of the analytical precision required of all definitions; that is, they should indicate not only what a thing is but also what it is not.
What polythetic approaches such as those of Alston and Southwold do not do, however, is indicate just how many of the characteristics listed should be identified before any particular set of practices and beliefs can be classified as ‘religion’. Presumably this number should not be so low as to suffer from the same weaknesses of singular definitions such as Tylor’s, but nor should it be so high as to become too demanding and thereby too exclusive. Nor do Alston and Southwold say if any of these characteristics are more important than any of the others and thereby carry more weight in the definitional stakes. For example, and in reference to Southwold’s list, does a particular set of beliefs and practices in possession of characteristics 1, 4 and 10 enjoy a more secure categorization as ‘religion’ than one exhibiting numbers 3, 5 and 12? Finally, and as with every other attempt to define religion to date, polythetic approaches offer only a superficial (‘thin’) description of the subject at hand. Although covering more ground by virtue of their inclusive approaches, the lists of Alston and Southwold still leave undefined just what is meant by terms such as ‘religious feelings’ and ‘ritual’ – terms which make sense only when fleshed out with detailed (‘thick’) descriptions of actual processes which occur in particular socio-cultural contexts. While a fact of life rather than a technical failing, the need to define further the constituent parts of lists such as these serves to underline that no matter how seemingly inclusive a definition appears, it still requires an element of interpretation; interpretation which is, by its nature, always a view from a particular socio-cultural point.
Approaching religion
Debates about how religion should be defined are directly related with arguments about how religion should be approached in practice. In addition to influencing where one looks for a particular phenomenon, definitions of that phenomenon (in our case, religion) directly impact upon how it is looked for. Talk of method and where it is to be applied is thereby inextricably bound to the issue of definition (Riis, 2008, pp. 229–44).
Academic approaches
A question related to method in the sociology of religion concerns the relationship between the academic researcher and the religious claims made by those individuals and groups being studied. Writing at the beginning of mainstream sociology’s reawakening interest in religion, Berger maintained that sociologists should not concern themselves with ‘the ultimate status of religious definitions of reality’ (1967, p. 180). Defining his approach as one of ‘methodological atheism’, Berger argued that questions relating to the truth or falsity of religious claims should be set to one side (‘bracketed’). Uncomfortable with the theoretical implications of the term ‘atheism’, others have chosen instead to talk of ‘methodological agnosticism’ (Smart, 1973, p. 54). The following quote by Beckford shows methodological atheism/agnosticism in action.
Regardless of whether religious beliefs and experiences actually relate to supernatural, superempirical or noumenal realities, religion is expressed by means of human ideas, symbols, feelings, practices and organizations. These expressions are the products of social interactions, structures and processes and, in turn, they influence social life and cultural meanings to varying degrees. The social scientific study of religion, including social theory, aims to interpret and explain these products and processes. (2003, p. 2) [emphasis added]
Whether employing the term ‘atheistic’ or ‘agnostic’ to describe the methodological bracketing employed, the weight of academic opinion holds that the sociology of religion does not concern itself with seeking to prove or disprove the veracity or falsity of religious worldviews.
As the sociology of religion is an academic discipline, adherents of a religious worldview are challenged to reach a point of critical distance from which they are able to engage religion in a manner conducive to prevailing academic standards and disciplinary expectations. At the same time, the peculiar subject matter of the discipline requires those of an agnostic or atheistic persuasion to reach a point of empathetic understanding from which they are able to engage religion with an awareness of and appreciation for its volitional, affective, practical, intellectual and evaluative particularities. In effect, the challenge to develop the critical empathy required to make the most of the sociological study of religion entails that the perspective of the typical believer, agnostic or atheist is neither more nor less privileged than any other.
The kind of self-critical reflection undertaken in respect of the sociologist’s encounter with religion is typical of what is often called ‘reflexivity’. Although reflexivity has a number of technical meanings, its most common usage refers to the need for social scientists to reflect upon the influence which their personal experience and academic approach have upon their research. Consequently, the principle of reflexivity combines two elements. First, it includes critical reflection ‘upon the ways in which our own values, experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and social identities’ shape our research. Second, the principle of reflexivity calls for reflection ‘upon the assumptions (about the world, about knowledge) that we have made in the course of the research, and . . . the implications of such assumptions for the research and its findings’ (Willig, 2001, p. 10). Sociologically speaking, then, reflexivity encourages those who engage religion to be aware of the particular point from which religion is approached and the respective impact which this given perspective has upon, for example, the definitions used, theories employed, methods applied, analyses undertaken and interpretations preferred.
Religion in social context
Applying the tripartite model outlined in Chapter 1, relevant data pertaining to religion are to be found in the macro-structural, mid-range institutional and micro-social dimensions of society.3
Micro-social dimension
When treating the micro-social dimension of religion, sociology turns its gaze upon both individual believers and the interpersonal practices through which individual belief is expressed. Although a philosopher and not a sociologist, Wittgenstein’s definition of religious belief provides a useful summary of some key features of religion’s individual dimension.
It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation. (1980, p. 64)
Emphasizing the symbolic aspects of faith, Wittgenstein captures the irreducibly subjective and non-vicarious character of religion’s individual dimension. He also furnishes a succinct representation of religious belief’s volitional, affective, evaluative, signifying and commitment-orientated nature. Although by no means a favoured topic of traditional sociology of religion, contemporary treatment of the individual dimension of belief draws support from established interpretative (also called ‘hermeneutical’) approaches. Such is the case because the micro-sociological focus of these approaches lends itself to engaging the subjective dynamics of such things as meaning-making, motivation and intent. For example, the individual dimension of belief may be engaged by sociologists wishing to explore the subjective dynamics informing the participation of women or homosexuals within conservative religious repertoires which both seemingly reject gender equality and apparently give nothing by way of affirmation to gay identity (see Chapter 6). At the same time, the subjective dimension of belief may be explored by asking individuals to explain the significance for them of religious practices and beliefs such as meditation, prayer, reincarnation and salvation (Spickard, 2007, pp. 121–43;
