also reflected in the workers of the emergency services community in the United States (and abroad).
Technology is only a tool in a collective toolbox for our military. Much of that same technology is used on a daily basis in emergency response activities. The military of the twenty‐first century has had to deal with technological leaps that are unprecedented in history. These leaps have undoubtedly caused many headaches and unseen problems that were unknown.
These same technological advances have been the cause of many problems to military leaders of the past. Modern warfare requires technology to become bigger and better, faster and stronger, but the warrior on the ground remains the most important part of war. Technology will allow him to win war with greater speed and ease, provided that the technology is managed and integrated into the plan of attack. Even with technology, it is the soldier on the ground fighting, and sometimes dying, in war that makes the true difference.
The same holds true in respect to emergency responders. It is not the soldier, but the firefighter, the police officers, the emergency managers, and the paramedic or Emergency Medical Technician's (EMT's) that serve their country on the home front. Technology will not, and cannot, do their jobs for them; it does however allow them to do their jobs in a more proficient manner and to undertake their tasks more efficiently. The men and women of emergency services make up the front line of Homeland Defense.
As we look back over time, it is plain to see that many of the fathers of incident command and incident management system had military backgrounds. They could see the obvious and sometime the unobvious needs of their emergency response agencies. They began to mold and modify military command and control structures learned while serving their country and developed those tools into systems that would allow their agencies to better respond to individuals who needed assistance during a time of crisis.
These individuals first adopted, then adapted, military command philosophy to be used in their day‐to‐day response activities as first responders. This adaptation process was not seamless nor was it an overnight success. Even after many years of honing these systems, incident management systems are still evolving, which creates a never‐ending process. The emergency services community looks to the military for guidance in ever‐increasing demands for response to incidents, and they rely on lessons learned in their own responses. The concepts that drive both emergency services incident management theory and military theories of tactical responses are still evolving. Often, those changes and improvements are on similar tracks, and for the most part, they always have been.
The beginnings of the modern‐day Incident Management Systems for public safety were born almost simultaneously in vastly different areas. They were developed for a wide and somewhat diverse array of reasons with one common goal. That goal was to better serve the needs of the community and to save lives and protect property in superior ways. Where each of these individual principals originated is still in question.
1.4 The Birth of IMS Method
When a public safety student begins to study emergency management theory, they will realize that there is a “documented birth” of IMS. While other incidents may have helped form IMS methods, the focused creation as a public safety entity‐based management system came about in the late 1960s. It was developed after the devastating wildfires that ravaged parts of Southern California. The fire service in California (as well as other state and local agencies) knew that they had to find ways to overcome a series of repeated deficiencies, mistakes, and negative events that seemed to occur during large‐scale, statewide (or multiagency) emergency operations. The agencies who responded to these incidents began to identify common failures in their response efforts to these events. These ongoing problems were especially important when multiple agencies responded to the same incident, and the same issues were seen time, and time, again. The most apparent problems, at least in the initial stages of creating IMS methods, appeared to be the same (or at least similar) issues.
1.4.1 No Single Person in Charge
As larger incidents occurred, often multiple jurisdictions would gather at the emergency incident, and there would be no clear command or person in charge. Additionally, in most instances, each entity did not communicate, coordinate, or collaborate with other first responders. With no clearly identifiable incident leader, it became apparent that multiple different agencies responding to the same incident had their own goals and objectives. This often led to more chaos and confusion, and it put first responders at risk as each agency “did their own thing.” Due to the fact that multiple entities were operating independently, competing tactics were sometimes contradictory to each other and dangerous to other crews operating at the scene of a major incident.
Old timers from the 1950s and the 1960s used to tell stories about how incredibly dangerous this was. While there is no way to confirm these stories, we often heard about firefighters who were directly attacking the flames with fire trucks and hoses, who would become caught in a wall of fire on all sides. From those stories, we learned that sometimes, later responding mutual aid crews did not know the first crew was actively fighting the flames, so they did what they felt was needed. These mutual aid crews would (sometimes) light backburn fires that would surround the first arriving crew, and the first arriving crew would be forced to run (or drive) for their life.
The old timers also told stories of crews helping to fight a structure fire, unaware that there were firefighters in the structure. Unbeknownst to the crews in the house, the mutual aid entity would arrive on scene, and not seeing anyone in charge, they would do what they thought was best. Not finding anyone in charge at a Command Post was typically because the command officers were usually with their crews fighting inside the fire rather than being at a Command Post and looking at the response objectively. This usually led to the mutual aid entity doing what they thought was best, and it would often cause issues. Sometimes those issues would turn life‐threatening. In firefighting, this would sometimes case a situation where interior firefighters would be hit with a large bore stream of water from the outside, or ventilation that drew the fire toward firefighters rather than away from them. This often resulted in injuries to firefighters inside.
During police actions, the old‐timers told stories of law enforcement officers nearly getting shot, primarily because the other agency had no idea the mutual aid agency was there. With tensions already high, the mutual aid agency unaware that a perimeter was partially in place, would come around the corner only to see a weapon pointed at them. There were times when officers did not realize that another officer was in the area when they were chasing a suspect, and in the pitch black, they would mistake another officer for the perpetrator. These are only a few of the dangerous issues that were caused by a lack of central command. If you want to hear some truly horrifying stories of near‐death experiences, find an old retired firefighter or law enforcement officer, and ask them to share some of their stories. The time you spend with them will be very enlightening.
1.4.2 No Formal Protocols or Policies
In the old days, prior to IMS, there were often no formal protocols, policies, or even legal statutes, that clarified the responsibility of who was in charge at major incidents. There was no clear‐cut identification of who oversaw the incident, and who reported to whom, and in what capacity. While there were some laws that could be cited (which somewhat addressed the issue) on a state‐by‐state basis, none of the laws in the 1950s through the 1970s was definitive enough to provide the clarity needed. They often failed to identify a single person or a singular agency that was in charge. Those laws that were often written were so vague, or incomplete, that they were usually left up to the interpretation of those responding, or by the entities they represented. They were also often based on the perspective of the mutual aid responding agency.
A lack of policies, especially in where a fire departments primary geographical response boundary was, caused many issues. In some instances,
