found fertile ground in the American South, after the Six-Day War and Nixon’s southern strategy, support for Israel gradually became religiously and politically right.
Thus, the U.S.-Israel special relationship is rooted in Western ideals of political liberalism, support for labor (particularly in urban areas), religion and other cultural values, along with defense spending and conservative and neoconservative ideas of projecting power and advancing liberal democracy abroad. Also important, Israeli officials, the Israel lobby, and some religious Jews have worked to cultivate bipartisan support for the State of Israel within the United States. When viewed through this lens, congressional support for Israel, as well as the effectiveness of the Israel lobby, becomes much more understandable.
By contrast, Americans by-and-large do not feel any strong attachment to Arabs. This stems mostly from the absence of such cultural, social, and political factors as undergird Americans’ more positive views of Israel. Jewish settlers from Europe (Ashkenazi) laid the foundations of the State of Israel and did so with Western ideas of nationalism, secularism, and social democracy. When Israel emerged as a state in 1948, Arab states were just coming out from under the thumb of European colonialism, in particular, the League of Nations mandate system. Arab societies largely resented the West for denying them basic independence and political liberties and proved reluctant to adopt Western models of political and economic development. Moreover, while Ashkenazi settlers brought with them many centuries of Westernization, no such demographic existed within the Arab world. Simply put, Arab societies lacked a Western tradition while the political body of Israel was steeped in that tradition. When the Cold War divided the globe into West versus East, Israel fit nicely into the American mindset, and Arabs did not.
Many Americans consider Arabs to be the “other,” culturally different and unappealing. In Orientalism, Edward Said analyzed European othering of the Orient, and while the United States followed a different trajectory than that of Britain or France, Americans still developed similar ideas of cultural difference.33 Douglas Little, while less interested in the literary and linguistic underpinnings of Orientalism, uses the concept as a way to explain U.S.-Middle East relations since 1945.34 Melani McAllister devotes more attention to cultural representations and theory when analyzing Americans’ distrust of, and dislike for, Arabs.35
Demographics naturally favor U.S.-Israel relations more than U.S.-Arab relations. Arab Americans comprise a much smaller percentage of the U.S. population than Jewish Americans and, therefore, attract much less attention from U.S. politicians. In terms of campaigns and reelections, backing an Arab position vis-à-vis one promoted by American Jews or the State of Israel brings with it very real political risks. Moreover, a sophisticated Arab lobby developed later and more slowly than the Israel lobby, particularly after the formation of the National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) in 1972 and following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.36 In relation to the Israel lobby, the Arab lobby lacked cohesion and organization. By comparison, Arab interests suffered while Jewish interests, persuasively articulated through private meetings with U.S. officials and publications like the Near East Report, a lobbying newsletter of AIPAC, gained more traction in American political discourse.
Despite little understanding of the Arab world, as Salim Yaqub notes, during the 1970s “Americans and Arabs came to know each other as never before.”37 Certain events necessitated greater awareness, such as the 1973 oil embargo, U.S. mediation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, expansion of trade with Arab states, international terrorism, an infusion of “petrodollars,” and an increase of Arab immigration to the United States.38 Greater familiarity generated both increased tension and increased understanding. Gradually, due to Arab American activism, an Arab perspective received greater attention in the American media and academia. While many cultural representations “continued to rely on hostile portrayals of the Arab world,” this actually encouraged Arab Americans to develop more sophisticated means for challenging such representations, which persuaded some “popular media outlets to soften their anti-Arab caricatures.”39 The events of the 1970s brought “Americans and Arabs into unprecedented proximity with one another. This growing intimacy encouraged attitudes of animosity and acceptance that would characterize U.S.-Arab relations in subsequent decades and, indeed, persist into our own era.”40
At the same time, Yaqub emphasizes the growing rift in U.S.-Arab foreign relations during the 1970s and cites Henry Kissinger’s diplomacy as the main reason for that rift.41 According to Yaqub, Kissinger’s diplomacy after the 1973 war aimed to shield Israel from having to leave the territories taken in 1967, which led to the downfall of the peace process. Yaqub makes a valid point. Kissinger did in fact aim to shield Israel from external pressures. However, while Kissinger tried to protect Israel from being forced to vacate the occupied territories, on numerous occasions he counseled Israeli officials to use the opportunity to secure bilateral peace agreements with Arab states in return for the territories, which would normalize Israel’s position in the Middle East. Kissinger, like the presidents between 1967 and 1975, recognized the importance of improved U.S.-Arab foreign relations in order to protect and advance both the American and Israeli national interests. Additionally, while impossible to substantiate using documented evidence, one has to imagine that Henry Kissinger, who prized his Jewish ancestry, hoped to be the diplomat who managed to negotiate lasting peace agreements for Israel. The challenge for Kissinger was in finding a way to secure such agreements without having to force Israel to go along. Kissinger proved unable to do so, and his efforts, like those of the presidents he served, brought him into conflict with Congress and the Israel lobby.
In sum, domestic politics, as much as foreign politics, inspired congressional support for Israel. That support fit within an American cultural preference for Israel, as well as Cold War geopolitics rooted in an us versus them mentality.
Chapter Outline
The present book unfolds in the following manner. Using research from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, FRUS, and the Congressional Record, the first chapter explores U.S.-Israel relations during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency. In 1967, provocative moves made by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and an Israeli first strike plunged the region into war. Legislators took to the House and Senate floors to proclaim the essence of the special relationship—an unwavering American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival. In the aftermath of the war, the Johnson administration decided to abandon existing U.S. policy regarding territorial integrity in the Middle East and support Israeli occupation of Arab lands in order to pressure Arab states to finally recognize Israel and make peace with it. The Johnson administration, like the administrations before it, could not solve the riddle of Arab-Israeli conflict and regarded the war as an opportunity to pursue a different path. The decision to not push Israel out of the territories, as well as an increase in weapons sales to Israel, were both justified by the American commitment to Israel’s survival and had a lasting impact on U.S. relations with the Middle East.
The themes of national security and domestic politics intersect in the second chapter. Based on the papers of Henry “Scoop” Jackson and J. William Fulbright, the chapter uses the conflict between the two Democratic senators to show how the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East, combined with the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, brought about a major upheaval within the Democratic Party as well as a rise in conservative support for Israel from the halls of Congress. A discussion about the Jackson-Fulbright conflict encourages broader thinking about congressional participation in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and also exposes significant political fault lines that would complicate the making of U.S. policy toward Israel for years to come. The United States and Israel developed a strategic alliance during this period, in addition to the special relationship, which involved a sizable increase in weapons sales from the United States to Israel.
The third chapter, based on research from the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, FRUS, and the Congressional Record, explores congressional reactions to Nixon’s request for $2.2 billion in emergency military
