to the view that all we see is ‘bare behaviour’. For a start, it is clear that intentionality plays a role (Taylor 1968).11 11 Indeed, within our own culture religion is very often dismissed as irrational because it does not conform to scientific criteria for establishing truth. On the wider issue, see Evans-Pritchard 1936; Winch, P. 1964.
12 12 Such a phenomenological approach does not entail that each perspective is a purely subjective experience dependent on the deliverances of the senses, although it depends on them. It is also a ‘world view’ with its own coherence and logic developed through the synthesising powers of the mind (Schutz 1932, 1976). These considerations do not, however, make such a reality objective in the sense that there are commonly held criteria for determining the truth or falsity of propositions.
13 13 This form of chronic aspect perception should be distinguished from what Wittgenstein calls ‘continuous’ aspect perception, which is related to an exercise of the will (Arahata 2015).
14 14 It is difficult to understand the aims of German vocational education without understanding the way in which know-how can be expressed both as Fähigkeit and Fertigkeit, a distinction not readily available in English. But it is also a distinction that might with profit be adopted when considering English vocational education.
15 15 A notorious example is the extrapolation of characteristics of effective schools from observation of schools with high contextual value-added (CVA) scores. Quite apart from questions about causality, it is difficult to see how to separate the normative commitments about ‘good practice’ (Alexander 1992) from genuine observation.
16 16 See for example the ‘progressive’ commitments of Leeds City Council and the more sceptical approach taken by the researchers into the Primary Needs Programme (Alexander op. cit.).
17 17 Clark (2011) for a contrary view. Clark is wrong to think that values and norms in use cannot be investigated empirically.
18 18 Although, as Lewis Carroll demonstrated through the story of Achilles and the Tortoise, such proofs depend on shared presuppositions (Carroll 1895).
19 19 While Levi is right to deny that Ad Baculum is a genuine form of argument, since its content is nothing more than a threat, it may nevertheless be rational to respond to threats by acquiescence.
20 20 Following Wilson (1959) a principle of charity is often recommended to researchers, in which subjects of research are assumed to be (constitutively) rational unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. Although this is a useful principle, it can be misused if, for example, it is interpreted so as to take our ability to tolerate inconsistencies as a counter-instance. See Evans-Pritchard’s (1936) discussion of the inheritance of witchcraft substance for example (also discussed in Winch, P. 1964).
21 21 Although that authority will usually be contextually circumscribed (Salmon 1984).
22 22 For more discussion see Newton-Smith (1981), Rosenberg (2012).
23 23 Perhaps echoing Hume’s identification of the primary sources of political allegiance in long habituation and legitimate succession (Hume 1739–40) Treatise of Human Nature, Bk III).
24 24 We need to remind ourselves of what this can involve. Conducting a randomised control trial (RCT) is to investigate phenomena in a very particular way, abstracting from many of the features of phenomena as we ordinarily perceive them. Other forms of interventions study such as field and natural experiments are different again. Interviewing subjects to gain their perspective on phenomena is another way of doing so, while observing processes over an extended period of time is yet another. We should be wary of homogenising the different ways in which we engage with the world in carring out research by lumping them all together as ‘looking at reality’.
25 25 A truth in the sense that it is never in experience contradicted. See Locke Essay on Human Understanding.
26 26 But this does not mean that we lack resources for discussing such issues. A useful starting point might be the distinction between formal, non-formal and informal learning, for example.
3 Why Empirical Educational Research Needs to Be Taken Seriously
WHY IT IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE POSSIBILITY OF EER
This chapter defends the claim that empirical educational research (EER) has a role in understanding educational practices and in solving educational problems. There is widespread scepticism about the value of EER, both in the philosophical community, but also among policymakers. There are (often justified) reservations about the quality of some research, but also a more radical scepticism about whether or not EER could be of any use. The former question will be returned to repeatedly during the course of this book, but this chapter will concentrate instead on the radical argument and show that it is incoherent.
PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM ABOUT EMPIRICAL EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
This comes in five forms:
1 Scepticism about whether or not there is an educational reality.
2 Scepticism about whether we can know anything of general application about educational practices.
3 A more pragmatic scepticism about whether or not it is possible to learn anything useful from EER.
4 The idea that commonsense can tell us all we need to know about educational practices.
5 The idea that one cannot research a good through empirical means.
In practice, these positions are rarely, if ever, distinguished from each other. This means that the critique of scepticism has to make the distinctions in order to see which, if any, of the versions can be taken seriously.
Scepticism about 1 is rarely stated openly. However, it does have distinctive philosophical roots which can be found in the phenomenological approach. Phenomenology argues that although we can distinguish subjective impressions from the perception of a non-subjective order, it does not follow that there is the same order for everyone. There are in fact multiple non-objective orders, depending on the perspective of those engaged with educational practices. We have already looked at this doctrine in the previous two chapters and have found it to be incoherent. It is based on an unduly rigorous conception of what it is for a proposition to be true. When truth does not measure up to that rigorous conception,
