themes which are rehearsed over and over (Thom’s second type), nor are they moral topoi (the third type). One can say that the external topoi are strategic or rhetorical in that they are employed to persuade an audience or jury; but, given Thom’s example of his first type of topos (arguing from the greater to the lesser), the external loci do not exactly fit this category either. Therefore, I propose that Thom’s continuum should be extended to include Cicero’s external loci; I will demonstrate that these external loci focus on witnesses and testimony.
To summarize the findings of this analysis to this point, I am arguing that the current understanding in NT scholarship of the term topos should be expanded to include what Cicero calls external arguments or proofs and what Quintilian labels inartificial proofs.146 Arguments drawn from these loci focus on documents, oaths, witnesses, and testimony. These loci are more substantive than formal in nature, as they represent the content of the argument selected by the orator rather than the form of the argument. Also, especially in Cicero and Quintilian, the loci are used to facilitate the development of arguments in legal cases; there is a strong emphasis on the outcome of the speech, namely the goal of persuading a judge of the validity of one’s case. I will now investigate a particular aspect of the external loci, specifically that of divine testimony.
The topos of Divine Testimony
In Topica, when introducing the external arguments, Cicero states, “External arguments depend principally on authority” (Top. 4.24). He then gives a more detailed explanation of the external loci later in his treatise. After a short introduction to those loci which “are extrinsic or brought in from without” (Top. 19.72),147 he writes:
This form of argumentation, that is said not to be subject to the rules of art, depends on testimony. For our present purpose we define testimony as everything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to win conviction. Now it is not every sort of person who is worth consideration as a witness. To win conviction, authority is sought; but authority is given by one’s nature or by circumstances. (Top. 19.73)
Thus, Cicero’s concept of an external locus is based almost exclusively on the testimony of others.148 He warns, however, that effective testimony is produced only by those who exhibit some type of authority, either through the nature of the witness or the circumstances in which the witness finds him or herself. Cicero then continues, defining what he means by authority through nature or circumstances:
Authority from one’s nature or character depends largely on virtue; in circumstances there are many things which lend authority, such as talent, wealth, age, good luck, skill, experience, necessity, and even at times a concurrence of fortuitous events. For it is common belief that the talented, the wealthy, and those whose character has been tested by a long life, are worthy of credence. (Top. 19.73)
Thus, authority from character can only be attributed to those who are virtuous, while authority from circumstances is based on wealth, talent, and a character which has been proven through many experiences in life, for “people generally put faith in those who are experienced” (Top. 19.73).
After a short digression in which he discusses the loci of necessity (which is a sub-topic of experience), and “the concurrence of fortuitous events,” Cicero turns his attention back to the testimony of one who possesses authority due to a virtuous character. He states,
The testimony which produces conviction through virtue is of two kinds; one sort gets its efficacy by nature, the other acquires it by hard work. That is to say, the surpassing virtue of the gods is the result of their nature, but the virtue of men is the result of hard work. The testimony of the gods is covered thoroughly enough by the following: first, utterances, for oracles get their name from the fact that they contain an utterance (oratio) of the gods; secondly, things in which are embodied certain works of the gods. First, the heavens themselves and all their order and beauty; secondly, the flight of birds through the air and their songs; thirdly, sounds149 and flashes of fire from the heavens,150 and portents given by many objects on earth, as well as the foreshadowing of events which is revealed by the entrails (of sacrificial animals). Many things also are revealed by visions seen in sleep. The testimony of the gods is at times adduced from these topics in order to win conviction. (Top. 20.76–77)
A human is virtuous through hard work; the gods, however, are virtuous simply because of who they are.151 And the virtuous testimony of the gods is possible through several ways listed above, examples of which I will provide in this chapter and explore throughout chapters three through six of the present study.
Other ancient authors also demonstrate that the concept of divine testimony was not limited to Cicero.152 The author of Rhet. Her. is familiar with this form of proof. In the section in which he describes the epilogoi within the speech (noted above), ten sources of loci are listed for use within the epilogos. The first listed is the locus of authority, and includes a form of divine testimony:
The first commonplace [Primus locus] is taken from authority, when we call to mind of what great concern the matter under discussion has been to the immortal gods, or to our ancestors, or kings, states, barbarous nations, sages, the Senate; and again, especially how sanction has been provided in these matters by laws. (Rhet. Her. 2.30.48)153
Quintilian also mentions divine testimony as a source of proofs, and seems to follow the author or Rhet. Her. closely. He does so after his introduction to loci (Inst. 5.10.20; cf. the discussion above) and in the context of arguments drawn from outside the subject matter. The general category in which divine testimony is found is that of authority (Inst. 5.11.36). Specifically, proofs from authority are “opinions which can be attributed to nations, peoples, wise men, distinguished citizens, or famous poets” (Inst. 5.11.36–37). After discussing these categories, and also including proverbial wisdom, Quintilian then states:
Under this head, and indeed as the first item, some put the Authority of the Gods, which is derived from oracles . . . This is a rare thing, but can be of use . . . When these belong to the Cause, they are called “divine testimonies”; when they are adduced from other sources, they are Arguments. (Inst. 5.11.42)154
Thus Quintilian, while his description is not nearly as comprehensive as Cicero’s, does demonstrate that he was aware of this form of proof.
Finally, the author of Art of Political Speech is also aware of this method of proof. In the section on proofs (περί πιστεύων) and within the context of discussing the most typical topoi, the author concludes his list of topoi with the following: “Judgment will be taken from that of gods, heroes, prose writers, philosophers, poets [Κρίσις δὲ ληφθήσεται άπὸ θεῶν, ἀπὸ ἡρώων, ἀπὸ συγγραφέων, άπὸ φιλοσόφων, άπὸ ποιητῶν]” (Anonymous Seguerianus, Art of Political Speech 181 [Dilts and Kennedy]). This is similar to Quintilian’s statement above, indicating perhaps that Quintilian is one of the author’s sources, or that they are both drawing from a common tradition.155
Therefore, Cicero and other authors of ancient rhetorical handbooks emphasize a particular topos/locus, one that is “inartificial” or “external” to the case being argued, and is based on the testimony of one in authority. The authority of the witness is based on many factors, including
