that ideas and the definitions they comprise do not fall ready-made from the skies. Rather, they are forged with conceptual materials bequeathed by a particular socio-cultural heritage and manufactured in light of specific experiences of a given economic-political context. Definitions have a tendency, then, however implicitly and often despite the attempts of their creators, to reflect the particular worldviews from which they spring. Consequently, definitions carry within themselves a range of theoretical presuppositions, value judgements and practical biases which lead their users to view, interpret and act towards what is being defined in one way rather than another.
Substantive definitions
Writing in a period of progressive global exploration and increasing awareness of socio-cultural diversity, Edward Tylor (1832–1917) offered one of the earliest and, for a time, most influential academic definitions of religion. Understood as a ‘minimum definition of Religion’, Tylor held it to comprise ‘the belief in Spiritual Beings’ (1871: I, p. 424). Regarded by Tylor as an essential (necessary) attribute of religion, ‘belief in Spiritual Beings’ served as a theoretical filter eliminating from religious consideration every form of conceptual and practical disposition, which did not embody some kind of preoccupation with non-natural agencies. To be defined as religious, a collective ritual practice such as harvest thanksgiving or individual belief in life after death must, however tacitly, acknowledge the existence of supernatural beings. At face value, and in view of its alluring simplicity, Tylor’s definition is an attractive one.
Appearances, though, can be deceptive. For Tylor’s definition excludes from consideration as religious the many historical and contemporary practices and beliefs (such as Theravada Buddhism and modern nature religion), which engage supernatural forces and dynamics lacking subjective attributes of ‘being’ such as self-awareness and self-determination (Southwold, 1978, pp. 362–79; Shaw and Francis, 2008). Each in its own way, Theravada Buddhism and modern nature religion embodies a religious mode of belief and practice which is not orientated to or by the kinds of ‘Spiritual Beings’ central to Tylor’s definition. In spite of its minimal and purportedly inclusive intent, Tylor’s definition nevertheless excludes from consideration certain forms of belief and practice which the overwhelming majority of scholars today include within their definitions of religion. Despite his inclusive aspirations, Tylor’s attempt at a universally applicable definition fails by virtue of its unacknowledged Judeo-Christian perspective and limited historical gaze.
Tylor’s definition of religion is typically ‘substantive’ in the way that it goes about saying what religion is. Typically, substantive definitions of religion seek to capture the essential preoccupations or core concerns of the religious worldview. In so doing, substantive definitions of religion tend to downplay, if not entirely overlook, explanations of what religion actually does relative to the socio-cultural context through which it is expressed. As a result, substantive definitions of religion tend to be sociologically thin in that they fail adequately to capture the social influence which religious practices and beliefs exert by means of their concrete expression through individual behaviour and corporate action. It is in this respect that ‘functional’ definitions of religion make an important contribution to sociological understanding.
Functional definitions
As the term implies, functional definitions of religion strive to express the social role or function which religious belief and practice play within the broader societal context.1 French sociologist of religion Hervieu-Léger offers the following functional definition of religion:
[R]eligion is a mode of imposing a social construction on reality, a system of references to which actors spontaneously have recourse in order to conceive the universe in which they live . . . religion is an ideological, practical and symbolic system through which consciousness, both individual and collective, of belonging to a particular chain of belief is constituted, maintained, developed and controlled. (2000, pp. 16, 82)
Hervieu-Léger hereby defines religion as a form of symbolic understanding through and by which humanity makes sense of both its surroundings and experience thereof. In effect, religion enables individuals and communities to function in the world by way of rendering their existence meaningful. For Hervieu-Léger, religion does this by drawing upon a range of theories, principles and practices which are inherited from and authorized by past generations in the form of tradition (here, ‘chain of belief’).
As with substantive definitions of religion, functional approaches have their limitations. If the strength of functional definitions lies in their ability to communicate the role played by religion relative to its social context, their weakness resides in their inability to identify with any meaningful precision the differences between religion and other non-religious modes of life which fulfil the same functions. If the social role of religion is that of making existence meaningful, for example, in what manner is religion different from the myriad other ways in which people render their world significant? Likewise, if the social role of religion is that of engendering societal cohesion, just what is it about religion which makes it different from other means which fulfil the same function?
By stressing functionality over substance, functional definitions of religion inevitably sacrifice attention to the precise details about religion which enable its differentiation from similar, but non-religious, modes of thinking, feeling, judging and doing. Consequently, functional definitions are unable to furnish sufficient substance to make possible sociological explorations of the precise differences between, for example, regular religious adherence and committed support of a football team. While participation in religious activities might have the same functional consequences as impassioned football support, the simple identification of shared social outcomes is not enough to tease out the precise differences between these two forms of commitment-orientated social behaviour. If substantive definitions of religion can be sociologically myopic, functional definitions are susceptible to analytical vacuity. Lacking the specificity necessary for fruitful critical analysis, functional definitions tell us what religion does without communicating what religion is; and, by extension, what it is not.
Mixed definitions
Setting aside typical distinctions between substantive and functional definitions of religion, the reality is that most social scientists tend to work with a mixture of the two; albeit a mixture which, in most instances, tilts towards one typical extreme rather than another. This mixture of emphases is exemplified by what are, perhaps, two of the most quoted sociological definitions of religion – those of Karl Marx and Émile Durkheim. According to Marx:
Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people. (McLellan, 1977, p. 63)
The substantive element in Marx’s definition resides in his understanding of religion as an outward manifestation (‘expression’) of an inner state of being. Be it the suffering of the proletariat or the satisfaction of the bourgeoisie, religion expresses the longings and preoccupations of the individual. At the same time, however, the inner state which religion expresses is, for Marx, a reflection of external processes which impact upon the self. Consequently, the externalization undertaken by religion inevitably involves the symbolic and practical representation of prevailing social forces and dynamics. In so being, the expressive dynamic of religion assumes a functional quality as its representation of internalized social forces in the form of religious symbols and rites serves, in effect, both to pacify the working classes (hence, ‘opium’) and reinforce the hand of those already in power. For Marx, religion functions as an inherently conservative force which underwrites existing (conflictual) social relations and prevailing (unequal) structures of power.
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