rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_449378d6-5226-57f4-a5c1-888158710fb0">45 This speaks of a distinct canonical awareness in Van Til’s interpretive approach.
Fifth, he emphasized the exhaustively personal and covenantal environment in which man exists and interprets.46 Likewise, God’s revelation, both general and special, is exhaustively personal and covenantal.47 As we shall see later, this idea is rooted in his doctrine of the Trinity, in which the three persons are covenantally related.48 However, for now, consider the implications for biblical interpretation. For example, Van Til insists that “covenant theology furnishes the only completely personalistic interpretation of reality.”49 This means that a biblical ontology is ultimately personal and covenantal—and must inform one’s epistemological approach to interpreting Scripture. Hence, reflecting the Trinity, theology and hermeneutics are inherently ethical activities. Either one interprets as a covenant keeper or as a covenant breaker in relation to the triune Creator.50 All of this resonates with issues in contemporary hermeneutics which center on whether the reader has an ethical obligation to the original author,51 and if so, what is the nature of that obligation?
Lastly, and closely related to the previous category of statements, there is a persistent concern in Van Til’s writings that men must submit to the pre-interpreted word of God or else it will only mean what they want it to mean.52 He vividly brings this point home when discussing the room left open for human autonomy in the hermeneutics of Bultmann, Fuchs, and Ebeling. Ultimately, these theologians, regardless of their particular emphases, are “following the example of Adam . . . modern theologians demythologize the voice of God and reduce it to ventriloquism.”53 It is clear that his concern parallels that of many contemporary evangelicals in response to postmodern trends in hermeneutics.54
Many more statements like these, appearing in various apologetic contexts, could be added to the list. However, my immediate concern here is not to be exhaustive but, rather, suggestive of macro-hermeneutical trajectories in his thought. As the above quotations show, Van Til repeatedly made reference to the concepts of meaning and interpretation in his writings, albeit in ways uncommon to most contemporary treatments.
Hermeneutical Response to Van Til
The general hermeneutical response to Van Til’s ideas has been lackluster to say the least. He has either received decidedly short and mixed reviews among some scholars, or from others, no review at all. Most fall into the latter category. In what follows, we will mention how Van Til has been spoken of and attempt to provide a succinct evaluation and response. Our aim here is not to be exhaustive, but to paint a picture in broad but accurate strokes.
First, let us consider a few examples of those who bring Van Til’s name up in hermeneutic discussion, yet are quick to dismiss his relevance for one reason or another. At the outset of his seminal work, The Two Horizons, Anthony C. Thiselton seeks to defuse possible objections to his explicitly philosophical approach to hermeneutics. He argues that such an approach is fitting due to the wider issues that have become part of the hermeneutical discussion.55 Curiously, after helpfully providing examples of this significant shift, he singles out Van Til as one who would oppose “any attempts” at such an endeavor. While agreeing that Christian revelation must have preeminence for all aspects of life, Thiselton warns against rejecting philosophical categories (apparently including Van Til as a proponent of such a view) in New Testament interpretation.56 He argues that to borrow certain conceptual tools from philosophy does not necessarily entail a subscription to a philosopher’s particular worldview.57
In response to Thiselton, it would seem that his fears, though understandable, are ultimately unfounded. Even a cursory glance at Van Til’s writings reveals a thorough working knowledge of philosophical categories and actual use of many “conceptual tools,” as Thiselton calls them. In particular, Van Til borrows largely from idealism in service of his theological formulation—e.g., concrete universal, limiting concept, implication, and linear inference.58 One example of a philosophical emphasis found in idealism which he found to be particularly helpful was that there needs to be comprehensive knowledge somewhere for there to be any true (partial) knowledge anywhere.59 He even articulates an interesting corollary to this thought related to the issue of dialogue between God and man in discussing the thought of Martin Buber: “One cannot find signs of God’s address to man anywhere unless one finds them everywhere and unless one finds them as controlling the whole of history from its very beginning.”60 To be sure, Van Til self-consciously re-defined such terms and concepts on the basis of a Christian worldview, but if anything, he sought tirelessly after a comprehensive Christian philosophy, covering the same ground as any nuanced secular system in terms of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.61 After all, in order to challenge unbelief at every point where it is found and function consistently with the precedent set in Scripture (1 Pet 3:15; 2 Cor 10:5), the apologetic method must address all legitimate categories. He even defined apologetics in the following manner, “the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of the non-Christian philosophy of life.”62 He argued that due to the comprehensive nature of what is involved in stating and vindicating a Christian theology, one necessarily must state and defend an entire Christian philosophy.63 Van Til did emphasize the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian thought, yet not in a way which ignored conceptual tools but, rather, in a way that involved the very use of them. He explicitly states that it is not wrong to make formal use of categories of thought from any thinker.64 Van Til did not shy away from philosophy, even as he confronted it. Due to his extensive interaction and borrowing of philosophical terminology, he was often accused of following and endorsing those very schools he opposed. For example, he has been labeled by his critics as Kantian,65 an idealist,66 and a follower of Kierkegaard.67 This at least shows that he truly engaged philosophically with differing views, even to the point of being accused of following them.
In discussing the rise of postmodernism and its impact on the field of hermeneutics, D. A. Carson considers various Christian apologetic responses. He mentions Van Til as coming out of a form of the fideist school, which he associates with Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and more generally, with all forms of reformed foundationalism. He cites the classroom experience of John Cooper’s presuppositionalist attack on modernism as evidence of the practical futility of such an approach in a postmodern world. In short, Cooper’s impassioned focus on presuppositions is met by an unimpressed Paul Ricoeur, who merely asks Cooper to validate his own presuppositions.68 Carson goes on to say that in light of the unique challenges of postmodernism, standard apologetic approaches (e.g., evidentialism and presuppositionalism) “simply
