them and seek for arguments from them all; but we shall use our judgment always to reject those of little value and also sometimes to pass over those that are of general application and not intimately related to our case. (Part. or. 3.8)
Here one notes that the loci are not only sources of arguments for Cicero; they also provide a methodology for evaluating the appropriateness of a particular set of arguments.
In summarizing Cicero’s concept of locus as found in his rhetorical treatises, Cicero considers the loci to be the sources of arguments for an orator arguing a case. In particular, Cicero is focused on what was indeed the emphasis in his own career, namely arguing mostly forensic cases in service to the State. The loci can be subdivided into internal and external arguments, internal arguments being those that are connected to the facts of the case being argued; external arguments are those from outside the case and are mostly concerned with witnesses and testimony. These various loci are concerned with the contents of the arguments themselves, and are to be scrutinized by the orator in order to assist in the process of crafting the most persuasive speech possible.128 Thus, there is an emphasis in Cicero on the practicality and utility of the loci, rather than the theory of argumentation as was seen in Aristotle.129
While this is certainly the primary sense for the term locus in Cicero’s writings, it is, however, not the only one. For example, Cicero can use the term to imply a common theme to which one might refer while giving a speech. In De or. he writes,
And indeed when, while a man is speaking—as often happens—such commonplaces [loci] have cropped up as demand some mention of the immortal gods, of dutifulness, harmony, or friendship, of the rights shared by citizens, by men in general, and by nations, of fair-dealing, moderation or greatness of soul, or virtue of any and every kind. (De or. 1.13.56)
Later in De or., Crassus encourages Antonius to go beyond what seems to be the current understanding of locus, saying,
[R]ather please omit that part of your programme which none of our friends here wants, touching the commonplaces [locis] which supply us with what we have to say in our cases: although you discuss these things with brilliant originality, they are for all that really rather easy and widely current in maxims. Produce for us the sources of what you so often handle and always in inspired fashion. (De or. 2.29.127)
Here, at the very least, Cicero provides evidence that he is familiar with an understanding of a locus as a proverb or maxim, or perhaps (as seen above) a stock theme, exemplary model, or pattern to which orators often refer.
A second, slightly different view of locus is found in Inv. Here, Cicero describes a “common” locus, “common” distinguishing an argument that can be used in multiple cases. It is, therefore, an argument of a more general nature. Cicero writes,
In every case some of the arguments are related only to the case that is being pleaded, and are so dependent on it that they cannot advantageously be separated from it and transferred to other cases, while others are of a more general nature, and adaptable to all or most cases of the same kind. These arguments which can be transferred to many cases, we call common topics [locos communes]. A common topic either contains an amplification of an undisputed statement . . . or of a doubtful statement against which there are also plausible lines of argument . . . A speech, however, is occasionally rendered distinguished or brilliant by introducing common topics and some topic [locis communibus et aliquo loco] backed up by arguments when the audience is already convinced. (Inv. 2.14.47–15.48)
In this passage, what Cicero infers through the phrase locis communibus et aliquo loco is that there are “common” loci (as described above) and simply loci; the difference between the two is that common loci are arguments applicable to any case, while loci are particular to the case being argued.130 Also, Cicero argues that the common loci are to be carefully constructed and embellished (note in the quote above he calls for them to include “an amplification”), which provides the impression they are arguments in a more complete form than simple loci.131
Locus in Ad Herennium
I will now explore the concept of locus as described in other Latin and Greek authors, beginning with the rhetorical treatise Ad Herennium. In Rhet. Her., in the author’s discussion of amplification, he lists ten areas from which to draw loci in support of summarizing statements (epilogoi) found in the speech. The author writes:
Amplification is the principle of using Commonplaces [per locum communem] to stir the hearers. To amplify an accusation it will be most advantageous to draw commonplaces from ten formulae. (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47)
The greater context of this statement is the description of the summarization that a rhetor is to do periodically within the speech.132 These summaries have a threefold purpose: summarizing the previous points, reinforcing and building on what has been stated (“Amplification”), and inciting the emotions of the audience (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47).
Locus in Quintilian
In Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria one finds a similar perception of locus. Quintilian discusses the locus in the context of the part of the speech he calls the proof, and which he considers the most significant.133 Quintilian makes the same distinction as was seen in Aristotle and Cicero, categorizing proofs as either “nontechnical” or “technical,” corresponding to Aristotle’s “inartificial” and “artificial” proofs.134 The sources for the inartificial proofs include judgments rendered in previous cases, rumors, statements made by those being tortured, documents, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses. After discussing these forms of proof in some detail, Quintilian turns his attention to the “technical” proofs, those invented by the orator.
Quintilian categorizes technical proofs into “signs,” arguments, or examples (Inst. 5.9.1). He discusses loci in the context of arguments. For Quintilian, loci are “Places where Arguments are found,” and are not “what are nowadays commonly meant by loci, namely set pieces against luxury, adultery, and the like, but the area in which Arguments lurk and from which they have to be draw out” (Inst. 5.10.20–21). Three things are significant here. First, Quintilian, like Cicero, argues that the loci represent sources of arguments from which the orator must select in order to argue the case at hand (“so every Argument is not found everywhere, and we have therefore to be selective in our search” [Inst. 5.10.22]). Second, Quintilian, again in a similar fashion to Cicero, albeit more explicitly, distinguishes his definition of locus from (what Cicero termed) the common loci, which Quintilian describes as stock arguments against (or, presumably, for) certain familiar themes.135 The third point comes from the greater context. Quintilian, in this case unlike Cicero, does not call the inartificial proofs “loci”; he restricts loci to those proofs inherent to the case which must be discovered and selected by the orator.
Topos in Theon
Theon, in the Progymnasmata, provides evidence of a similar distinction between two concepts of locus/topos already seen in Cicero and Quintilian. Within the Progymnasmata there is an exercise entitled ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΠΟΥ. Within this exercise Theon defines what he means by τόπος:
Topos (topos)136 is language amplifying something that is acknowledged to be either a fault or a brave deed. It is of two kinds: one is an
