would have to be flexible in order to meet the needs of the organization, regardless of size, as well as supporting the mitigation of incidents of varying types and sizes.
Agencies would need to be able to use the method on a day‐to‐day basis. This meant the method would have to meet the needs of daily use, as well as catastrophic emergencies and disasters.
The method would need to be simple enough to use that personnel from an assortment of agencies and assorted geographic locations could swiftly merge into a common organizational structure.
The method would need to be cost‐effective.
Once the structure of the system was completed, the ICS framework continued to change to meet the previously mentioned needs. The system began to evolve and gain acceptance, albeit slowly. It began to spread across the United States similar to the wildfires that it was designed to manage. Many larger agencies, and eventually states themselves, began to accept, perfect, and acclimate themselves with the work that originated in California for use in their agency.
In the mid‐to‐late 1980s, the National Fire Academy (NFA) began to fund regional classes that taught the Incident Command System to firefighters. These direct delivery classes typically utilized instructors that were already teaching fire classes. Usually, these instructors worked for a state training entity, to help create and integrate a standard for managing incidents. These instructors would usually teach the ICS classes on a county‐by‐county basis. By teaching ICS on a county‐by‐county strategy, the local firefighter would only have to travel to a class that was in their local county. Rather than going hundreds (if not thousands) of miles to receive training, they usually only had to travel under 30 miles. In most instances, one ICS class was offered per county, per year, throughout the United States.
1.7 Evolution of IMS Methods
The creation of the ICS method was a result of a chain of fires that challenged the California response community. Like the development of a physical item, history tends to remember the item itself rather than the development and the methods that were created to make it. As an example, if you were to attempt to remember the basic history of the light bulb, most individuals would say that Thomas Edison invented it in 1879. If you were to dig deeper, historical evidence would reveal that many different inventors played a role in the development process of the incandescent light bulb.
Much like the invention of the light bulb, the modern‐day ICS component of NIMS being currently used by the first responder community was a well‐designed result, or byproduct, of the Incident Command System. ICS was initially developed for the specific needs of large‐scale wildland fires, although it should be mentioned that is was not the only IMS method developed. It became apparent to users of the early versions of ICS that the method (itself) was appropriate for use in other emergencies, including manmade and natural disasters.
More likely than not, the early development of ICS, beyond the use of wildland firefighting situations, was also carried out by Californians. The State of California seems to have a greater propensity for assorted disasters, which seems to occur somewhat regularly both on a large scale and a smaller scale. Sometimes the State of California has major disasters back to back.
The reason for further development of ICS made perfect sense. The first responder community quickly realized that the same underlying factors and problems that led the wildland firefighting community to develop ICS were quite often shared by other disciplines and in similar and dissimilar incidents. When it came to multidisciplinary response, the management of those other disciplines did not seem to integrate with the proven ICS method. If fire departments needed the assistance of law enforcement, EMS, emergency management, and public works, they were usually not on the same page as the fire department. This affected the management of these incidents both in terms of complexity and scope, not to mention frustration. Much like the problems that plagued multiagency response in California, similar commonalities were seen nationwide with multidisciplinary response, and usually revolved around
Spans of control were too large (too many people reporting to one supervisor).
Varying and dissimilar types of organizational structures (among different disciplines and agencies) responding to the same incident.
A variety of types and levels of government who did not work well together.
Little or no formal method to consistently share incident information.
Incompatible and inadequate communication systems (and procedures) between disciplines.
No formal method of coordinated planning among agencies and disciplines.
Severe misinterpretations of lines of authority.
Substantial terminology differences between agencies and differing response disciplines.
Lack of formal, or in some cases unspecified, incident objectives.
Lack of any incident action planning.
Lack of backup plans in case the initial plans failed.
One typical factor in most major disasters is that they usually occur with no warning. These disasters and incidents tend to develop rapidly and can grow from the initial incident. A prime example of this might be as a small grass fire that evolves and expands into a major wildland forest fire. These incidents can transpire rapidly and become a multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary response that crosses multiple jurisdictional boundaries. Some common examples of these types of incidents might include an earthquake, a tsunami, severe thunderstorms, tornadoes, a large hazardous material spill (such as a pipeline break or train derailment), and other similar incidents.
It is important to realize that even the smallest of incidents, if not properly addressed and managed, can grow in size, proportion, and/or complexity. The conditions surrounding an event can rapidly change and increase in size when they are not properly managed. Without all of the response personnel being trained and proficient in ICS, it creates an environment that can allow the incident to expand in size and complexity.
It is also important to realize that even if everyone is on the same page, these incidents can increase substantially even when proper operational actions are being taken. This rapid increase in size creates a greater risk for first responders as well as individuals who may be present in the geographically affected area. Almost any incident that is not properly managed will usually increase this risk substantially. Unmanaged or mismanaged incident can also lead to extremely high property losses and loss of economic stability.
A great example of this was the wildland fires in Yellowstone National Park. In a single week during the summer of 1988, fires within the park encompassed more than nearly 99 000 acres. By the end of the month, dry fuels and high winds combined to make the large fires nearly uncontrollable. On the worst single day, 20 August 1988, tremendous winds pushed fire across more than 150 000 acres requiring a massive national‐level response.
Similarly, in 2003, California succumbed to a major wildfire. The Cedar Fire was an especially destructive fire that was fueled by Santa Ana and Diablo winds. The fire was started by a lost hunter who tried to light a small signal fire, and before it was brought under control, the fire consumed over 280 000 acres. Surprisingly, 30 000 acres burned inside the city limits of San Diego. While there were numerous other fires burning in California in 2003, the Cedar Fire was the most destructive of the year, and according to some, the most destructive modern‐day wildfire until the 2017 Thomas Fire (Tierney, 2018). At the peak of firefighting efforts during the Cedar Fire, there were a total of 4275 firefighters,
