Squires also includes God’s direction of events through history and the concept of necessity (δεῖ). On the use of δεῖ in Luke-Acts, see also Cosgrove, “The Divine ΔΕΙ,” 168–90.
68. On the role of scripture and the fulfillment of the plan of God, see also Moessner, “The ‘script’ of the Scripture,” 218–50. Moessner surveys Luke’s use of scripture in the major defense speeches in Acts, arguing that scripture is used to emphasize the fulfillment of three major aspects of God’s plan: the apostles’ preaching that Christ has been raised from the dead; the crucifixion of Jesus; and Jesus’ resurrection.
69. Chatman, Story and Discourse.
70. Kelber, “Redaction Criticism,” 14. I was directed to this through C. Talbert’s citation of same; see Reading Luke, 4.
71. Kennedy, Rhetorical Criticism, 8.
72. Ibid., 3–12. See also Kurz, “Hellenistic Rhetoric,” 171–95; Kurz cites Malherbe (Social Aspects, 45) in claiming that the lowest level of education that an NT writer who quotes from Greek literary works would have had would be “the upper levels of secondary education” (Kurz, “Hellenistic Rhetoric,” 192). Cf. Satterthwaite, “Acts,” 340–43.
73. Kennedy, Rhetorical Criticism, 8–10.
74. See Kurz, “Hellenistic Rhetoric,” 172–84, for Luke’s use of enthymemes, and ibid., 185–91, for other evidence of Luke’s knowledge of rhetoric. As will become evident, the present study agrees wholeheartedly with Kurz’s point concerning witnesses and inartificial proofs.
75. Satterthwaite, “Acts.”
76. “The Gospels and Acts,” 507–32; the quotation is from ibid., 530.
77. Parsons, Acts.
78. Parsons, Acts, 9–11.
79. Kennedy, introduction to Progymnasmata, ix.
80. Rabinowitz, “Truth in Fiction,” 121–42.
81. Iser, The Act of Reading.
82. Jauss, Aesthetic of Reception.
2 • The topos of Divine Testimony and its Application in Ancient Speeches and Treatises
The goal of this chapter is to define how the term topos83 should be understood in the rest of this work, and to explore the specific topos of divine testimony.84 Examples of the topos of divine testimony from ancient speeches and treatises will then be provided. The chapter will finally conclude with an assessment of the persuasiveness of this particular topos in the first-century Mediterranean milieu in which Luke-Acts was composed and heard. Defining what I mean by topos is necessary for two reasons. First, in the ancient rhetorical handbooks, the term topos (or locus) was used differently by various authors and, indeed, in some cases by the same author. Thus, as will be demonstrated, the term as used by the ancient rhetoricians (and philosophers) enjoyed a somewhat wide semantic range.85 Second, the term in modern NT scholarship has continued on this same trajectory; in general, biblical scholars’ application of a topos to the study of NT passages tends to focus on E. Curtius’s definition of a topos as a universal theme or cliché, applicable to any type of literature.86 In this study, however, rather than a stock theme, I will consider the topos as a source of proofs, used in composing a speech for the purposes of defending or prosecuting one accused of some crime. In the following analysis, through a survey of the appropriate rhetorical treatises as well as examples of the topos of divine testimony found in forensic speeches and other works, it will be demonstrated that this is certainly a possible understanding of topos.
In the section that follows, I will first summarize the definition and application of the concept of topos in NT scholarship during the previous approximately sixty years. It is to this history of research that I now turn.87
The Concept of topos in Contemporary NT Scholarship
The definition of topos and its use in the NT originally emerged out of form criticism and neglected the ancient rhetoricians’ definitions of topos. In 1953, D. Bradley offered this definition of topos: “the treatment in independent form of the topic of a proper thought or action, or of a virtue or a vice, etc.”88 Terence Mullins found Bradley’s definition lacking and offered his own: “The Topos is a form with three essential elements: injunction, reason, and discussion. Two optional elements, analogous situation and refutation, might be used. Its purpose was to urge a type of behavior or attitude and there was no limit to the range of behavior discussed” (emphasis in original).89 Mullins (as did Bradley before him) simply applied a form critical analysis to ancient texts and the New Testament to formulate his definition, and did not rely on evidence from the ancient rhetorical handbooks.90
J. Brunt, however, reversed this trend, using the rhetorical handbooks as evidence to correct the definitions of topos offered by both Bradley and Mullins.91 Brunt argued that it had become a common misconception to view a topos as a “stereotyped, recurring motif.”92 Instead, Brunt offers a definition quite similar to what we will see in the ancient rhetorical handbooks, especially those of Cicero and Quintilian: “topoi are stereotyped arguments that are applied to specific cases.”93
During this same time, others are also seeking independently to define and apply the topos to the study of the NT. For example, W. Wuellner94 reviews modern research on the topos as part of literary criticism, while recognizing that modern Toposforschung is “rooted” in the ancient rhetorical handbooks. Wuellner begins with Curtius’s definition of topos, noting that Curtius recognized that both the structure and content of the argument being made could be understood under the umbrella of topos. Thus, Wuellner rightly admits that the topos is a “komplexes Phänomen.” Wuellner, however, makes a contribution to the application of the topos to NT studies by recognizing that the author’s choice of topos/topoi is culturally conditioned and therefore can provide insight into both the audience which is the target of the persuasive discourse, as well as the rhetorical issue being argued.
