two countries also developed a strategic alliance during the Cold War. Time and time again, Israeli officials told their American counterparts of Israel’s strategic value in the Middle East. They could point to practical results. For example, the Israeli intelligence organization Mossad managed to flip an Iraqi pilot, Munir Redfa, who agreed to fly a Soviet MiG 21 from Iraq to Israel in August 1966. Israel eventually shared that technology with the United States, which helped American military planners, and especially U.S. pilots, to understand the capabilities of the Soviet fighter plane.1 At the behest of the Richard Nixon administration, Israeli forces mobilized in defense of King Hussein of Jordan during Black September in 1970. Although Israel did not directly intervene in the crisis, which ended in a decisive Jordanian victory over Palestinian and Syrian forces, the move signaled to Moscow that an American ally stood ready to act, if necessary, and also demonstrated to Washington that Israel could be counted on to advance American objectives in the region.
Israeli officials emphasized Israel’s strategic utility to justify the acquisition of more weapons from the United States, and to strengthen the bonds between the two countries. Some U.S. policymakers wanted Israel to become an American ally in a crucial region to contain communism, especially given the disastrous war in East Asia, which meant selling more weapons to Israel. U.S. military aid grants to Israel, which in 2019 have come to reach nearly $4 billion annually, grew out of the special relationship and, at times, served American strategic purposes. Yet one has to wonder – at what point does U.S. military aid and political protection for Israel exceed the boundaries of either a special or strategic relationship? At what point does U.S. support for Israel become excessive to the point that it undermines other U.S. interests, as well as the pursuit of peace in the Middle East?
Neither the special relationship nor a strategic alliance properly frames U.S.-Israel relations since the 1970s. Rather, the two countries share an uneasy, yet durable alliance that contains elements of a special relationship and a strategic alliance.
This alliance, which continues into our present time, came into existence between the Six-Day War in June 1967 and the Sinai II Disengagement Agreement in September 1975. A formative moment happened when the Gerald Ford administration agreed to secret executive agreements with Israel, connected to the Sinai II agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1975, which created a new foundation for U.S.-Israel relations moving forward. The United States pledged to provide for Israel’s future economic and military needs and, at the same time, agreed to not force Israel to return Arab territories taken in 1967. The administration believed it needed to secure an agreement between Israel and Egypt to keep the peace process alive, to prevent the outbreak of war, and to continue drawing Egypt away from the Soviet Union. Unable to pressure Israel into going along with U.S. foreign policy, the Ford administration instead felt obligated to buy the agreement. With these open-ended and far-reaching commitments, Israel managed to get just what it wanted: virtually unlimited weaponry without American arm-twisting to give back Arab lands. In return, Israeli officials understood that the United States expected Israel’s full cooperation with any security issues that might arise in the region. As numerous U.S. legislators noted at the time, these agreements represented a monumental change in U.S.-Israel relations.
A sense of uneasiness persisted between the two countries. This new arrangement severely strained U.S.-Arab relations and diminished the prospect of a regional peace, and U.S. officials continued to stress to Israel the need to address Palestinian grievances and return Arab lands. Israeli officials, for their part, continued to fear the possibility of a Palestinian state—especially one governed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—and to worry that U.S. officials would coerce Israel into accepting that reality. These concerns would not abate but, instead, would fester.
The U.S. Congress played a key role in shaping U.S.-Israel relations during this period (as it does today) and, therefore, occupies a central place in this book. Between 1967 and 1975, the United States placed itself in the middle of Arab-Israeli peacemaking and became Israel’s closest and most important supporter. Also during this period, congressional power and influence in foreign relations became unusually strong. Yet no study of U.S.-Israel relations focuses primarily on the role of Congress, which can bring together the main factors that scholars use to explain the U.S.-Israel special relationship: national-security concerns, cultural similarities (Judeo-Christian religious tradition, democracy, Western historical experience, and settler colonialism), and the importance of domestic politics, especially the activities of the Israel lobby. Congress, much more than the executive, captures the degree to which many more interests and concerns of Americans can have a voice in foreign policy. In many respects, support for Israel reflected a more democratic foreign policy. By integrating the role of Congress into the historical narrative of U.S.-Israel relations during a crucial period, this work seeks to connect popular affinity for Israel with decidedly pro-Israel positions of the U.S. government.
Traditional approaches to the study of U.S.-Israel relations have emphasized presidential policies.2 Even in standard textbooks about U.S. foreign relations, the presidential narrative frames the discussion and tends to exclude other perspectives or angles of study.3 (The State of Israel, by contrast, has been much more interested than scholars in the legislative branch’s ability to shape U.S. foreign policy.)
The presidential narrative begins with Harry Truman’s recognition of Israel only minutes after the official announcement on May 14, 1948, and scholars like Peter Hahn have pointed out that Truman’s presidency, which included an arms embargo to the Middle East, was actually evenhanded, despite the administration’s quick recognition of Israel.4 U.S.-Israel relations during the Eisenhower years were marked by conflict, especially over the Suez Crisis, but as Douglas Little and Abraham Ben-Zvi have noted, a thaw in relations happened toward the end of Eisenhower’s presidency.5 The Kennedy-Johnson years are generally treated as the gradual abandonment of Eisenhower’s more evenhanded policy, as two successive Democratic presidencies inched closer and closer to Israel, particularly through modest increases in military aid and weapons sales, as well as political support in the international arena, especially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.6
Scholars recognize that, in terms of military aid and political support, the 1970s were a crucial period. The Nixon and Ford years witnessed an enormous increase in U.S. military aid to Israel, and Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, as well as his pro-Israel leanings, have been well documented.7 The narrative continues with Jimmy Carter’s publicized battles with the Israel lobby over weapons sales and peace negotiations, and the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David is seen as a watershed event.8 The United States and Israel moved closer together in the decades that followed. Researchers continue to wait for more declassified records to detail presidential approaches to U.S.-Israel relations after Camp David.
While some scholars have explored the congressional role in U.S. foreign policymaking, particularly in response to the Vietnam War, little attention has been devoted to the Middle East.9 Robert David Johnson avoids discussion of U.S.–Middle East relations in his outstanding study Congress and the Cold War.10 Books by Mohamed Rabie and Marvin Feuerwerger have shed light on congressional influence on foreign-aid packages for the Middle East, and specifically for Israel.11 Former State Department Middle East expert Harold Saunders has written a helpful chapter about Congress and U.S.–Middle East policy.12 No book-length treatment has placed Congress at the center of U.S.-Israel relations, which this work attempts to do.
Basic Argument
The imbalance in the scholarly perspective about U.S.-Israel relations has created a misleading narrative that treats the legislative branch as being incidental to foreign policymaking. But in the years between the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1975 Sinai II agreement, an activist Congress, empowered by the quagmire in Southeast Asia and popular distrust of the presidency, and increasingly influenced by the Israel lobby, played a central role in reworking U.S.-Israel relations, and U.S. relations with the Middle East more generally.
Congress
