peace process. Despite objections from Fulbright and several other legislators, along with the Nixon administration’s lack of effort to justify such a massive aid package, Congress passed the emergency aid bill in full. Enough legislators successfully argued that Israel needed the immense amount of aid in order to feel strong enough to take risks in peace negotiations. But by May 1974, fearful that Israel felt too strong, the Nixon administration started to threaten to cut off all military aid to soften Israel’s position in peace negotiations. The fall of Nixon due to Watergate sapped the power of the White House at precisely the moment when a strong president was needed to advance such an ambitious program of U.S. peace diplomacy. Also important, Kissinger had to work against pro-Israel elements that sought to scuttle his gradual approach to a comprehensive peace.
The increasing influence of pro-Israel lobbying groups is a central theme of the entire book, and especially the fourth chapter. Research from the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem shows that the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C. proved very able to influence U.S. policymaking during Ford’s reassessment of U.S.–Middle East policy in 1975, which included a freeze on military aid to Israel. In particular, the chapter reveals the efforts made by Israeli officials and pro-Israel lobbyists to secure a Senate letter to President Ford, signed by seventy-six senators in May 1975, that called for the resumption of military aid to Israel; otherwise, the senators insinuated that the upper chamber would kill Ford’s upcoming foreign-aid request. In effect, the president could not withhold weapons to pressure Israel into returning territory. Unlike the work by Mearsheimer and Walt, this chapter exhibits the actual dimensions—the extents and limits—of Israeli influence on U.S. foreign policy. The chapter reveals, in full and granular detail, how a foreign government is able to work within the American political system to influence foreign policy. Along with other scholars in the field of U.S.–Middle East relations, like Yaqub, Roham Alvandi, and Paul Chamberlin, this work demonstrates how Middle Eastern nations, in particular Israel, can influence U.S. policy.42 While these scholars assess influence on the White House and State Department, this book, which is different in detail and evidence, investigates Israeli influence through Congress.
The fifth and final chapter examines the controversial executive agreements connected to Sinai II, concluded in September 1975, in the context of a congressional effort to restrict the broad use of such agreements. In order to make Sinai II acceptable to both Israel and Egypt (and to avoid another war and oil embargo), the United States entered into a series of commitments that signaled a new stage in U.S.-Israel relations. The agreements, made in secret and central to Sinai II, committed the United States to providing for Israel’s military and economic security and pledged to not advance any steps in the peace process without Israel’s approval. Numerous legislators argued that the secret agreements marked a dramatic and questionable shift in U.S.-Israel relations and that they resembled treaties, which required Senate approval. Based on research from the Congressional Record, Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and congressional hearing reports, the chapter shows that legislators felt handcuffed by Sinai II. They felt obligated to pass a resolution to allow for U.S. technicians to man an early-warning station in the Sinai Peninsula in order to preserve the agreement between Israel and Egypt and thereby prevent another war. After wars involving Israel and Egypt in 1956, 1967, 1969–1970, and 1973, another war seemed quite possible to U.S. officials. But by passing the resolution, Congress also authorized, by what Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) called “backdoor” approval, the secret agreements that committed the United States to providing for the future economic, military, and energy needs of Israel, regardless of Israel’s willingness to adhere to the spirit of U.N. Resolution 242.
The May 1975 Senate letter forced the Ford administration to quit threatening to withhold military aid from Israel and instead buy the Sinai II agreement. But in order to preserve the agreement between Israel and Egypt, Kissinger’s diplomacy, in turn, forced Congress to approve of U.S. technicians and, by extension, of the secret and open-ended executive agreements with Israel. Neither U.S. presidents nor Congress wanted to advance U.S.-Israel relations to such an extreme but did so to prevent another war in the Middle East, which threatened to bring with it another oil embargo and possibly superpower confrontation, and to draw Egypt away from the Soviet Union. The United States developed an uneasy alliance with Israel, not by intent, but out of desperation.
1
Johnson, Congress, and the Special Relationship
An American Commitment to the Survival of Israel
An American commitment to the survival of Israel became evident before and during the Six-Day War in June 1967. For the first time after the Holocaust, Jews in Israel felt genuinely afraid of being overrun.1 Arab leaders, particularly Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, refused to recognize Israel and continually threatened to destroy it or to drive it into the sea. Nasser aimed to generate popular support through bombastic rhetoric and likely did not really believe Egypt—or any collection of Arab forces—could, or would, destroy Israel. But threats to exterminate Israel could not be ignored. Israel also contributed to the rising tensions in the region with its attack on Samu, a Jordanian village, in November 1966, and needless provocations with Syria, which led to an air battle in April 1967.
While the threats against Israel added to Nasser’s popular appeal in the Arab world, they encouraged American support for Israel just as much. As events moved toward war, U.S. legislators took to the House and Senate floors and collectively declared an uncompromising commitment to protecting Israel. After the war, the United States supported Israel’s decision to remain in the occupied territories (Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem) until Arab states agreed to make peace with Israel. That decision, which would guide U.S. policy for decades to follow, was originally rooted in an American commitment to securing the safety of Israel.
Map: After the Six-Day War, Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, and East Jerusalem. The Johnson administration initiated land-for-peace diplomacy, whereby Israel would give back Arab lands in return for peace agreements.
Lyndon Johnson felt a strong affection for the State of Israel, but like the presidents before him, he aimed to pursue an evenhanded policy in the Middle East. He often refused Israeli requests for weapons in order to stave off an arms race with the Soviet Union. Unable to prevent an arms race, Johnson tried to avoid selling weapons disproportionally in the region, to support American claims to evenhandedness. Despite his efforts, Johnson became the first U.S. president to sell offensive weapons to Israel. Nevertheless, Johnson’s decisions should be considered within the context of a desire to balance weapons sales between Israel and moderate Arab states and to limit such sales altogether. As Zach Levey has argued, Johnson wanted to avoid entering into a strategic relationship with Israel.2 Israel, for its part, wanted to expand a special relationship into a strategic alliance built on military aid. Walter Hixson has ably demonstrated that the Israel lobby played an important role in pressuring Johnson into adopting a decidedly pro-Israel position.3
The U.S. Congress emerged as a vocal branch of dissent to Johnson’s foreign policy with Israel and, in particular, to his reluctance to sell weapons to Israel. Legislators forced Johnson to publicly contend with the issue of weapons sales to Israel by using legislation (binding and nonbinding), letters, speeches, and official statements to criticize the president’s unwillingness to better arm Israel. These efforts laid a foundation for an ongoing critique of presidential foreign policy in the region that contributed to a dramatic increase of weapons sales. Congress legitimized dissent of presidential foreign policymaking in both East Asia and the Middle East during Johnson’s presidency and in that way affected presidential decision-making in both regions.
Several scholars have analyzed U.S.-Israel relations during Johnson’s presidency; however, no work situates U.S.-Israel relations within the context of increased congressional activity
