discusses the legacy of Van Til’s apologetic in terms of the present context of postmodernism. He highlights Van Til’s all-encompassing vision which governs our view of reality (ontology) and our access to it (epistemology).119 He applauds Van Til’s emphasis on a covenantal epistemology which shows that the deep problems of apologetics “are not final intellectual, but ethical.”120 Horton sees these points to be especially relevant to a contemporary situation where rationalism and empiricism have crumbled. Postmodernity has now adopted the myth of neutrality as a by-word and assumed the stance of truly coming to grips with horizons, language games, and paradigms. One will recognize these terms as regular verbiage in contemporary hermeneutics. In Horton’s opinion, Van Til’s approach is uniquely equipped to deal more adequately with such issues and to confront the ethical rebellion lurking behind unbiblical notions of them.121
More directly, albeit much more briefly, William Edgar introduces the second edition of Van Til’s Christian Apologetics with the call for not only providing more detailed applications of Van Til’s pioneering work, but also to apply his thought to other fields besides apologetics. In particular, he believes more work must be done in the area of philosophy in order to engage contemporary issues. He specifically asks, “How does [Van Til’s] approach work its way into discussion . . . with hermeneutical philosophies?”122
In a critical discussion of Van Til’s concept of analogy, James Emery White raises the question of how one is supposed to “determine the correct analogical correspondence in light of the subjective interpretation of the text?”123 He claims that particular weaknesses in Van Til’s ideas, such as a lack of clarity in knowing how and when our interpretation coincides with God’s and a general neglect of the hermeneutical problem of subjective interpretation, contribute to endorsing an infallible hermeneutic for the regenerate (similar to Sparks). Again, there seems to be some confusion present throughout his argument, evidenced by the fact that White at one point associates Van Til with Gordon Clark124 (an outspoken opponent of Van Til’s epistemology), and at other points cites and endorses accusations of fideism125 and Kantianism.126 Regardless of these particular misconceptions, what is interesting for our purposes is that all of this leads White to conclude: “Put simply, Van Til leaves no room in his concept of truth for the serious hermeneutical issues his system generates.”127 Even if White ultimately disagrees with Van Til’s system and his ability to provide adequate answers for the issues raised by it, there remains at least the acknowledgment of its relevance for hermeneutics.
J. I. Packer, in an essay for Van Til’s festschrift, speaks of the inherent relations between biblical authority, inerrancy, and hermeneutics. He observes that “it appears also from the fact that every hermeneutic implies a theology . . . where a false hermeneutic operates the Bible will not in fact have authority, whatever is claimed to the contrary.”128 This observation clearly parallels Van Til’s own insistence upon apologetic method assuming either the truth or the falsity of Christian theism as its starting point.129 More specifically, “every bit of exegesis of Scripture already involves a view of the nature of Scripture.”130 Packer laments the tendency of latter-day evangelical separation of interpretive principles and the conditions and means of understanding.131 Again there is a similar concern in Van Til’s emphasis on deeper philosophical presuppositions and preconditions related to knowledge and method.
Krabbendam comes to many of the same conclusions Van Til does in his work on the subject.132 He also locates the new hermeneutic within the larger hermeneutical stream running from Schleiermacher, Heidegger, Gadamer, and theologians, such as Bultmann and Barth. It is Krabbendam’s “transcendental appraisal of the New Hermeneutic” which particularly resonates with Van Til’s own critique. He sees the fundamental failure of the new hermeneutic, and modern hermeneutics in general, in an assumed Kantian dualism which provides its basic framework.133 This nature-freedom dialectic of Kant is expressed in terms of the subject-object relation (nature) and a transcendence of that relationship (freedom). There exists a fundamental opposition between the two realms, while at the same time a presupposing of one another. There is a necessary subject-object relationship, yet that relationship must necessarily be transcended in order for true hermeneutical understanding to be achieved.134 The new hermeneutic’s failure comes into focus amidst the backdrop of such dialecticism. It is not interested in traditional rules or techniques of interpretation because such things are merely carried out in the realm of nature. Epistemologically, it seeks understanding in the non-objectifiable realm of freedom. Yet no matter how much they try to achieve such understanding via the so-called language event, objectifying assertions remain inescapable. True understanding remains a perpetual mirage. It allows higher critical methods to have final authority in the nature realm regarding Scripture and assumes that the language of the Bible is “metaphysically deficient,” failing to transcend objectification (i.e., the language of Scripture is inadequate and incapable of expressing its own subject matter.) Seeking to bridge the gap between objectifying and non-objectifying understanding, the new hermeneutic only succeeds in further objectification.135 Krabbendam insists that it is this assumed and unquestioned dialectic which must be confronted in order to expose its true nature—rebellion against the God of Scripture.136 Specifically, this presupposed dialectic is symptomatic of fallen man in general, who seeks to interpret creation from an autonomous vantage point—one not in submission to Scripture but rather one which suppresses it.
It is important to note how Krabbendam brings Van Til’s own critique of the new hermeneutic into view, while endorsing the scope of its application beyond it. First, he seeks to confront a presupposed framework of metaphysics and epistemology underlying the more salient features. Second, he seeks to expose the unstable mix of rationalistic and irrationalistic elements of the dialectic which undermine its own claims and goals. Third, he identifies the new hermeneutic with the ethical rebellion of the would-be autonomous man against the God of Scripture. He and Van Til both understand the search for the transcendence of the subject-object relation as a sinfully evasive move.137 Fourth, he argues that the dialectic underlying the new hermeneutic is merely symptomatic of fallen man’s attempt to conceive of reality and knowledge apart from Scripture. Hence, the critique leveled at the new hermeneutic by Van Til, it is argued, is fit for biblically evaluating other hermeneutical approaches and philosophies.
Bahnsen has identified a search for epistemological certainty among twentieth-century philosophers.138 He surveys three key figures representing the schools of both pragmatism and linguistic analysis: Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Austin. The latter two are particularly notable because of their association with contemporary hermeneutics. Wittgenstein’s concept of language games and Austin’s speech-act theory have become common parlance in the field. None of the three is ultimately able to escape skepticism regarding certainty, because, according to Bahnsen, they never started with the only presuppositions fit for the task.
