things” (1.2.21–22).
Later in the treatise, after a discussion of the three types of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative, and epideictic), Aristotle specifically mentions twenty-eight different topoi which are available to the rhetor for the construction of enthymemes. Examples of the topoi found in this list include those arguments which are generated from opposites, the more and the less, the definition of terms, and induction (2.23.1–29). As was seen in Aristotle’s Topica, these topoi represent methods of rhetorical argumentation, rather than the content of the arguments themselves.107
As I have previously stated, the concept of the topos was already familiar to the Greeks of his day; therefore, this list represents Aristotle’s attempt to systematically categorize topoi. Aristotle’s contribution to this aspect of rhetoric was to classify and generalize the use of the various topoi.108
For the purposes of the present study, however, it is important to examine briefly Aristotle’s concept of inartificial proofs,109 specifically focusing on what he says concerning witnesses. For Aristotle, witnesses fall into two categories: ancient and recent. Ancient witnesses are the most reliable, because it is no longer possible to refute or discredit them; they have, in effect, stood the test of time. Appropriate ancient witnesses include poets, “men of repute whose judgments are known to all” (here, Aristotle provides Homer as an example), “interpreters of oracles for the future” (i.e., Themistocles’s interpretation of the wooden wall), and proverbial wisdom (παροιμία, 1.15.13–19).110 Witnesses who are contemporaries of the orator include “all well-known persons who have given a decision on any point” (these decisions can be used in similar cases) and “those who share the risk of the trial, if they are thought to be perjurers.” Witnesses such as these, however, can only help establish if something occurred or not; they are not reliable in establishing “the quality of the act” (1.15.15–17).
In sum, Aristotle views topoi as generally agreed-upon methods of argumentation, useful both to those engaging in dialectic and those who would construct arguments through the use of rhetoric. Some topoi, the use of which is not tied to a particular field of inquiry, are beneficial for all cases. Others, those which Aristotle calls specific (ἴδια), are to be used only in particular types of arguments. In the area of rhetoric, topoi for Aristotle constitute the sources of enthymemes and are therefore useful for logical reasoning.111
With Aristotle’s view of topos as a background, I will now focus on the Latin rhetoricians’ views concerning the topos, or locus, beginning with Cicero and then considering the treatments found in Rhetorica ad Herennium and Quintilian.112
Locus in Cicero
I begin with Cicero’s De inventione rhetorica, considered to be a work written by Cicero in his younger days.113 In the introductory section of the treatise, Cicero justifies his work in the area of rhetoric by noting that many rhetors abuse the use of rhetoric, thus actually doing harm to the state.114 For Cicero, this negative effect on the state is motivation for the training of orators in the proper use of rhetoric. He writes:
Therefore, in my opinion at least, men ought none the less to devote themselves to the study of eloquence although some misuse it both in private and in public affairs. And they should study it the more earnestly in order that evil men may not obtain great power to the detriment of good citizens and the common disaster of the community . . . For from eloquence the state receives many benefits, provided only it is accompanied by wisdom, the guide of all human affairs. (1.4.5)
Here in the opening of Inv., one sees that Cicero at an early age considers the practice of rhetoric to be a means to an end; namely, it is to be employed in service to the state.
Regarding the loci, in Inv. Cicero does not provide a general definition of locus for his readers.115 One can infer, however, what Cicero understands under the term locus through his discussion of the part of the speech he calls “confirmation.”116 In the introduction to this section, Cicero states:
Now it seems desirable to give in turn the rules about confirmation as is demanded by the regular order of the speech. Confirmation or proof is the part of the oration which by marshalling arguments lends credit, authority, and support to our case. (1.23.33–24.36; emphasis in original)
Cicero then lists the “attributes of persons or of actions” (1.24.34). The attributes concerning the person include qualities such as the person’s name, his or her nature, manner of life, and financial standing.117 In regards to actions, Cicero lists (and explains in each case) the place at which the action in question took place, the time (when it occurred as well as the duration of the action), occasion for the action, etc. Cicero prefaces the list of attributes and his explanations of them through a short explanation of his understanding of these attributes and how they can possibly function within the confirmatory proofs in the speech:
But I think that it will be not inconvenient to set forth . . . a kind of raw material for general use from which all arguments are drawn, and then later to present the way in which each kind of case should be supported by all the forms of argumentation derived from this general store. (1.24.34)
Within the list of attributes of actions, Cicero elaborates on the “performance of the act” and writes, “In connection with the performance of the act (which was the second topic [locus secundus] under the heading of attributes of actions)” (1.26.38). From this use of terminology one can infer that in this context, Cicero considers these attributes to be loci. At the end of this section, one sees the same idea being expressed; Cicero concludes by stating, “All argumentation drawn from these topics which we have mentioned [ex eis locis quos commemoraviums sumetur] will have to be either probable or irrefutable” (1.29.44). After an extended discussion of what constitutes probable and certain arguments, Cicero offers this summary: “Now the sources of confirmatory arguments have been revealed as the occasion offered, and explained as clearly as the nature of the subject required” (1.30.49).
Considering these passages in the context of this section of the work, it seems that Cicero considers the loci to be the fundamental building blocks from which persuasive arguments are composed. And his concept of topos/locus differs significantly from Aristotle in that for Cicero, in many cases the loci are not the form of the argument; rather, they comprise the actual content of the arguments and proofs that are being constructed. This idea is confirmed in Cicero’s later rhetorical treatises.118
De oratore is considered to be one of Cicero’s major works from the latter phase of his life.119 The three books that comprise De or. are composed as a dialog between various prominent orators in the Roman Empire, and in it Cicero describes the ideal orator. In the opening to the treatise, Cicero, in expounding on the importance of oratory, remarks (in the voice of Crassus) that
there is to my mind no more excellent thing than the power, by means of oratory, to get a hold on assemblies of men, win their good will, direct their inclinations wherever the speaker wishes, or divert them from whatever he wishes. In every free nation, and most of all in communities which have attained the enjoyment of peace and tranquility, this one
