whose ultimate origins lie in external social processes. In his most famous definition of religion, however, Durkheim chooses to emphasize other things. Religion, he says:
is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions – beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community called a church. (2001, p. 46)
The substantive character of Durkheim’s definition rests in his identification of religion as a ‘system of beliefs and practices’ orientated to ‘things’ (material and immaterial) held to be ‘sacred’. Underlying the first part of this definition is Durkheim’s understanding of religion as a kind of classificatory system by which different kinds of objects, practices, values and beliefs are labelled and the most appropriate dispositions towards them identified. As with Marx, however, the functional nature of Durkheim’s understanding of religion eventually comes to the fore. Unlike Marx, though, the function which Durkheim holds religion to undertake is that of reinforcing social cohesion rather than underwriting social division. First and foremost, religion unites. Religion does so by generating among its followers a shared range of dispositions (attachment, obedience, awe) in respect of a given set of beliefs and practices. Taking the word religion at its most literal (from the Latin re-ligare, meaning ‘to bind’), Durkheim regards religion’s fundamental function as that of binding individuals together through its orchestration of their mutual association, common beliefs and shared practices. Importantly for Durkheim, and mediated through the ‘single moral community called a church’, the mutuality engendered by religion reinforces social cohesion and is thereby conducive to wider societal harmony.
Practitioner perspectives
The challenging nature of studying religion in its sociological contexts is further highlighted when we move beyond consideration of established academic definitions and their conceptual preferences. What about religious practitioners themselves? Surely they’re best placed to offer a balanced definition of the word ‘religion’? Well, not exactly. Take the case of Spiritism, for example. Known also as Kardecism, after its founder Allan Kardec (1804–69), Spiritism arose in the mid-1800s as Europe underwent large-scale and rapid modernization thanks to the ongoing industrial revolution and emergence of modern capitalism.2 Reflecting the aspirations of its age, Spiritism styled itself as the modern-day successor to pre-scientific and overly superstitious religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Spreading from France to other parts of the world (particularly Latin America), it was not long before Spiritism assumed many of the reportorial ingredients which characterize the traditional religions it aspired to supersede.
Today, the overwhelming majority of Spiritists gather in purpose-built locations, at scheduled times of the week, in which designated functionaries lead tightly orchestrated meetings during which prayers are said to supernatural beings, honoured writings are read and edifying lessons taught. In effect, Spiritism exhibits a very large number of the ritual and symbolic traits which are generally regarded as typical of religion – at least, in its traditional format. However, when asked whether Spiritism is a ‘religion’, Spiritists vehemently resist the application of this term to their practices and beliefs. Continuing to define itself over and against established traditions such as Christianity, and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Spiritism refuses to regard itself as a ‘religion’. Although more dissimilar to traditional religious repertoires than Spiritism, the refusal of many new age (such as Transcendental Meditation) and non-mainstream (such as Wicca) groups to own the label ‘religion’ is further indication of the negative connotations which this term has for certain practitioners.
Not so, however, for Scientology. The Church of Scientology was founded in the early 1950s by L. Ron Hubbard (1911–86). Heavily influenced by the human potential movement, Hubbard developed Scientology as the institutional channel through which his programme of spiritual enlightenment (‘Dianetics’) would be delivered to the world. Although recognized in various parts of the world as a legitimate religious organization, and despite the work of high-profile adepts such as Tom Cruise and John Travolta, Scientology has still to achieve unanimous acknowledgement of its claims to be defined as a bona fide religion rather than a ‘cult’ (see Chapter 7). Unlike Spiritism and Transcendental Meditation, for Scientology the application of the word ‘religion’ to its beliefs and practices is something very much sought after. Scientology’s public response to the ongoing refusal of certain countries (for example Germany) to recognize it as a religion is to argue that the suspicion with which it is treated serves only to hamper its mission and inhibit individual religious freedoms. Unofficially, of course, the continued denial of the label ‘religion’ renders Scientology ineligible to access the legal protections, political privileges and financial benefits which established, mainstream religions have traditionally enjoyed. Scientology’s campaign to be accorded the title ‘religion’ is as much motivated by strategic savvy as it is by evangelistic zeal.
Polythetic definitions
In contrast to Spiritism and certain other non-mainstream movements, Scientology is keen to be labelled a ‘religion’. Not necessarily wishing to become involved in the ongoing legal-political machinations in respect of this desire, the majority of sociologists who work in this area nevertheless tend towards the view that Scientology, like Spiritism, exhibits a sufficient range of typical characteristics to justify its academic recognition as ‘religion’ (Lewis, J., 2009). While both substantive and functional definitions of religion are brought to bear in cases such as Scientology (Beckford, 1980; Frigerio, 1996), social scientists are increasingly using what are termed ‘polythetic’ or ‘multi-factorial’ approaches. I have already used this type of approach when arguing above that Spiritism, irrespective of what its adherents claim, should be regarded as religion on the grounds that it exhibits a sufficient number of characteristics which are taken to be typical of what we understand a religion to be and do.
Also known as the ‘family resemblance’ model, the polythetic (literally, ‘many attributes or themes’) approach to defining religion starts from the premise that no single definition can adequately capture what is, in its actual manifestations, a highly varied phenomenon. As no single concept or theory is able to capture sufficiently the variegated character of religion, polythetic approaches attempt to define religion through an inventory of its most commonly occurring characteristics. Those phenomena adjudged to have a sufficient number of these characteristics (share an adequate number of ‘family resemblances’) are thereby acknowledged to belong to the category of ‘religion’. Alston, for example, includes nine ‘religion-making characteristics’ in his definition of religion (1967, pp. 140–7), while Southwold lists twelve such ‘attributes’ (1978, pp. 362–79).
According to Southwold, for example, ‘the word “religion” designates cultural systems which have at least some of these attributes’:
(1) A central concern with godlike beings and men’s relations with them. (2) A dichotomization of elements of the world into sacred and profane, and a central concern with the sacred. (3) An orientation towards salvation from the ordinary conditions of worldly existence. (4) Ritual practices. (5) Beliefs which are neither logically nor empirically demonstrable or highly probable, but must be held on the basis of faiths . . . (6) An ethical code, supported by such beliefs. (7) Supernatural sanctions on infringements of that code. (8) A mythology. (9) A body of scriptures, or similarly exalted oral traditions. (10) A priesthood, or similar specialist religious elite. (11) Association with a moral community, a church (in Durkheim’s sense . . .) (12) Association with an ethnic or similar group. (1978, pp. 370–1)
The strength of the polythetic model resides in its ability to offer an inclusive definition of religion which readily reflects the actual variety of religious belief and practice evident across the globe. Provided the list of characteristics/resemblances is
