Indeed they do not.
SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not?
ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
SOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.
ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness.
ALCIBIADES: I accept the security.
SOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.
ALCIBIADES: Very possibly.
SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?
ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish.
SOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.
ALCIBIADES: That is true.
SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.)
ALCIBIADES: That is evident.
SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?
ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.
SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: How?
ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates.
SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades.
ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said?
SOCRATES: By the help of God.
ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.
SOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.
ALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice.
SOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us.
Greater Hippias{2}
Introduction
The Greater Hippias (or What is Beauty) is one of the dialogues of Plato. It belongs to the Early Dialogues, written while the author was still young. Its precise date is uncertain, although a date of circa 390 BCE has been suggested.
Authenticity
The authorship of Hippias Major has long been in dispute. Although some works previously attributed to Plato have been ruled as not authentic, this is one where authorship has still not been firmly established, though academic consensus appears to be drifting towards favouring its authenticity. The argument is summarized in (Sider 1977): "Dorothy Tarrant is the foremost advocate for the cause of spuriousness: cf. her edition of The Hippias Major Attributed to Plato (Cambridge, 1928). Opposing her in a series of articles is G.M.A. Grube, who wrote in 1926 and 1927. W. K. C. Guthrie, in A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge 1975) also argues for its genuineness." Sider, writing in 1992 states that G.R.Ledger, in Re-counting Plato (Oxford 1989) carried out a computer text analysis and though not conclusive "On balance the evidence for genuineness is fairly convincing". He goes on to state that amongst other recent work, P. Woodruff,
