in order to “preserve some continuing role in the development of petroleum and other resources.” Read argued that “we must avoid full commitment to either side or to any party…. Our influence is greatest if we serve as a balance, not a partisan.”74 Zbigniew Brzezinski, a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff and future National Security Advisor for Jimmy Carter, recommended that the best path would probably be “publicly defining a U.S. position that is reasonable, fair and constructive, even if initially not satisfactory to any of the belligerents.” The United States had to keep in mind “the long-range interests of the region” and not become “identified with one side alone.” Brzezinski realized, “Some Israeli resentment of the above posture is to be expected, but that is unavoidable unless the United States wishes to become fully identified with it.”75
The war severely strained U.S.-Arab relations. During the course of the war several Arab countries—including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—broke diplomatic relations with the United States, and Arab oil-producing states unsheathed the “oil weapon” against the United States and Britain. Although the uncoordinated attempt failed to influence either American or British policy, the effort provided the groundwork for a future oil embargo, with much greater impact, in 1973. According to an intelligence memorandum, “the course of the present Arab-Israeli crisis has already done considerable damage to the U.S. position in the Arab world. Most Arabs believe the U.S. is the staunch ally of Israel and can in effect control its actions.”76 Even further, “the damage to the U.S. position in the area already appears serious.”77
Not even an Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, an American spy ship in the Mediterranean, lessened support for Israel. On June 8, Israeli aircraft struck the Liberty with rockets and napalm, followed by boat-launched torpedoes, which killed 34 crewmembers and wounded 171. Israeli officials insisted the attack was a result of mistaken identity, believing the ship to be Egyptian. But Liberty crewmen had notified Israeli forces that they were Americans, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) headquarters had identified the Liberty only several hours before. Many Americans never accepted the Israeli explanation and felt the attack was a deliberate attempt to prevent American monitoring of a potential Israeli attack on Syria or Israeli executions of Egyptian captives, or to keep the Liberty from jamming Israeli communications.78
Little was said on the House and Senate floors about the controversial attack. Rep. Roman Pucinski (D-IL) and Sen. Robert Kennedy (D-NY) both called the attack on the Liberty a “tragic mistake,” and Pucinski and Senator Javits noted that Israel had already apologized for the attack.79 Javits excused the apparent mishap: “I have heard Senator after Senator say that while they were terribly dismayed and saddened by this accident, they understood how it could take place under the terrible stress which the forces of Israel have been under in these last few weeks.”80 Almost two months later, John Tower (R-TX) submitted a resolution from the American Legion Post 52 of Houston that denounced the “unprovoked attack” and aimed “to see that those Israel officials or personnel who were responsible for the attacks be punished in keeping with their participation and in keeping with the enormity of their criminal acts.”81 Israel paid millions of dollars in compensation, but no Israeli was ever blamed or punished.82 Rep. Harold Royce (H. R.) Gross (R-IA) wondered, based on reports that the U.S. government had made $27 million available to Israel for food and other supplies, if the United States was subsidizing Israel’s “payment of full compensation for the lives that were destroyed, the suffering of the wounded, and the damage from this wanton attack.”83
Legislators broadly supported Israeli occupation of Arab lands taken during the war. Representative Pucinski, with the aftermath of the 1956 war in mind, did not want to “again rob Israel of the gains she has won on the hard-fought fields of battle.”84 Rep. Robert Sikes (D-FL) went further than Pucinski. Sikes suggested that Israel “simply annex” the West Bank and the Sinai Peninsula “and eliminate future problems.” For Sikes, the move would have biblical implications as Israel “would then control, essentially, the Jewish homeland.” Sikes closed with a contestable point: “Had we and our allies kept hands off in 1956, the situation could have been solved permanently at that time.”85 Rep. Donald Clausen (R-CA), who also used a religious allusion, believed “Israel was ‘sinned’ against … and is entitled to retain whatever gains she has made in the interim.”86 Rep. Alphonzo Bell (R-CA) supported Israeli occupation and predicted that Israel “will prove herself to be a magnanimous victor, but this magnanimity must be allowed to be voluntary.”87 Representatives Ogden Reid (R-NY) and Floyd Hicks (D-WA) stressed the need to not repeat the perceived mistake of 1956–1957.88
Some legislators made the specific connection between Israeli occupation of Arab lands and a diplomatic plan to secure a lasting peace in the region. A poll conducted by the Associated Press revealed that 365 out of 438 responses from legislators “were opposed to withdrawal without peace.”89 Rep. Thomas Morris (D-NM) wanted Israel to keep the territories to secure its “right to live in peace with her neighbors.”90 Halpern followed, “If the Arabs expect Israel to leave the territory she has won, then Israel is entitled to a treaty of peace, signed by the Arabs.”91 Rep. James Corman (D-CA) argued, “The Arab world must accept the permanency of the State of Israel,” and therefore he wanted “no attempt” by the United Nations or the United States to force an Israeli withdrawal.92 Senator Mondale stressed that “there must be no return to a quasi-permanent supervised military standoff between Israel and the Arab nations…. We must reinforce our historic commitment to the existence and permanence of the State of Israel.”93 Rep. William Widnall (R-NJ) called for U.S. support “of the present lines” until Israel received recognition and peace.94 Halpern reiterated his earlier point: “No withdrawal can be expected of Israel without … peace and stability.” He also mocked the State Department’s neutrality statement and wondered, “Is our Government going to heed our voices, the voices of the vast majority of the American people? Or are we going to crawl back into the State Department shells and let the striped-pants boys continue to guide U.S. policy.”95 Indeed, Congress stood solidly behind Israel’s occupation of Arab lands until its neighbors offered recognition and peace.
But Israel wanted land more than it wanted peace. According to Avi Raz, Israel did not genuinely seek peace with its Arab neighbors after the war. The Israeli cabinet developed a June 19 peace plan that would have returned the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula in return for peace agreements with Syria and Egypt. But the “generous peace offer” was never communicated to the Arab states. Instead, Israeli officials, particularly Foreign Minister Abba Eban, perpetuated the myth of such an offer to secure U.S. support against a Soviet measure at the United Nations that called for an immediate Israeli withdrawal.96 According to Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, in the wake of the war, Israel started to construct settlements in the occupied territories, which Israeli officials claimed were reversible military outposts and not civilian in nature. This deception aimed to provide cover from international pressure during a vulnerable period of civilian settlement construction. The Johnson administration, distracted by the Vietnam War, failed to offer any substantial resistance to the settlement construction and missed an early opportunity to shut down Israel’s efforts to create “facts on the ground.” Israel would continue to build more and more settlements in the occupied territories in the years and decades to follow, which added a major obstacle to peace efforts and fulfillment of a two-state solution.97
Legislators did not demand the return of Arab territory; however, a few voices cautioned against indefinite Israeli occupation. On the second day of the war, Representative Hayes reasoned that “if we are going to maintain the territorial integrity of all the states out there in the Middle East, we will possibly have to get in against Israel.”98 After the war, Rep. Jim Wright (D-TX) pointed out that “Israel has every right to demand security, no right to demand spoils.”99 Representatives Pucinski and Ray Madden (D-IN) both criticized the Soviet Union for demanding an Israeli withdrawal, given its occupation of Eastern Europe.100
Numerous
