in garnering attention from the government of Thailand, and made them realize that even a Royal Project could be drawn into such a fray. It also resulted in only a partial confiscation of lands from the Akha villages, instead of a complete confiscation, the most likely outcome had McDaniel not organized the campaign. In the end, however, McDaniel can be seen as being only partially successful, as he was unable to pressure the Royal Project to return all the land that it had taken from the Akha villages.7
Indigenous activists in Thailand have recently unsuccessfully tried to gain Thai government support for draft legislation associated with the recognition of indigenous peoples in Thailand. Thailand’s Office of Ethnic Affairs prefers the term chattiphan to the more political concept of chon phao pheun muang, or indigenous peoples (see Baird et al. 2017).
This notwithstanding, there have been some promising developments in recent years. In particular, in 2010 the Thai government agreed, in two separate cabinet resolutions, to establish “special cultural zones” (khet wattanatham phiset in Thai) for the seafaring Moken or “Chao Lay” people in southern Thailand and the ethnic Karen in western and northern Thailand.8 The first resolution, issued on 2 June, was titled “Revitalizing the Sea People’s Way of Life.” The second, adopted on 3 August, was titled “Revitalizing the Karen Way of Life.” These resolutions fall short of recognizing the concept of indigeneity, but they are significant developments, as they at least provide government recognition and support for protecting the particular lifestyles and livelihoods of two groups of people based on ethnicity—a first for Thailand. It is not surprising, for various reasons, that the Karen were among the first to be connected to this sort of designation, as their agricultural and natural resource management practices have been romanticized to some extent among activists and scholars (see Forsyth and Walker 2008; Walker 2001). Many Karen also have closer ties and a longer history with Thai lowlanders and Buddhism than other ethnic groups such as the Hmong, Iu-Mien, Akha, Lisa, and Lahu, thus making them potentially more acceptable and familiar to Thai government officials.
While the practical value of these resolutions remains to be seen, and while they have been criticized by some Thai academics for not going far enough, they have so far resulted in the establishment of provincial committees in each of the provinces where substantial numbers of people from these two groups are found. These committees are tasked with developing plans for successfully protecting the cultures of these groups, including considering ways in which aspects of local cultures linked to natural resource management can be protected. The proposed measures have important potential to provide these indigenous communities with more rights in relation to their self-management of natural resources, although the extent to which they can be effectively implemented remains uncertain. Other indigenous groups in Thailand have also expressed interest in having similar “special cultural zones” designated for them, but it remains unclear whether these groups will receive the same considerations.
The following excerpt from an August 2011 statement made by indigenous representatives on behalf of the Network of Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Groups in Thailand, on the occasion of the Fifth Festival of Indigenous Peoples in Thailand, at Thapae Gate in Chiang Mai, illustrates the link between the indigenous peoples’ movement and land and resource issues:
Our cultures are closely attached to our land, water and forest resources, especially with respect to the rotational farming which has been part of our identity and traditions for generations. This right is enshrined in the Thai constitution of 2007 under Articles 66 and 67, as well as many international laws including the International Convention on Bio-diversity (Articles 8[j] and 10[c]).
We ask the responsible government agencies to work for the revision of laws and policies on natural resources conservation and management which conflict with the constitution and international agreements and obligations. Moreover, we call for the cessation of actions which diminish and abuse these rights of community use of natural resources in a sustainable manner and institution of measures promoting community rights and authority in environmental resource management. Mechanisms must be in place which ensure joint and genuine community-state participation, as well as state policies and laws which clearly specify local and community rights in these matters.9
Interestingly, indigenous activists are linking their narratives to the Thai constitution (see Baird et al. 2017) and international agreements such as the Convention on Biodiversity. Even if indigenous peoples are not yet legally recognized in Thailand, their movement has certainly become more sophisticated than it was just a few decades ago.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR or Laos) has the greatest ethnic diversity of the three countries under consideration here, and it is generally acknowledged that over half of the population of the country is made up of people outside of the dominant Lao ethnic group and that at least one-third of the population speak first languages other than those in the Tai-Lao language family (IWGIA 2009). The Government of Laos (GoL) recognizes forty-nine distinct ethnic groups, and over 160 ethnic subgroups (IWGIA 2013; LFNC 2005). Although the GoL has not recognized the concept of “indigenous peoples” (xon phao pheun muang in Lao), they have nevertheless recognized people from all ethnic groups within their territorial confines as lawful citizens (Baird 2015). For example, Article 22 of the 1991 constitution of Lao PDR states: “Ethnic groups are all equal before the law.” In line with this, the GoL has long been firmly against discrimination based on ethnicity. For example, in 2009 the vice-president of the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC) was quoted by the Vientiane Times (2009) as stating, “any acts creating division and discrimination among ethnic groups were prohibited.” However, the GoL abides by a version of the saltwater theory, which fits with their longstanding policy that all citizens, whether they belong to an ethnic group or not, have equal rights (Baird 2015; LFNC 2005; Vientiane Times 2009). This is essentially a policy that recognizes ethnic diversity, but is ultimately founded on equality between ethnic groups rather than differences. Multicultural equality is the officially stated goal, even when the reality often falls short of official rhetoric, as reflected in the examples of restrictions associated with swidden or shifting cultivation, and the resettlement of minorities from villages in the uplands to settlements along major roads and in the lowlands (Baird and Shoemaker 2007).
There were reasons to believe that the GoL was becoming more accepting of the concept of indigenous peoples in the mid to late 2000s. In 2007, for example, they signed onto the UNDRIP, as did all other countries in Asia, and in 2008 and 2009 the United National Development Programme (UNDP) collaborated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the LFNC to recognize “Indigenous Peoples’ Day” in Vientiane, the capital city (IWGIA 2010; Phongkhao 2008; Vientiane Times 2009). Since then, however, no further government-endorsed celebrations have been permitted. Moreover, over the last few years, the GoL has increasingly objected to the use of the term “indigenous peoples” in project documents prepared by NGOs, international organizations, and donors, typically insisting on its replacement with the term “ethnic peoples.” Furthermore, whereas at least two local organizations linked to particular ethnic groups were registered in around 2009 (IWGIA 2011), the GoL is not presently allowing any new civil society organizations, or non-profit associations (NPAs) as they are known in Laos, to register if they have links to ethnic groups. Illustrative of this trend, on 27 April 2012 the Interior Division of Champasak Province, in southern Laos, denied the request made by a group of indigenous peoples to establish an NPA linked to “ethnic groups” in the province. The reason given for this denial was that the NPA would not be related to vocational training, and was therefore prohibited due to local interpretation of the Lao law. In addition, written correspondence stated that the LFNC and other GoL officials were sufficiently positioned to work with the different ethnic groups, thus making such an NPA unnecessary (Saisopha 2012).
The
