officers and National Guard were integrated into security.
Eventually, the rescue operation included 11 federalized Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Teams from local agencies across the nation. Firefighters from more than 75 Oklahoma communities and more than 35 departments from Texas, Kansas, Arkansas, and other states participated. In all, FEMA deployed more than 1000 of its own employees and hundreds from other federal agencies. The American Red Cross provided food and shelter for emergency personnel and support for victims and their families. Private firms ranging from building supply companies to funeral homes to restaurants supported the responders. The scale of the operation required resources from all levels of government and a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations.
The bombing was a federal crime involving a federal facility that resulted in the deaths of federal officers and employees. The legal jurisdiction for the investigation resided with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal law enforcement agencies, who integrated local agencies. While the response had a few issues, they were relatively minor when compared to other incidents of similar size.
2.5 Comparing and Contrasting These Incidents
While neither the Tokyo sarin attack response (and recovery) or the Oklahoma City Bombing was incidents that went without problems, it is easy to see that the Oklahoma City Bombing was substantially more organized. While much speculation could be made about the reason behind the significant differences, there is no doubt that the IMS method being used in the Oklahoma City Bombing played a significant role in creating a better, more organized response. Understanding the positive role that ICS played is imperative to comprehending how much IMS is needed for managing any incident.
2.5.1 Command
The act of commanding an incident means that an individual or a group of individuals working together have the authority to direct operations, and they do so. In the Tokyo attack, there was not anyone commanding the incident. Each agency was working independently of other responding agencies. Due to the lack of command, the incident had no specified direction, security was lax or almost nonexistent, and each agency operated under their own authority. This equated to each agency making decisions and addressing issues as they saw fit, based on their view of the incident. Even after the realization that the Tokyo incident was a terrorist attack, there was no overall command presence to guide and direct these response and recovery efforts.
An overarching presence that provided direction for all personnel was not present during the Tokyo response. The lack of organization for the resources that responded to this attack caused each to work independently of other organization. Each entity managed the incident based on what their individual agencies priorities were, and there was little to no regard for what other entities were doing, or how they could approach the response and recovery in a unified effort.
In Oklahoma City, there was a command presence, and command direction from the onset. When Oklahoma City Fire Department arrived at the Murrah Building, a senior officer in the fire department immediately established command. While the command of the incident was initially chaotic, this was primarily because good Samaritans were interjecting themselves into the incident. In most major incidents, the general public does not realize that their efforts can cause issues with commanding an incident.
The Oklahoma City Fire Department commanded the incident until it was no longer safe to search for bodies. For a little more than a month, the fire department commanded the incident. This is not to say that the fire department did all of the work because they did not. The fire department organized and planned every detail, usually in cooperation with other agencies. Everything that was accomplished during this response was done so with the overarching goal of recovering all of the victims to be accomplished. In fact, each agency had specific tasks, but those tasks were either directed by, or requested and approved by, Incident Command (IC). In most instances, these goals were specific in nature, and each goal had a way of measuring success, they were attainable with the resources on scene, they were relevant to the overall mission, and except for the investigation, timelines were set to ensure ongoing progress. Even the FBI response was to a certain extent commanded by the fire department. While the FBI did the investigation on their own terms, they also coordinated and sought approval from the fire department to ensure that the FBI was not in the way of rescue and recovery operations.
2.5.2 Control
Controlling an incident helps to reduce the severity and reduce the lifecycle of a crisis. The act of controlling an incident involves leading (or guiding) the response, and in most instances, the recovery. To accomplish control, responsibility must be taken for the acts and achievements of all responders. Control involves maneuvering resources toward a desired result; in this case, the desired result was to save survivors and to recovers the bodies of victims without any injuries or death of responding personnel. Controlling an incident is done so that the response and recovery can keep on a specified course. This means that there must be a constant guidance and oversight so that the response and recovery is an operation that is organized and effective rather than haphazard.
Control can also be related to the accountability of personnel, and it is highly important for the safety of personnel. When responding to an emergency or incident, personnel accountability can usually involve two factors. The first factor of accountability is the number of personnel that are entering an area that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH). Those commanding an incident need to make sure that they know exactly how many people are in a dangerous area, sometimes called a Hot Zone. Knowing the location of each of the first responders in a hot zone is extremely important. If conditions worsen or deteriorate, those in control need to ensure that all personnel are able to or already have evacuated the area. Essentially, the first part of accountability is to have a head count of who is in a danger zone (Tippett, 2013).
The second component of accountability is the physical location of all personnel operating on the incident scene, even those outside of the hot zone (Tippett, 2013). In the event of a catastrophic, or even potentially catastrophic, event (such as an explosion, an aftershock, a flash flood), it is critical that those controlling the incident to know the exact location of each, and every person involved in the response. By knowing where all the personnel are, it provides direction so that personnel can become a rescue priority if the unthinkable happens. If those controlling an incident know that personnel were on the second floor of a structure, they can go directly to that location, rather than wasting more time by searching the whole building.
An example of this is in order. Imagine if you will that rescue workers are working in a semicollapsed building after an earthquake. As they progress through the building, they give regular reports of their location. While still in the building, a sudden aftershock causes the building to shift, thereby blocking any attempt to exit. The rescuers are pinned down to a specific area with no chance of self‐extrication. Because control of the incident was exercised, and accountability efforts were in place, those rescuing the trapped personnel have a focus area of where in the building these individuals are trapped. They can send a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) to their last‐known location to start the search. Without control and accountability, the Rapid Intervention Team would have no idea where to start.
When we look at the Tokyo sarin attack response for control, we must, to a certain extent, make an assumption on the control of the incident. While this statement is speculative, based on lack of communication and the lack of cooperation, it is likely that accountability in the Tokyo incident was undertaken by each individual agency, if at all. The lack of a defined overall accountability is documented by Murakami (2000), and multiple accounts from victims describe that there were no specific zones set up to protect workers from areas that were identified as Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH). This evidence also coincides with the accounts that there were numerous individuals who suffered secondary contamination. These eyewitness reports also confirm that
