noting the necessity of addressing epistemological problems, justification, objectivity, and the need for a self-attesting worldview which will ground certainty, he turns to Van Til for clarity.140 The key issue boils down to the relation of the human mind to the divine mind and with respect to how the human mind attempts to interpret reality.141 Perhaps more pointed is the question: “Which mind, man or God’s, is to be taken as original and epistemologically ultimate?”142 Christian epistemology, he argues, is “revelationally transcendental in character.”143 Bahnsen asserts that modern philosophy is encumbered by a phenomenalism wherein all methods of interpretation have become anchored in the mind of man as an autonomous thinker, who seeks to impose order on an ultimately chaotic, irrational reality.144 What of Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Austin? In spite of helpful emphases in terms of epistemological awareness, they too are entangled in the dialectical tensions between rationalism and irrationalism, leading to ultimate skepticism.145 Clearly, Bahnsen sees the relevance of Van Til’s thought for broader issues which necessarily affect hermeneutics.
In a different, but relevant context, Beale brings up Van Til in his interaction with Peter Enns concerning his book, Inspiration and Incarnation. Beale asks whether we should allow extra-biblical ancient Near Eastern texts to dictate the genre of Genesis or let it speak for itself. Beale opts for the latter, for only then can we rightly seek to understand its relation to extra-biblical texts. He criticizes Enns’ use of these texts as a lens through which to understand the Old Testament, as well as his endorsement of Second Temple Jewish hermeneutics as a lens through which to understand the hermeneutics of the New Testament authors.146 Ironically, Enns claims to be coming from a “reformed, specifically presuppositional, theological, and epistemological starting point.”147 Beale acknowledges his own indebtedness to Van Til and argues that Enns has got it all backwards. Van Til would first start with Scripture and judge all things by Scripture.148 He would seek to understand the self-interpretation of Scripture first and then judge all ancient Near Eastern texts and Second Temple Jewish methods accordingly. What is intriguing is that Van Til is considered relevant to a hermeneutical discussion of which he never directly wrote about.149
Somewhat perplexing, however, is Beale’s mention of Van Til in another, yet related hermeneutical context. This time he is dealing with postmodern questions regarding the New Testament use of the Old Testament. Beale seeks to explain a biblical epistemology in which “we can sufficiently, but not exhaustively, understand the meaning of the biblical authors’ writings.”150 Specifically, he is responding to Moyise’s view that what is important is not whether the New Testament author respected the Old Testament context, but how the Old Testament context interacts with the New Testament context, sometimes creating new understandings which can redefine and distort the original context by placing it in a new one.151 Contrary to Moyise’s subjectivist hermeneutic, Beale favors N. T. Wright’s “critical realism,”152 which seeks to avoid the extremes of objectivism and subjectivism.153 Beale seems to adopt an epistemology which is essentially based on probability and a horizontal frame of reference, rather than one consistently in relation to God.154 Yet, this is clearly something that he wants to avoid, as is evident later, when he grounds his epistemology and meaning in the transcendent God of Scripture.155 He then suggests that Wright’s epistemology of “presuppositional verification” as being very close to that of Kuyper, Van Til, and Gordon Clark, as well as the common sense hermeneutical validation of E. D. Hirsch.156 The key observation to be made at this point is twofold. First, Beale lumps Van Til in with some strange bedfellows—namely, Wright, Clark, and Hirsch.157 This will become more apparent later, but there seems to be some over-generalization and a neglect of epistemological differences among these individuals, especially in relation to Van Til. Second, Beale has rightly underscored the need for a distinctively Christian epistemology in order to clarify and properly evaluate a key issue in contemporary hermeneutics (i.e., New Testament use of the Old Testament). In doing so, he brings Van Til into consideration, yet in a way which begs for more elaboration. Moreover, he has recognized that the stability of meaning can only be found in an omniscient, sovereign, and transcendent God. This implies that not only do we need a distinctively Christian epistemology for hermeneutics, but a Christian ontology as well.
McCartney and Clayton have also cited Van Til favorably in their work on biblical interpretation.158 Much of their general approach implicitly resonates well with many of Van Til’s particular emphases. There is a clear emphasis on the doctrine of God and its relevance for interpretation. For instance, they see God’s comprehensive knowledge, among other things, as the ultimate solution to many of the common postmodern objections against absolute truth. Our knowledge is limited and partial in relation to this comprehensive knowledge, yet grounded in it.159 God provides the basis for interpretation which is both truly objective and subjective. God’s horizon comprehends all horizons in the interpretive process.160 They also emphasize both God’s personal nature (in terms of the ontological Trinity) and his ultimate authority in determining meaning.161 They clearly root the goal and method of hermeneutics in God. He must point us to the goal of interpretation primarily in terms of the Bible’s own interpretation of itself, from which method naturally flows. This involves having sensitivity to both systematic and biblical theology.162 Since methods are determined by the hermeneutical goal, there is no neutrality in interpretation,163 not only with respect to the presuppositions we bring to the text, but also their relation to God as the determiner of the goal.
However, they explicitly make reference to Van Til when discussing the foundations of understanding. Unbelievers, in seeking to make an absolute judgment concerning truth yet denying the Christian system of truth found in Scripture, must essentially put themselves in the place of God as omniscient.164 They argue that human reason can only function effectively as a tool to comprehend language and other created things if it is conceived of according to the Creator-creature distinction. This is also rooted in how Scripture speaks of man’s constitution and the created world around him (Rom 1:19–21).165 When discussing the relationship between general and special revelation as it relates to interpretation, they argue that facts only have meaning in relation to other facts. Hence, there are no brute facts (i.e., no fact exists apart from the meaning the Creator has given to it). “No fact or predication about reality can be known, let alone stated, without a framework of understanding.”166 Similarly, when discussing the underlying issue in using Scripture in evangelism, they bring
