winch, P. 1958) proposed that the social sciences had greater affinities with philosophy than they did with the natural sciences. Like philosophy, social science was to be to a large extent a conceptual investigation. Winch’s suggestion was initially received with outrage as an attempt to send the social sciences back to a pre-scientific era. However, the intervening sixty years have only served to show the prescience of his claim and EER in particular bears many of the marks that result from not paying sufficient attention to Winch’s arguments.
In addition to this hermeneutic problem it is also too often the case that the explanatory concepts invoked by educational researchers to structure their own investigations are themselves inadequately framed, leading to further confusion about what it is exactly that they are supposed to be investigating. Thus, framing investigations about language use and educational achievement or about skills without adequate conceptions of what ‘verbal deficit’ might mean or without an investigation of what is meant by ‘know-how’4 can also lead to poorly designed empirical investigation. In the latter case, not only is the research design compromised, but also the investigation of the concepts of the research subjects.
So those who complain about the poor quality of conceptualisation to be found in EER often have plenty to complain about. But it is important to note that their complaints do not relate to the possibility of ever finding anything out through EER, but rather to the inadequacy of many of the efforts made so far. If conducting an activity is more valuable than not conducting it, the fact that it is currently poorly conducted cannot be a good reason for not conducting it at all, but rather a reason for conducting it properly, even if that means a more cautious and less ambitious approach is needed in the future.
It is generally speaking true that EER is too often (although by no means always) inadequately conceptualised. We will have cause to look at some important examples in subsequent chapters. However, this is symptomatic of a larger problem in the social sciences, that much of the empirical work carried out is inadequately conceptualised. This can mean one of three things:
1 That the value position from which the research is being conducted is not sufficiently defined and is insufficiently self-reflexive. It is inevitable that educational and social science researchers more generally come to their work with ‘baggage’ in the form of presuppositions, prejudices and values of their own which may place barriers in the way of their seeing the practices that they are studying in the way that they are seen by the agents themselves. A failure to acknowledge this and to take account of it can lead to misunderstanding of the point of the practices being researched.
2 That there are inadequate framing explanatory frameworks. For example, neoclassical economics may employ a concept of rationality that is inadequate to explain human behaviour in the relevant contexts. Here the problem is, at bottom, at least partly philosophical since an explanatorily adequate concept of rationality requires philosophical development not empirical research, although the use of
