presidential administrations. An embattled White House due to Watergate and Vietnam created a situation for Congress to play an unusually large role in U.S.–Middle East relations, which resulted in a fundamental shift in U.S.-Israel relations. After the Sinai II agreement in the fall of 1975, the United States committed itself to preserving its dominance in the Middle East at the expense of the Palestinians and other Arab grievances in order to keep Israel powerful and Egypt out of the Soviet orbit. Taking Egypt out of the war with Israel ensured decades of peace between the two countries and further cemented the U.S.-Egypt relationship. But since then, annual military aid to Israel has increased substantially, while peace efforts have ebbed much more than they have flowed. Arming Israel regardless of movement in the peace process has empowered Israel to continue to occupy substantial tracts of the Arab lands taken in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which in turn has contributed to an ever-growing amount of anti-Americanism in the Middle East, and other regions as well. The U.S.-Israel relationship that most people recognize today, which includes enormous amounts of U.S. military aid to Israel, a powerful strategic alliance, and an American willingness to acquiesce to Israeli occupation of certain Arab territories taken in 1967, came into existence between 1967 and 1975, particularly with the transformative executive agreements in 1975.
Congress and the Israel Lobby
In the case of Israel, Congress takes on an even more significant role in shaping U.S. policy because of the Israel lobby. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, in The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, describe the Israel lobby as being “a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.”17 Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the Israel lobby, especially since the end of the Cold War, has been the most important factor influencing U.S.–Middle East policy.18 Regarding the lobby’s influence on U.S. foreign policy, two particular organizations deserve mention. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (Conference of Presidents) meets with executive-branch officials and foreign dignitaries to discuss policy issues and put forward a particular position (and had no Arab counterpart until 1972), while the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) primarily lobbies Congress. These two organizations “funnel the bulk of articulate Jewish opinion on policy issues to governmental decision-makers” and thereby influence U.S. foreign policy on a level rivaled by few, if any, countries.19 While not a monolithic organization, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, the lobby “is simply a powerful interest group, made up of both Jews and gentiles, whose acknowledged purpose is to press Israel’s case within the United States and influence American foreign policy in ways that its members believe will benefit the Jewish state.”20 During the 1960s the Israel lobby had already established itself as one of the most powerful lobbying groups in the United States.21
The president typically prefers to conduct foreign relations with little input from Congress and out of view of the American public. But the Israel lobby and Israeli officials have convinced many legislators to resist presidential initiatives if they are deemed disadvantageous to Israel. Congressional speeches on the House and Senate floors, statements from congressional offices, and even legislation often bear the imprint of AIPAC. When a U.S. official makes a public statement—regardless of who actually authored the statement—that position becomes legitimized in American political discourse. This dynamic forces the president to publicly contend with an Israeli position effectively channeled through Congress. Moreover, as Steven Spiegel notes, Israel’s advocates in the United States can “solicit support in Congress and from friends in the Pentagon appealing directly to the president over the heads of State Department and Defense Department opponents.”22 William Fulbright (D-AR), who served as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959 to 1975, complained in 1973, “The Israelis can count on 75 to 80 votes ‘on anything … (they) are interested in in the Senate.’” I. L. “Si” Kenen, then head of AIPAC, confirmed Fulbright’s observation: “I rarely go to the Hill. There is so much support for Israel that I don’t have to.”23 In addition to contacts with legislators, Kenen admitted that Jewish campaign contributions “play a very real part” in congressional support for Israel.24
The American political system is extraordinarily open to influence, and the degree to which it can be penetrated by foreign lobbyists and others representing foreign governments is something that must be understood and not just condemned. Stephen Walt, in an April 2019 article in Foreign Policy, makes a similar case. Walt argues “for a more hardheaded, cynical, and realistic approach to the influence that foreigners invariably seek to exercise over U.S. foreign policy. As long as the U.S. political system is so permeable, it behooves Americans to treat foreign efforts to shape their thinking with due discretion.”25 The Israel lobby is strong because for the most part, though not always, it pushes against an open door. There is so much public support and sympathy for Israel that it does not face a great deal of difficulty in convincing legislators to vote its way. While all of the major Arab governments have their lobbyists in Washington, it has taken them a lot longer to learn the game, and they often have a much harder case to sell. However, both Anwar Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan proved very effective in generating American sympathy and support. Ultimately, lobbyists and foreign governments recognize that the U.S. Congress can play a very important role in shaping U.S. foreign policy.
Bipartisan Support for Israel
The Israel lobby undoubtedly affects U.S. policy, but overemphasis on the lobby itself can diminish the importance of U.S. popular affinity for Israel. The lobby’s ability to influence U.S. policy, to some extent, is rooted in bipartisan American support for Israel. Indeed, any study of Congress’s influence on U.S.-Israel relations must recognize overwhelming legislative support for Israel and thereby affirm the solid foundation of the special relationship. While the present book is not about popular support for Israel, it implies that support through an analysis of Congress’s influence on U.S. foreign policy.
Many congressional members are happy to boldly, loudly, and publicly back an ally like Israel, and in some cases this support can swing a congressional election. Since many everyday Americans feel a connection to Israel, and for a variety of reasons, it befits legislators to adopt pro-Israel positions, either to represent their constituencies or to have a talking point for the next election, and perhaps both. The U.S. president can serve only two terms, but legislators can serve an unlimited number of terms and generally seek to advance policies that can lead to reelection. For legislators, the line between personal interest and the national interest, unfortunately, does not always appear very clear. It must be noted that legislators use Israel as much as the Israel lobby uses legislators; the political game is played by all parties involved.
In the context of U.S. domestic politics, broadly speaking, Americans more closely identify with Jews and the State of Israel than with Arabs and Arab states and nations in the Middle East. This understandably leads to preferential treatment for Israel vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. The Israel lobby exerts significant influence on U.S. policy, but its ability to do so stems from popular affinity for Israel and manifests itself in the branch of government meant to represent popular opinion—the legislature. And congressional support for Israel is nothing new. Congress promoted the Zionist movement before Israel’s declared statehood. Resolutions in 1922 and 1944 endorsed the Balfour Declaration, while the pro-Zionist American Palestine Committee, founded in 1932 and revived in 1941, included the membership of more than two hundred congresspeople.26 Many legislators became ardent supporters of Israel after its declared existence in May 1948.
Prior to the Cold War, the United States (similar to Europe) harbored a significant amount of anti-Semitism. But after the horrors of concentration camps became widely known, many Americans reconfigured their ideas about Jews. Cultural representations reflected this evolution of thought. In Eye on Israel, Michelle Mart includes a multitude of examples from American newspapers, magazines, fictional stories, and motion pictures to show that by the 1950s, American Jews occupied a much more respectable position than ever before.27 Rather than depicting Jews as weak victims,
