effective. Had there been coordination and collaboration, everyone likely would have been on the same page rather than being at odds with each other.
2.4.2 Oklahoma City Bombing
On 19 April 1995, in Oklahoma City, OK, the Alfred P. Murrah Building was bombed by a domestic terrorist. This bombing remained the deadliest terrorist attack on United States soil until the 11 September 2001 attack that was committed by foreign terrorists. The Oklahoma City bombing killed 168 people, including 19 children under the age of six, and physically injured more than 675 other individuals (Shariat, Mallonee, & Stidham 1998).
Beyond the human toll, the explosion destroyed or damaged 325 buildings, including the Murrah Federal Building. The blast was so strong that numerous buildings suffered damage in a 48‐block area and the window glass of 258 nearby buildings was completely shattered. The blast destroyed or burned 86 cars and caused over $650 million in damage (Hewitt, 2003). This was the work of domestic terrorists, later identified as Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols (Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management [ODCEM], n.d.). The homemade explosive was contained in seventeen 55‐gallon drums and delivered to the Murrah Federal Building using a rented 24‐ft Ryder delivery truck. The device was designed and positioned to inflict the most damage.
The response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City involved hundreds of public, nonprofit, and private organizations, as well as untrained spontaneous volunteers. According to the Oklahoma City Memorial Museum, (n.d.), this incident was the first time that the ICS was utilized in a major incident that was not fire‐related. By utilizing the ICS method, there was a fully integrated response of federal, state, local, and tribal governments as well as nongovernmental resources. While there were some issues, overall, the ICS method worked extremely well in organizing and managing all responders.
In looking over the previous actions of Oklahoma City, the city government appeared to be moving in the right direction in preparedness as well. Not only had they created the plans, but they also had been implementing the Cycle of Preparedness. While their preparedness efforts had not considered such a large event, or an event that involved blowing up a federal building, those plans provided a basis and the key elements for any type of disaster response. Because they began undertaking this preparedness process, collaborative networks were already in place, there was already some cooperation that was ongoing, coordination was in place, and some of the communications issues had already been addressed. Additionally, many of the roles and responsibilities for each level of city government were already known and practiced, which reduced uncertainty. All of these factors combined created the foundation for a more organized and unified response and recovery (Manzi, Powers, & Zetterlund, 2002).
City agencies were also sporadically training together, undertaking exercises, evaluating plans, and taking corrective action. While they were moving in the right direction, there were still identified and unidentified gaps that needed to be fixed. Among those gaps were an effective way to evaluate exercises, and the occasional agency that did not think they needed to be involved in these preparedness efforts (Manzi et al. 2002).
As is often the case, some agencies in the area did not play well with others, so there were some additional gaps already in the plans prior to the incident. It should also be noted that planning for a catastrophic event such as this had never been broached prior to the bombing. Even so, the preparedness efforts that had been addressed would play an important role in how, when, and where resources were deployed (ODCEM, n.d.).
As you read further, you will see how specific discipline responded and how seamlessly they integrated with other agencies. You will see how there was coordination and cooperation, and some of the outcomes from using the ICS method. While the use of an ICS method was not perfect, it did provide for a more integrated response.
2.4.2.1 At the Scene of the Explosion
The Oklahoma City Fire Department was one of the key players in preparedness prior to the bombing. They knew about, trained on, and used the ICS system, and they encouraged others within their city to do the same. A year prior to the bombing, senior staff and senior management from Oklahoma City government attended a weeklong (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] sponsored) training course on disaster management. This course helped to forge strong interpersonal relationships between city officials and the tabletop exercise that was the culmination of the course. This training helped to open the eyes of many city officials. Long before the bomb was ever detonated, the city determined that everyone in city government would need to be on the same page, and they would need to integrate resources in a disaster (Manzi et al. 2002). This led to training and exercises that helped pave the way for a more unified response.
At the very second that the explosion occurred, many of the senior staff for the Oklahoma City Fire Department were having a meeting. After hearing the explosion and seeing the debris cloud, Oklahoma City Fire Station No. 1 self‐deployed to the incident. Their response was initiated before the Oklahoma City Communications Center dispatched any units. While self‐deploying is typically frowned upon, this was not the only fire station that self‐deployed after hearing the explosion. Considering that Station No. 1 was only five blocks away from the Murrah Building, it was surmised that they probably arrived on scene in the first two minutes (ODCEM, n.d.).
The first arriving fire officer, a District Fire Chief, implemented the ICS system as soon as he arrived on scene. He immediately ordered that two triage areas be set up in strategic yet safe areas so that the influx of patients could be evaluated and prioritized for transport based on the severity of their injuries. Shortly after setting up ICS and triage areas, the Oklahoma City Fire Chief (the District Fire Chief's superior) arrived at the incident only moments later.
Upon arriving on scene, the Oklahoma City Fire Chief left his subordinate the District Chief in Command as the Incident Commander (IC). The Fire Chief supported the District Chief by performing intelligence gathering and reporting back to the District Chief. After observing the Murrah Building from all sides, the Oklahoma City Fire Chief made the suggestion to the Incident Commander (IC) that a Unified Command ([UC], discussed in detail in Chapter 7) be initiated. The initiation of a Unified Command (UC) would allow all responding agencies to provide direct input on the resources they possessed, the capabilities of their agency and personnel, other resources that were available, and any agency that was part of a Unified Command (UC) would have a seat at the proverbial table. It would also help to somewhat overcome communications barrier (Final Report, 1996).
After completing a quick evaluation of the damage to the area, the needs for initial response were reported to the Incident Commander (IC), and the Oklahoma City Fire Chief determined that all off‐duty personnel should be called in and that reserve apparatus should be pressed into service. He made that recommendation to the Incident Commander (IC), the Deputy Fire Chief. Additionally, he suggested organizing mutual aid resources from nearby cities to help backfill stations. In doing so, daily emergency calls could still be answered in a timely manner while the Oklahoma City Fire Department was still dealing with the major disaster at‐hand (Final Report, 1996).
Four minutes into the incident, the Incident Commander (IC) requested that the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) be activated. This was important to the overall mission because it gave the Incident Commander (IC) one point of contact that could find and request additional resources. Once established, and at the Incident Commanders (IC's) request, they requested that the National Guard be requested and activated, that resources should be requested from Tinker Air Force Base, and that the American Red Cross and other voluntary organizations should be activated. There was also a request made to contact FEMA for support and to activate several Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams to assist with the response. Other requests were made, but these were the first round of requests, and they were made within minutes of arriving on scene (ODCEM, n.d.).
Like the self‐deployed
