between which there are relations, interconnections, and reciprocal effects. Whenever such a nexus of interrelations exists, one speaks of complexity, whose defining quality can be called density.6 Of course, the type of elements and relations that form a given complexity and determine its density depends on the social entity at hand. An object (such as a painting), a theory, a culinary meal, or a smartphone differs in its composition from a human subject (that entity composed of body and mind), while a physical place (a living-room, a landscape, or a city) consists of elements and relations quite different from those of a temporal entity (such as an event) or a collective (such as a scene, a project, or a nation). Nevertheless, this material variation does nothing to change what singularization means for every social entity: they are constituted as inherent complexities with inner density.
Complexity and density are characteristics of the internal structure of singularities, and this is why I have used the terms inherent complexity and inner density. Singular entities, however, also have a specific relation to the outside. Yet it would be insufficient to claim that there are simply certain differences between them (between the urban logic of Rome and San Francisco, for instance). Of course, difference theory has taught us that, in the socio-cultural realm, it would be impossible to identify any entities at all without the existence of differences, because every entity is constituted in the first place by being different from others.7 Despite its general appeal to cultural theorists, however, it would be a mistake to embrace difference theory fully, for it would bring two serious disadvantages to the analysis of singularities. First, the social relevance of the inherent complexity of entities would be marginalized in favor of the ostensibly ubiquitous “play of differences.” Second, it would raise the risk of losing the capacity to distinguish between the multiplicities of differences that exist in the social world.
It must be stressed that, in the social logic of singularities, differences are certainly identified, but the main issue involves the production and appropriation of inherent complexities. What this means can best be illustrated with an example, for instance American literature. In this case, there are countless ways to identify a difference between the novels of Edith Wharton, John Dos Passos, John Steinbeck, or F. Scott Fitzgerald. Now, if we take the novels of Thomas Pynchon, they are not only unlike the latter; they not only “differentiate themselves” ex negativo from all of them. Rather, in their semantics, syntax, plot structure, characterizations, etc., they develop their own irreducible inner density ex positivo. This inherent complexity stands at the center of singularization in the minds of readers, critics – and the author himself. In contrast to the difference-theoretical primacy of difference over identity, the logic of singularities favors the primacy of inherent complexity over the outward identification of differences.
Within the social logic of singularization, of course, entities also gain their uniqueness by way of their differences, but these have a special form. Whereas, according to difference theory, all cats (differences) are gray at night, the issue now is to distinguish between forms of difference, and to do so according to a social logic. In the social logic of the general, which also identifies differences between its socially relevant entities (objects, subjects, etc.), its focus is on gradual differences of a qualitative or quantitative sort, as I already described above. In an order of singularities, in contrast, differences are always absolutely and without exception qualitative. What prevails here is not rankings but rather a qualitative otherness, which has the character of incommensurability. Incommensurability means that the entities in question lack a common measure; they are not understood as two variants of the same, but rather appear to be incomparable in the strict sense of the word.8 Rome is incommensurable with San Francisco, as is Russia with China, or David Bowie with Van Morrison. The logic of singularization is thus concerned with identifying strong differences.
What happens, however, when the entities of social singularization are compared to one another? As a social practice, the act of comparison did not simply cease with the advent of singularities, and later we will see how, to a considerable extent, the expansion of the social logic of the singular in late modernity led to the creation of new technologies of comparison.9 Comparisons between singularities, which are always inherent complexities, now do exactly what might be expected: they reduce the complexity at hand. In practices of comparison, general parameters are used in order to classify the singularities themselves according to a qualitative or even quantitative standpoint. This means seeing in them only that which fits into the given set of comparative parameters, whereas everything else falls out of view. Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris and the Doge’s Palace in Venice are thus two examples of Gothic architecture; Christianity and Islam are two monotheistic religions; the album Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band sold more copies than the album Blonde on Blonde; and so on. The schemata of the general therefore reduce the complexities of singularities to a few chosen characteristics that make it possible to draw a comparison between them. Thus, comparisons made within the framework of the social logic of the general differ in a fundamental way from those made within the framework of the social logic of the particular, even if they resemble one another on the surface. A comparison made between entities in the social logic of the general (with various quantifiers or school grades, for instance) serves to represent these entities exhaustively, whereas comparisons made in the social logic of the particular reduce complexity, which does not then disappear but rather – and this is decisive – goes on to function in a structurally formative way (by affecting its recipients, for instance).10
What should we think about the relation between the three aforementioned configurations of the particular – again, the general-particular, idiosyncrasies, and singularities? It can be maintained first of all that the distinction between them should lead to more than just a classification – it can also help to analyze their interrelations. In all three cases, at any rate, we are dealing with real configurations in the social world. The social logic of singularities exists, as does the social logic of the general (with its production of the general-particular) as well as the population of idiosyncrasies, which may not be part of any social logic but exist nevertheless (in the manner of “things in themselves”). What is interesting is that these three spheres are not closed off from one another but rather share a dynamic relationship of translation and exchange, especially in late modernity.11
Idiosyncrasies can thus transform into singularities when previously unrecognized unique features are socially recognized for their uniqueness – when, for instance, a computer specialist with all his quirkiness is elevated to a nerd, or a formerly unacknowledged and seemingly worthless object is suddenly regarded as a work of art. Every idiosyncrasy has the potential to become a singularity. Conversely, as already mentioned, singularities can (if only temporarily) become part of the register of the general-particular at the moment when someone attempts to make their presumably incomparable qualities comparable or even gradable (for instance, in analyses of art or religion, in the quality rankings of films, etc.). Beyond that, it is possible for previously merely functional goods from the register of the general to be singularized (the mass-produced plastic chair, for example, advanced to become the singular Eames design) if a degree of inherent complexity is discovered in something that otherwise bears general features, as a result, for instance, of heightened cultural sensitivity or the development of more discerning tastes. Finally, singularities can lose their character as valuable entities, become de-singularized, and sink to the status of unnoticed idiosyncrasies (as when religions cease to be practiced or works of art cease to be recognized as such). As we will see more clearly later on, the rising significance of the social logic of singularities in late modernity owes a great deal to the fact that idiosyncrasies – but also examples of the general-particular – can transform into singularities. At the same time, the transformation of general-particular parameters into singularities has also gained significance, with the result that a broad spectrum of singularities has been cultivated by society and allowed to flourish.
It should have become clear from the foregoing discussion that a sociological analysis of singularities requires a sophisticated heuristic. Although I have already pointed out that the familar semantic complex of individualism, the individual, individualization,
