From Jail to Jail. Tan Malaka
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Perjuangan versus Diplomasi. Tan Malaka introduces chapter 10 as follows:
I based this conclusion on the following considerations:
1. the conflict between the desires and actions of the head of state and those of people and pemuda everywhere;
2. the conflict and hostility among the parties (e.g., Islamic versus socialist in Pekalongan and Priangan);
3. the hostility among the various militias as shown in Surabaya (shooting from behind);
4. the attitude and actions of the British in acknowledging Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia, and imposing that sovereignty by force of arms on the Indonesian people, who have proclaimed their independence; . . . (Volume III, p. 109)
The Battle of Surabaya was the final determinant in his assessment of the current course of the revolution, with Sukarno and Sjahrir in the leadership, and his conviction that that course had to change if 100 percent independence was to be achieved. Over the next five chapters he provides documentary evidence on the program of the Persatuan Perjuangan, its adoption and modification, and point-by-point refutation of the government’s program adopted to counter the PP program. Chapter 10 describes in great detail the cabinet of March 1946 in which Sjahrir regained the upper hand. It describes this period as one that “drew the line between the initial and secondary phases of the Indonesian revolution, between the phase of mass action and the phase of diplomacy” (Volume III, p. 132).
Chapter 15 is most unusual. It is a profit-and-loss political and economic analysis of the Linggajati and Renville agreements in algebraic terms. Couched in Tan Malaka’s caustic style, this fifty-page chapter makes fascinating reading as he dissects and attacks the treaties article by article. To my knowledge, it is the most comprehensive analysis of the implications for Indonesian independence of these treaties. Harsh though it is, this criticism of Tan Malaka’s received subsequent endorsement from Sukarno, who wrote that “Linggajati was a shower of ice water on the fire of revolution.”15
The 3 July Affair. Like the Testament Affair, the 3 July Affair (also known as the “coup d’etat of Tan Malaka”), has been used by his opponents to show Tan Malaka’s megalomania and readiness to use extralegal methods. In the concluding chapters of his autobiography Tan Malaka documents the arrest of himself and others on 17 March 1946, and his own experiences in various jails during the ensuing two years, up to the conclusion of the book in March 1948. The government’s “Official Statement” on the 3 July Affair is reproduced, together with his own refutation of the allegations made in that document. Tan Malaka maintains that he was not involved in either the kidnapping of Sjahrir, nor the show of strength at the palace on 3 July. Further, he asserts that his philosophy of mass action excluded such an approach to political change. Certainly, despite every effort over a period of two and a half years, the government was unable to lay charges against him. The introduction to Volume III was written in October 1948, after Tan Malaka’s release from jail and after the Madiun Affair (both of which took place in September). It contains the following bitter comment on the affair, likening the republican government’s actions to those of the colonial and imperialist powers.
My experiences over more than a quarter of a century in prisons in many parts of the world have never once concluded with a satisfactory feeling of justice achieved. In March 1922 the “East Indies” judiciary did not “permit” me to face “Gerecht, Recht en Rechtvaardigheid” (Judiciary, Jurisdiction, and Justice) Dutch style. In Manila at the beginning of August 1927 the United States, which idolizes “democracy and justice,” was not even willing to permit me to come face to face with its legal experts in its court of justice, as I had been promised when arrested. England, which brags about being “democratic” and praises to the skies its “British justice,” preferred to detain and isolate me in its Hong Kong prison for several months at the end of 1932. Even our republic, supposedly a nation of law, which claims to have had cause for our arrest in Madiun, had to think for two and a half years about constructing a charge against us. When Sukarni and I were freed on 16 September 1948 from the prison at Magelang, this charge still had not been formulated and presented to us. (Volume III, p. 9)
Besides being one of the few contemporary primary sources on the revolution, From Jail to Jail is of particular importance because Tan Malaka was the first “loser”; the principal advocate of the perjuangan course of action that lost out to diplomasi. It is, ipso facto, an analysis that runs counter to official histories and memoirs of those whose policies carried the day.
Tan Malaka makes no bones of the fact that this presentation of his life story is made to serve particular ends. He does not purport to be writing an unbiased and objective history of the revolution. His introduction to Volume III states as follows:
This volume . . . has its beginnings in my detention in a prison of the republic and concerns the resulting judicial process. Therefore it is rather abstract and theoretical, tending toward the polemical. Here I deal with such questions as my philosophy of life, the nature of the state, the Persatuan Perjuangan, negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, and so on. All this is part of my defense against the “charge” that has been made against me (see the official statement).
This volume can in no way be a complete defense, since it appears that the office of the public prosecutor, which has the “right” to press charges, is unable to present a clearly formulated accusation. A clear and systematic defense naturally cannot be prepared on the basis of a “charge” that is still being awaited and is only a matter of speculation. This volume, then, is not intended as my defense, but should be seen rather as material for a defense that is as yet unformulated. (Volume III, p. 3)
In advancing his own defense, Tan Malaka is selective in his choice of matters to discuss and what lines of argument to follow. Does this purposeful and partisan intent make the work any less valuable as a primary source? I believe not. My research into the events described has found a high degree of accuracy in his depiction of events. His polemics are always presented clearly as his own interpretation or opinion. Tan Malaka’s account is not diminished by his being an actor in the events described, with a vital concern for their outcome. On the contrary, this very involvement and passion make the work such a valuable contribution to our understanding of the process of the revolution.
As Marxist Historiography
By 1947-1948, although many people and organizations had declared themselves to be Marxist in orientation or origin, a Marxist historiography had not yet developed in Indonesia. It might even be said that Indonesian historiography of any form was still in its formative stage. Before the war a colonial historiography, viewing Indonesia’s history through the prism of the colonial power’s “civilizing mission” and “modernizing influence” had dominated the official educational system, and the countervailing influence to such an interpretation came only from regional histories (predominantly in traditional chronicle form), historical fiction, and personal or family histories.
It was not until 1938 that a book declaring itself to be a “history of Indonesia” was published: Zainoeddin Saleh and Anwar Dusky’s Ringkasan sedjarah Indonesia (Padang: Express, 1938). In spite of its title, this book was criticized at the time as being so firmly in the mold of colonial history “that a reader might reasonably ask whether it was written by a foreigner.”16
During the Japanese occupation, Sanusi Pane’s Sedjarah Indonesia appeared, the first three volumes