Most participants in historical events are too involved to have time to document them. Diaries, of course, are the principal exception to this rule, but in most cases even the appearance of diaries may be delayed for years, until the author has had time to edit or censor their content, or until the author’s place in history is assured. It requires a peculiar set of circumstances to extricate a protagonist from the scene far enough to allow comment on events as they unfold. Such a set of circumstances was brought into play when Tan Malaka was jailed in March 1946, just as his Persatuan Perjuangan was displaced by the reemergent social-democratic prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir. A continuing keen sense of concern for the course of the revolution led Tan Malaka to write about developments occurring after his arrest, as well as to chronicle events that had taken place previously. Not until some years later did any of the other political activists from the revolution write their interpretations of that period. (I discuss these later in the context of the significance of this text as autobiography.)
Indeed, contemporary analyses of the Indonesian revolution even from nonparticipants were few and far between. As Anthony Reid has commented,
The importance of the revolution as a symbol of Indonesian identity and freedom has made it a difficult, perhaps increasingly difficult, subject for Indonesians to write about with candour. To the best of my knowledge only two serious attempts have been made to describe the revolutionary process as a whole, including its internal dynamics. Muhammad Dimyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia (Jakarta, Widjaya, 1951) is the earliest and best such account, dealing frankly with internal developments at the national level from a viewpoint sympathetic to Tan Malaka. The second volume of Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Sedjarah revolusi Indonesia (Jakarta, Grafica, [1965?]), is a partial account by one of the leading 3 July detainees, but it does give some attention to the “social revolutions” and to events outside Java. Two slighter general accounts, Susanto Tirtoprodjo, Sedjarah revolusi nasional Indonesia (Jakarta, Pembangunan, 1962) and Samawi, 25 tahun merdeka (Jogjakarta, Kedaulatan Rakjat, 1970), stress the international aspect.12
In the late 1970s the situation changed with the publication of a major history of the revolution in eleven volumes: A. H. Nasution’s Sekitar perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia. The fact that it was nearly thirty years after the transfer of sovereignty that such a history appeared illustrates by exception the paucity, one could say even the absence, of contemporary analyses of any depth (of course the newspapers and magazines of the day carried numerous polemics and analyses). While From Jail to Jail concludes in March 1948 (with a postscript comment made in October 1948) and therefore cannot give a final judgment on the revolution, it can be regarded as one of the very few contemporary works to attempt to see a pattern and a logic in the crowded saga of events from 1945 to 1948. The major events are discussed and analyzed in Volume III, with the relevant forces and dynamics of each sitution forming the author’s main focus. It is appropriate here, in the discussion of the text’s significance, to draw together Tan Malaka’s perception of a number of events and situations with which he was involved or associated.
The Proclamation of Independence. Tan Malaka opens his discussion with the following words:
Forced by the people of Jakarta under the leadership of the pemuda headquartered at Menteng 31, on 17 August 1945 Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia13 and chose a republican form of government. To me, this momentous event for the people of Indonesia meant stepping from the world of ideas to the world of reality in a period of little over twenty years. (I had written Naar de ‘Republiek Indonesia’ in January 1924 in Singapore.) (Volume III, p. 63)
These sentences sharply bring out the major points of his perspective on the proclaiming of Indonesia’s independence: first, that Sukarno and Hatta were forced to act by the people under the leadership of the pemuda, and second, that Tan Malaka should get the credit as the originator of the idea of “the Republic of Indonesia” (discussed in more detail below, p. lxxxv).
Tan Malaka devotes four chapters of Volume III to developing these two points as the focus for his discussion of the proclamation and its interpretation. Chapter 5 shows that in terms of international law and natural justice, the people of Indonesia had the right to make such a proclamation. Clearly, at the time Tan Malaka wrote this section (1948), this right was being violated in practice by the continuing Dutch occupation of large areas of the territory claimed by the republic of Indonesia. The very survival of the republic was at stake, and so Tan Malaka felt it necessary to prove the case for Indonesian self-determination by invoking the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter.
Chapter 6 considers the revolution in Indonesian terms, clearly differentiating it from the French and Russian revolutions. It discusses “the technology and the economy; the sociopolitical structure; the culture and psychology of the Indonesian people,” showing the reasons Indonesia has chosen self-determination as a republic. The chapter examines the class structure of Indonesia under Dutch colonialism and the effect of the Japanese conquest of the Dutch forces, and of the Japanese occupation itself. Tan Malaka wrote: “The interpretation we place on our August revolution and on every step in our struggle is, then, very important since it is on that basis that we must develop the strategy and tactics for the defense of our revolution” (Volume III, p. 68).
Sukarno himself is the subject of chapter 7 “because it has a strong connection with the question of the Republic of Indonesia’s leadership in this revolutionary period.” This chapter makes trenchant criticism of Sukarno’s political role in cooperating with the Japanese, in making concessions to the Dutch in both the Linggajati and Renville agreements, and in curbing the militancy of the struggle for independence. Chapter 8 is in large part a dramatization of the events in the days leading up to 17 August.
The proclamation of 17 August was not what Sukarno and Hatta wanted; on the contrary, it took place against their wishes. A proclamation that had the full support of Sukarno and Hatta would have straight away been branded by the Allies as a Japanese proclamation. Many people are going to feel offended by this statement, but history is not a dream, a hope, or a fairy tale to please either the reader or those in power; it consists of real facts.
It appears that attempts have already been made to whitewash the history of the proclamation. It is to balance such attempts, to defend truth, and to pass on to our descendants its true history that I am writing this explanation of the events, based on what I saw and heard. (Volume III, p. 85)
Tan Malaka’s explanation and dramatization does indeed place the role of Sukarno and Hatta as “proclamators,” with chief responsibility for the proclamation, in a different perspective than the version of events given at the time, the version which still persists in official histories. In this, Tan Malaka’s account accords with those from the side of the pemuda and their supporters, such as Sidik Kertapati, Subardjo, Adam Malik, and Nasution. On the other hand, Hatta and Sukarno maintained that the proclamation was actually delayed by the actions of the pemuda, although neither denied that it would otherwise have been made at the session of the Committee for the Preparation of Independence of Indonesia established by the Japanese occupation forces, and therefore would have had, as Tan Malaka asserted, a substantially different impact and content.
The “Testament” Affair. The surat wasiat or surat warisan (testament) affair has been one of the principal grounds for the development of a negative image of Tan Malaka as a manipulator and falsifier. Tan Malaka’s interpretation is given in Volume III, chapter 7. He maintains that the initiative of handing over the leadership of the revolution to him, should Sukarno and Hatta be immobilized (for instance in an occupation of Jakarta), came from Sukarno himself, at their first meeting in early September 1945. Tan Malaka says that, at Hatta’s urging, three others were added to the list to inherit the leadership (Sjahrir, Iwa Kusumasumantri, and Wongsonegoro), and Hatta countersigned the document, which was given to Tan Malaka before he left Jakarta on 1 October 1945.
Opponents of Tan Malaka have suggested that he substituted a false text, deleting the other three names;
