unbounded, in the sense given above to these two words.
The Surfaces of Constant Curvature.—One objection still remained possible. The theorems of Lobachevski and of Riemann present no contradiction; but however numerous the consequences these two geometers have drawn from their hypotheses, they must have stopped before exhausting them, since their number would be infinite; who can say then that if they had pushed their deductions farther they would not have eventually reached some contradiction?
This difficulty does not exist for Riemann's geometry, provided it is limited to two dimensions; in fact, as we have seen, two-dimensional Riemannian geometry does not differ from spherical geometry, which is only a branch of ordinary geometry, and consequently is beyond all discussion.
Beltrami, in correlating likewise Lobachevski's two-dimensional geometry with a branch of ordinary geometry, has equally refuted the objection so far as it is concerned.
Here is how he accomplished it. Consider any figure on a surface. Imagine this figure traced on a flexible and inextensible canvas applied over this surface in such a way that when the canvas is displaced and deformed, the various lines of this figure can change their form without changing their length. In general, this flexible and inextensible figure can not be displaced without leaving the surface; but there are certain particular surfaces for which such a movement would be possible; these are the surfaces of constant curvature.
If we resume the comparison made above and imagine beings without thickness living on one of these surfaces, they will regard as possible the motion of a figure all of whose lines remain constant in length. On the contrary, such a movement would appear absurd to animals without thickness living on a surface of variable curvature.
These surfaces of constant curvature are of two sorts: Some are of positive curvature, and can be deformed so as to be applied over a sphere. The geometry of these surfaces reduces itself therefore to the spherical geometry, which is that of Riemann.
The others are of negative curvature. Beltrami has shown that the geometry of these surfaces is none other than that of Lobachevski. The two-dimensional geometries of Riemann and Lobachevski are thus correlated to the Euclidean geometry.
Interpretation of Non-Euclidean Geometries.—So vanishes the objection so far as two-dimensional geometries are concerned.
It would be easy to extend Beltrami's reasoning to three-dimensional geometries. The minds that space of four dimensions does not repel will see no difficulty in it, but they are few. I prefer therefore to proceed otherwise.
Consider a certain plane, which I shall call the fundamental plane, and construct a sort of dictionary, by making correspond each to each a double series of terms written in two columns, just as correspond in the ordinary dictionaries the words of two languages whose significance is the same:
Space: Portion of space situated above the fundamental plane.
Plane: Sphere cutting the fundamental plane orthogonally.
Straight: Circle cutting the fundamental plane orthogonally.
Sphere: Sphere.
Circle: Circle.
Angle: Angle.
Distance between two points: Logarithm of the cross ratio of these two points and the intersections of the fundamental plane with a circle passing through these two points and cutting it orthogonally. Etc., Etc.
Now take Lobachevski's theorems and translate them with the aid of this dictionary as we translate a German text with the aid of a German-English dictionary. We shall thus obtain theorems of the ordinary geometry. For example, that theorem of Lobachevski: 'the sum of the angles of a triangle is less than two right angles' is translated thus: "If a curvilinear triangle has for sides circle-arcs which prolonged would cut orthogonally the fundamental plane, the sum of the angles of this curvilinear triangle will be less than two right angles." Thus, however far the consequences of Lobachevski's hypotheses are pushed, they will never lead to a contradiction. In fact, if two of Lobachevski's theorems were contradictory, it would be the same with the translations of these two theorems, made by the aid of our dictionary, but these translations are theorems of ordinary geometry and no one doubts that the ordinary geometry is free from contradiction. Whence comes this certainty and is it justified? That is a question I can not treat here because it would require to be enlarged upon, but which is very interesting and I think not insoluble.
Nothing remains then of the objection above formulated. This is not all. Lobachevski's geometry, susceptible of a concrete interpretation, ceases to be a vain logical exercise and is capable of applications; I have not the time to speak here of these applications, nor of the aid that Klein and I have gotten from them for the integration of linear differential equations.
This interpretation moreover is not unique, and several dictionaries analogous to the preceding could be constructed, which would enable us by a simple 'translation' to transform Lobachevski's theorems into theorems of ordinary geometry.
The Implicit Axioms.—Are the axioms explicitly enunciated in our treatises the sole foundations of geometry? We may be assured of the contrary by noticing that after they are successively abandoned there are still left over some propositions common to the theories of Euclid, Lobachevski and Riemann. These propositions must rest on premises the geometers admit without enunciation. It is interesting to try to disentangle them from the classic demonstrations.
Stuart Mill has claimed that every definition contains an axiom, because in defining one affirms implicitly the existence of the object defined. This is going much too far; it is rare that in mathematics a definition is given without its being followed by the demonstration of the existence of the object defined, and when this is dispensed with it is generally because the reader can easily supply it. It must not be forgotten that the word existence has not the same sense when it refers to a mathematical entity and when it is a question of a material object. A mathematical entity exists, provided its definition implies no contradiction, either in itself, or with the propositions already admitted.
But if Stuart Mill's observation can not be applied to all definitions, it is none the less just for some of them. The plane is sometimes defined as follows:
The plane is a surface such that the straight which joins any two of its points is wholly on this surface.
This definition manifestly hides a new axiom; it is true we might change it, and that would be preferable, but then we should have to enunciate the axiom explicitly.
Other definitions would suggest reflections not less important.
Such, for example, is that of the equality of two figures; two figures are equal when they can be superposed; to superpose them one must be displaced until it coincides with the other; but how shall it be displaced? If we should ask this, no doubt we should be told that it must be done without altering the shape and as a rigid solid. The vicious circle would then be evident.
In fact this definition defines nothing; it would have no meaning for a being living in a world where there were only fluids. If it seems clear to us, that is because we are used to the properties of natural solids which do not differ much from those of the ideal solids, all of whose dimensions are invariable.
Yet, imperfect as it may be, this definition implies an axiom.
The possibility of the motion of a rigid figure is not a self-evident truth, or at least it is so only in the fashion of Euclid's postulate and not
