The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and Method. Henri Poincare

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The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and Method - Henri  Poincare

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has no meaning.

      As well ask whether the metric system is true and the old measures false; whether Cartesian coordinates are true and polar coordinates false. One geometry can not be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.

      Now, Euclidean geometry is, and will remain, the most convenient:

      1º Because it is the simplest; and it is so not only in consequence of our mental habits, or of I know not what direct intuition that we may have of Euclidean space; it is the simplest in itself, just as a polynomial of the first degree is simpler than one of the second; the formulas of spherical trigonometry are more complicated than those of plane trigonometry, and they would still appear so to an analyst ignorant of their geometric signification.

      2º Because it accords sufficiently well with the properties of natural solids, those bodies which our hands and our eyes compare and with which we make our instruments of measure.

       Table of Contents

       Table of Contents

      Let us begin by a little paradox.

      Beings with minds like ours, and having the same senses as we, but without previous education, would receive from a suitably chosen external world impressions such that they would be led to construct a geometry other than that of Euclid and to localize the phenomena of that external world in a non-Euclidean space, or even in a space of four dimensions.

      As for us, whose education has been accomplished by our actual world, if we were suddenly transported into this new world, we should have no difficulty in referring its phenomena to our Euclidean space. Conversely, if these beings were transported into our environment, they would be led to relate our phenomena to non-Euclidean space.

      Nay more; with a little effort we likewise could do it. A person who should devote his existence to it might perhaps attain to a realization of the fourth dimension.

      Geometric Space and Perceptual Space.—It is often said the images of external objects are localized in space, even that they can not be formed except on this condition. It is also said that this space, which serves thus as a ready prepared frame for our sensations and our representations, is identical with that of the geometers, of which it possesses all the properties.

      To all the good minds who think thus, the preceding statement must have appeared quite extraordinary. But let us see whether they are not subject to an illusion that a more profound analysis would dissipate.

      What, first of all, are the properties of space, properly so called? I mean of that space which is the object of geometry and which I shall call geometric space.

      The following are some of the most essential:

      1º It is continuous;

      2º It is infinite;

      3º It has three dimensions;

      4º It is homogeneous, that is to say, all its points are identical one with another;

      5º It is isotropic, that is to say, all the straights which pass through the same point are identical one with another.

      Compare it now to the frame of our representations and our sensations, which I may call perceptual space.

      Visual Space.—Consider first a purely visual impression, due to an image formed on the bottom of the retina.

      A cursory analysis shows us this image as continuous, but as possessing only two dimensions; this already distinguishes from geometric space what we may call pure visual space.

      Besides, this image is enclosed in a limited frame.

      Finally, there is another difference not less important: this pure visual space is not homogeneous. All the points of the retina, aside from the images which may there be formed, do not play the same rôle. The yellow spot can in no way be regarded as identical with a point on the border of the retina. In fact, not only does the same object produce there much more vivid impressions, but in every limited frame the point occupying the center of the frame will never appear as equivalent to a point near one of the borders.

      No doubt a more profound analysis would show us that this continuity of visual space and its two dimensions are only an illusion; it would separate it therefore still more from geometric space, but we shall not dwell on this remark.

      Sight, however, enables us to judge of distances and consequently to perceive a third dimension. But every one knows that this perception of the third dimension reduces itself to the sensation of the effort at accommodation it is necessary to make, and to that of the convergence which must be given to the two eyes, to perceive an object distinctly.

      These are muscular sensations altogether different from the visual sensations which have given us the notion of the first two dimensions. The third dimension therefore will not appear to us as playing the same rôle as the other two. What may be called complete visual space is therefore not an isotropic space.

      It has, it is true, precisely three dimensions, which means that the elements of our visual sensations (those at least which combine to form the notion of extension) will be completely defined when three of them are known; to use the language of mathematics, they will be functions of three independent variables.

      But examine the matter a little more closely. The third dimension is revealed to us in two different ways: by the effort of accommodation and by the convergence of the eyes.

      No doubt these two indications are always concordant, there is a constant relation between them, or, in mathematical terms, the two variables which measure these two muscular sensations do not appear to us as independent; or again, to avoid an appeal to mathematical notions already rather refined, we may go back to the language of the preceding chapter and enunciate the same fact as follows: If two sensations of convergence, A and B, are indistinguishable, the two sensations of accommodation, and , which respectively accompany them, will be equally indistinguishable.

      But here we have, so to speak, an experimental fact; a priori nothing prevents our supposing the contrary, and if the contrary takes place, if these two muscular sensations vary independently of one another, we shall have to take account of one more independent variable, and 'complete visual space' will appear to us as a physical continuum of four dimensions.

      We have here even, I will add, a fact of external experience. Nothing prevents our supposing that a being with a mind like ours, having the same sense organs that we have, may be placed in a world where light would only reach him after having traversed reflecting media of complicated form. The two indications which serve us in judging distances would cease to be connected by a constant relation. A being who should achieve in such a world the education of his senses would no doubt attribute four dimensions to complete visual space.

      Tactile Space and Motor Space.—'Tactile space' is still more complicated than visual space and farther removed from geometric space. It is superfluous to repeat for

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