Oklahoma City Fire Department, many ambulance crews from the Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) self‐deployed to the bombing incident. While they did not know it at the time, the explosion knocked out all incoming lines to the EMSA switchboard, and all emergency lines except for 911 were rendered useless by the explosion. Within minutes, cell phones were unable to make connections. The high call volume jammed the networks just from the sheer number of calls being placed (ODCEM, n.d.).
Prior to the incident, EMSA had integrated and worked with other agencies in the preparedness phase, so they were already aware of what their roles and responsibilities were. The first EMSA personnel that arrived began treating the walking wounded after arriving on scene. They set up at the designated triage areas and began sorting patients according to the seriousness of their injuries. Less than 15 minutes into the incident, they declared a Level Three mass casualty incident and called for EMS resources from mutual aid agencies from across the state (Nordberg, 2010).
EMSA also called for buses to transport those that were considered walking wounded, meaning they had nonlife‐threatening wounds (Nordberg, 2010). Those that suffered more critical injuries would be transported by ambulance. Within the first hour after the incident, over 100 people were transported to one of 12 local hospitals in the area. Prior to sending patients to any hospital (or clinic), the vast majority of EMS crews checked with hospitals to identify that they were available and had the resources to treat the patient being transported. This allowed a more equal distribution of patients and it helped to prevent overwhelming only one or two hospitals. In total, over 670 patients were seen on the first day of the incident (Nordberg, 2010).
A few of the local hospitals were having communications issues in the first 20–30 minutes. The radio frequency used for disasters was turned off, or down, in most of these cases. This is a common practice when there is no disaster because interference, radio waves from distant areas bouncing off the earth's atmosphere (skip), and other similar issues can cause radios to crackle and make a lot of noise. Often, if that frequency or radio is not being used, the radio will be turned down to avoid this annoying noise, and then it is forgotten about. To help mitigate this issue of no disaster communications with hospitals, law enforcement officers were initially sent to the hospitals to advise them to turn the frequency on, or up, whatever the case might be. Additionally, these officers were ready to provide the needed communications by relaying information if needed (Nordberg, 2010).
Less than 10 minutes after the explosion took place, the American Red Cross arrived on scene. Not long thereafter, the Salvation Army arrived on scene to assist as well. The quick response of these two organizations suggest that they were in the process of self‐deploying when the official request was sent. Both organizations were utilized immediately (ODCEM, n.d.).
While still within the first hour of the incident, numerous response agencies and volunteers arrived. In order to better organize them while keeping resources nearby, at least three staging areas were created. Individuals, equipment, and goods were kept separate in an effort to organize these resources while reducing confusion.
Operational response agencies and personnel were placed in the Personnel Staging Area. This was located just outside of the disaster zone. These were the people that would go into the active disaster zone and crawl through the rubble or treat patients as needed. They were staged close enough that they could quickly deploy (within minutes), but far enough away that they could not interfere with ongoing operations (ODCEM, n.d.).
The resources that arrived at the Personnel Staging area included local, state, and federal law enforcement officers, fire, and rescue crews, EMS personnel, the first of many federal government resources from Tinker Air Force Base, the first contingency of the Oklahoma National Guard, and other resources too numerous to list. They continued to arrive throughout the day, and staged resources were put into service as they were needed (ODCEM, n.d.).
An additional staging area was set up to receive donations that began coming in within the first hour. These donations included just about everything you can imagine (ODCEM, n.d.). From tools, to toilet paper, to work clothes, the community began to bring what they thought might help. At this staging area, the donated items were sorted and categorized. This allowed agencies to ask if there was the availability of a specific item, and this donation staging area could identify and provide the item if it was available. This would later be moved and turn into a donation's management warehouse.
Not long after the explosion, at least three different heavy equipment companies arrived at the Incident Command Post (ICP) offering all of their resources (ODCEM, n.d.). The Incident Commander (IC) tasked one company with setting up a staging area for heavy equipment and shoring materials, and then organizing the construction/demolition staging area. A liaison was placed in this staging area to ensure effective communication. These companies cooperated and collaborated together and with public safety. In one instance, a police escort was provided to one company that was bringing an extremely large crane from 15 miles north of the bombing site. This escort was given to provide a quicker response (Final Report, 1996). The After‐Action Report (AAR) identified that there were some issues with staging, but Incident Command knew where their resources were and could check availability of a resources within seconds (ODCEM, n.d.).
The Oklahoma City Fire Department had already set up a Command Post on a street corner, and they had initiated ICS from the beginning of the incident. The fire department had put the key people in place to fill General Staff, and Command Staff positions. Because of the size of the incident, there were not enough law enforcement officers on scene to control the multitude of untrained people that came to help. An area of 48‐blocks was affected, and it was determined that it would be a monumental task to try to keep people out. When it was thought that a secondary explosive device was found (90 minutes into the response), the entire 48‐block area was evacuated (ODCEM, n.d.).
This provided an opportunity to regroup and move the initial Incident Command Post (ICP) to a safer location two blocks away. The new location was a small parking lot. Because it was still early in the incident, the only Mobile Command Centers that were present at that time were the Oklahoma City Fire and separately Oklahoma City Police command centers (Final Report, 1996).
As part of this regrouping and because of an earlier request for more law enforcement and the Oklahoma State National Guard, it was determined that enough resources were on hand to secure entry to the main site. This was based on the number of military personnel, National Guard personnel, and law enforcement that were staged, or who were already working top secure part of the perimeter. When it was determined that there was not a secondary device, rescuers were let back into the area, but access was restricted, and each individual trying to enter the area had to provide security personnel a valid reason of why they should be let in the area. This action substantially increased accountability throughout the disaster area (ODCEM, n.d.).
By 10:55 a.m., less than two hours after the explosion, the Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams from Phoenix Arizona and Sacramento California were activated by FEMA (ODCEM, n.d.). Nine additional Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams were alerted that they may be soon deployed to the incident. A total of teams would eventually assist in the response and recovery. The Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams that worked at the Oklahoma City bombing site included teams from New York City, NY, Montgomery County, MD, Virginia Beach, VA, Los Angeles, CA, Fairfax County, VA, Dade County, FL, Puget Sound, WA, Menlo Park, CA, and Orange County, CA (Oklahoma City National Memorial and Museum, n.d.).
Additionally, FEMA's Regional Director and his staff were deployed from Denton, TX, to Oklahoma City at approximately 11:00 a.m., so they could support what would be an ongoing operation. FEMA arrived in Oklahoma City within four hours of the bombing, and they offered the full cooperation of the federal government. This is important to note because they did not try to take over the response, they were there to support it (ODCEM, n.d.).
Around 11:00, the National Weather Service notified the Incident Command Post (ICP) that harsh weather was moving
