Declaration of 1950, a joint declaration of the United States, Britain, and France.42 Wayne Morse (D-OR), for his part, added that in the Tripartite Declaration, the three major powers pledged to “come to the assistance of the party against whom aggression had been committed.”43 More often than not, legislators referenced only an American commitment to the territorial integrity of Israel.
The United States, true to its special relationship with Israel, would not allow Israel to be destroyed. Sen. Joseph Clark (D-PA) spoke “to anybody in the Soviet Union … do not think that the United States of America is going to permit the Arab nations to overrun Israel.”44 A few days later, Rep. Jack Brinkley (D-GA) extolled the historical virtues of the Hebrew people and echoed Clark: “We cannot permit Israel to be overrun.”45 Sen. Jacob Javits (R-NY) argued that the United States had a “clear obligation and responsibility and a vital national interest in the area and in Israel.” He cited John Foster Dulles’s statement that “it is U.S. policy that the preservation of the State of Israel is a fundamental tenet of U.S. foreign policy.”46 Rep. Wayne Hayes (D-OH), aware of the divisive Vietnam War, observed that an Egyptian attack on Israel would turn “a lot of the doves in this country into hawks immediately.”47 Hayes returned to the same theme the next day and mentioned that Representatives Sidney Yates (D-IL) and Jonathan Bingham (D-NY)—two doves on Vietnam—had explained to him that one can “be a hawk with Israel and a dove with Vietnam.”48 Gruening and Pepper each suggested a mutual defense pact with Israel.49 Numerous additional legislators rose in vocal support of an American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival.
Israel chose war on the morning of June 5. According to William Quandt, who served in the National Security Council for Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, the Johnson administration changed its “red light” to a “yellow light,” which meant the administration would not protest an Israeli first strike.50 In addition to the exit of UNEF and the blockade in the Straits of Tiran, Israel felt hemmed in by a collection of Arab states that called for its destruction. Also, Jordan signed a defense treaty with Egypt on the eve of war in 1967, which heightened Israel’s fears. Within hours of the first morning, the Israeli Air Force had destroyed approximately 90 percent of the Egyptian Air Force. In control of the skies, Israel proceeded to decimate the Arab armies in six days. The war ended with a cease-fire after Moscow threatened military intervention to save its allies, especially the shaky Syrian government, as Israeli forces seemed poised to strike Damascus.
The outbreak of war intensified legislative voices of support for Israel. On June 5, Rep. William Ryan (D-NY) called on the United States “to do whatever is necessary to protect Israel in this hour of crisis.”51 Fellow congressman Leonard Farbstein (D-NY) followed by arguing that “Israel represents the American presence in the Middle East.”52 Rep. Silvio Conte (R-MA) stated, “The commitments of the United States to uphold and safeguard the national and territorial integrity of Israel are clear. We are the moral and legal ally of Israel in defense against territorial aggressors. We must and do stand ready with unilateral military assistance in behalf of the Israelis.”53 Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), among other legislators, claimed that the United States had a moral and legal obligation to defend Israel.54 Bingham encouraged other legislators to follow his lead in giving blood to support Israel.55 Regarding an Israeli first strike, which started the war, Javits assured the Senate and the American people, “Israel’s Prime Minister has declared that his nation has no territorial ambitions. He did not have to make that declaration. We all know that.”56 This would become a debatable point in years to come.
President Johnson felt heavy domestic pressure to back Israel. As Hixson has argued, the Israel lobby undertook intensive efforts to elicit U.S. support from the legislative and executive branches for Israel against Nasser.57 Prior to the war, hoping to persuade the Johnson administration to support an Israeli first strike, the Israeli government instructed its ambassador in Washington to “create a public atmosphere that will constitute pressure on the [Johnson] administration … without it being explicitly clear that we are behind this public campaign.”58 The effort aimed to get sympathetic Americans to write letters, editorials, telegrams, and public statements to “strengthen our friends within the administration.” The pressure was so bothersome that the White House requested that the Israelis shut it down, although the Israeli ambassador reported back, “Of course we are continuing it.”59
To the dismay of Israeli officials and Israel’s supporters in the United States, the Johnson administration tried to maintain an evenhanded position. On the first day of the war, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey communicated to the press, “We have tried to steer an even-handed course…. Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed.”60 McCloskey’s statement drew the ire of many Jewish Americans.61 Later that day, Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano phoned Secretary of State Rusk to say that McCloskey’s statement was “killing us with the Jews in this country” and asked Rusk to issue a more pro-Israel statement. Rusk released a statement that blandly reaffirmed Johnson’s position of independence and territorial integrity in the Middle East.62 Two days later, American Jewish Zionists communicated their “sharp disillusion and dismay” to the White House.63 David Ginsburg, the long-time advocate for American Jewish Zionists, pressured U.S. officials to not force an Israeli withdrawal, which Eisenhower had done during the Suez Crisis. He wrote in a memo to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, “Here I’ll add a word of my own: what was done particularly in 1956 and 1957 but since then as well, from the viewpoint of U.S. interests alone, was appalling.” Ginsburg also warned the White House, “What the Administration is saying and doing now is being watched carefully not only by the Jewish community, but by others who should be and have been close to the Administration and whose support—and advice—we need, have had, and should have again.”64
Legislators took aim at McCloskey’s statement of neutrality and denounced it on the floors of the House and the Senate. Rep. William Scott (R-VA) stated, “The people of this country are not neutral in thought and word. Everything I hear, every expression of opinion from people in all walks of life, shows a deep concern for the preservation of the State of Israel.”65 Senator Clark remarked, “Morally and legally we are an ally of Israel. Their cause is our cause. We are not neutral in thought, word, or deed. I am distressed by our Government’s ambiguous declaration of neutrality.”66 Rep. Louis Wyman (R-NH) derided the Johnson administration for “flubbing the ball just at the wrong time” and for giving “the impression to the world that we are pussy footing…. We cannot possibly be neutral in the situation of Nasser versus Israel.”67 Representative Ryan called the neutrality declaration “grotesque” and insisted that “the United States has never been ‘neutral in thought, word, and deed’ on the matter of Israel’s right to exist.”68 For Rep. Margaret Heckler (R-MA), “Historically, we have had a close and special relationship with the State of Israel from the time of its inception. Consequently, I rise to protest against the administration’s declaration of ‘neutrality’ in this great crisis.”69
Several legislators used a familial analogy, of an American mother to an Israeli child, to describe U.S.-Israel relations. Rep. Jacob Gilbert (D-NY), for one, regarded Israel as “the child of Western humanitarianism and U. N. diplomacy.”70 According Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D-NY), “Since its inception in 1948, Israel has been a stepchild of the United States…. If necessary, this country must defend Israel’s territorial integrity.”71 Benjamin Blackburn (R-GA) claimed that the United States “served as midwife during the birth of Israel as a free and independent nation” and, therefore, “now has a moral responsibility to protect her rights as such.”72 Not long after the war, Sen. Frank Church (D-ID) similarly stated that “the United States was the midwife at the birth of Israel, and the Arab countries have been determined, ever since, to kill the child.”73
Some State Department officials stressed the need to continue an even-handed position and not appear biased by Israeli sympathies. Benjamin Read,
