body is equal to the force acting on it divided by its mass. Can this law be verified by experiment? For that it would be necessary to measure the three magnitudes which figure in the enunciation: acceleration, force and mass.
I assume that acceleration can be measured, for I pass over the difficulty arising from the measurement of time. But how measure force, or mass? We do not even know what they are.
What is mass? According to Newton, it is the product of the volume by the density. According to Thomson and Tait, it would be better to say that density is the quotient of the mass by the volume. What is force? It is, replies Lagrange, that which moves or tends to move a body. It is, Kirchhoff will say, the product of the mass by the acceleration. But then, why not say the mass is the quotient of the force by the acceleration?
These difficulties are inextricable.
When we say force is the cause of motion, we talk metaphysics, and this definition, if one were content with it, would be absolutely sterile. For a definition to be of any use, it must teach us to measure force; moreover that suffices; it is not at all necessary that it teach us what force is in itself, nor whether it is the cause or the effect of motion.
We must therefore first define the equality of two forces. When shall we say two forces are equal? It is, we are told, when, applied to the same mass, they impress upon it the same acceleration, or when, opposed directly one to the other, they produce equilibrium. This definition is only a sham. A force applied to a body can not be uncoupled to hook it up to another body, as one uncouples a locomotive to attach it to another train. It is therefore impossible to know what acceleration such a force, applied to such a body, would impress upon such another body, if it were applied to it. It is impossible to know how two forces which are not directly opposed would act, if they were directly opposed.
It is this definition we try to materialize, so to speak, when we measure a force with a dynamometer, or in balancing it with a weight. Two forces F and F´, which for simplicity I will suppose vertical and directed upward, are applied respectively to two bodies C and C´; I suspend the same heavy body P first to the body C, then to the body C´; if equilibrium is produced in both cases, I shall conclude that the two forces F and F´ are equal to one another, since they are each equal to the weight of the body P.
But am I sure the body P has retained the same weight when I have transported it from the first body to the second? Far from it; I am sure of the contrary; I know the intensity of gravity varies from one point to another, and that it is stronger, for instance, at the pole than at the equator. No doubt the difference is very slight and, in practise, I shall take no account of it; but a properly constructed definition should have mathematical rigor; this rigor is lacking. What I say of weight would evidently apply to the force of the resiliency of a dynamometer, which the temperature and a multitude of circumstances may cause to vary.
This is not all; we can not say the weight of the body P may be applied to the body C and directly balance the force F. What is applied to the body C is the action A of the body P on the body C; the body P is submitted on its part, on the one hand, to its weight; on the other hand, to the reaction R of the body C on P. Finally, the force F is equal to the force A, since it balances it; the force A is equal to R, in virtue of the principle of the equality of action and reaction; lastly, the force R is equal to the weight of P, since it balances it. It is from these three equalities we deduce as consequence the equality of F and the weight of P.
We are therefore obliged in the definition of the equality of the two forces to bring in the principle of the equality of action and reaction; on this account, this principle must no longer be regarded as an experimental law, but as a definition.
For recognizing the equality of two forces here, we are then in possession of two rules: equality of two forces which balance; equality of action and reaction. But, as we have seen above, these two rules are insufficient; we are obliged to have recourse to a third rule and to assume that certain forces, as, for instance, the weight of a body, are constant in magnitude and direction. But this third rule, as I have said, is an experimental law; it is only approximately true; it is a bad definition.
We are therefore reduced to Kirchhoff's definition; force is equal to the mass multiplied by the acceleration. This 'law of Newton' in its turn ceases to be regarded as an experimental law, it is now only a definition. But this definition is still insufficient, for we do not know what mass is. It enables us doubtless to calculate the relation of two forces applied to the same body at different instants; it teaches us nothing about the relation of two forces applied to two different bodies.
To complete it, it is necessary to go back anew to Newton's third law (equality of action and reaction), regarded again, not as an experimental law, but as a definition. Two bodies A and B act one upon the other; the acceleration of A multiplied by the mass of A is equal to the action of B upon A; in the same way, the product of the acceleration of B by its mass is equal to the reaction of A upon B. As, by definition, action is equal to reaction, the masses of A and B are in the inverse ratio of their accelerations. Here we have the ratio of these two masses defined, and it is for experiment to verify that this ratio is constant.
That would be all very well if the two bodies A and B alone were present and removed from the action of the rest of the world. This is not at all the case; the acceleration of A is not due merely to the action of B, but to that of a multitude of other bodies C, D, … To apply the preceding rule, it is therefore necessary to separate the acceleration of A into many components, and discern which of these components is due to the action of B.
This separation would still be possible, if we should assume that the action of C upon A is simply adjoined to that of B upon A, without the presence of the body C modifying the action of B upon A; or the presence of B modifying the action of C upon A; if we should assume, consequently, that any two bodies attract each other, that their mutual action is along their join and depends only upon their distance apart; if, in a word, we assume the hypothesis of central forces.
You know that to determine the masses of the celestial bodies we use a wholly different principle. The law of gravitation teaches us that the attraction of two bodies is proportional to their masses; if r is their distance apart, m and m´ their masses, k a constant, their attraction will be kmm´/r2.
What we are measuring then is not mass, the ratio of force to acceleration, but the attracting mass; it is not the inertia of the body, but its attracting force.
This is an indirect procedure, whose employment is not theoretically indispensable. It might very well have been that attraction was inversely proportional to the square of the distance without being proportional to the product of the masses, that it was equal to f/r2, but without our having f = kmm´.
If it were so, we could nevertheless, by observation of the relative motions of the heavenly bodies, measure the masses of these bodies.
But have we the right to admit the hypothesis of central forces? Is this hypothesis rigorously exact? Is it certain it will never be contradicted by experiment? Who would dare affirm that? And if we must abandon this hypothesis, the whole edifice so laboriously erected will crumble.
We have no longer the right to speak of the component of the acceleration of A due to the action of B. We have no means of distinguishing it from that due to the action of C or of
