evaluation.38 Although observation and evaluation are two different sets of practices, they are often interconnected. Evaluations do not result in a neutral understanding of the matter being evaluated; rather, the latter is understood in a positive or negative light. In the social world, things are of course constantly being evaluated; in the social logic of singularities, however, the process of (e)valuation differs from that in the social logic of the general. In the latter, as I have already discussed, the goal of evaluation is to determine whether something corresponds or not to the desired standard – that is, to determine whether something can be regarded as normal and acceptable. There, singularities are negatively sanctioned, and the act of evaluation involves sorting things into dualisms, rankings, and scales.
In the logic of singularities, on the contrary, evaluation means ascribing value in a strict sense. It designates a praxis of valorization in whose context a singular entity acquires the status of being valuable (or not). Here, to evaluate is to certify. In general, the criteria defining what is desirable are inverted: now, the singular is valuable, while mere examples of the general seem profane and are devalued. Whereas rationalism is based on the distinction between the correct/normal (general) and the abnormal (particular), the main distinction of singularism is between the sacred (particular) and the profane (general), in which case the sacred should not be associated too closely with religious holiness but rather implies that something has been regarded as intrinsically valuable.39 Of course, even formal rationalization ascribes value to things in the broadest sense, but it is concerned with functional or instrumental value – that is, with something’s utility or function according to a given order, ranking, or scale (and therefore I will avoid the term “value” in this context). In contrast, the logic of singularities valorizes entities in a strong sense by endowing them with a seemingly intrinsic worth, so that they appear to be valuable, good, and meaningful in their own right.
The central task of practices of valorization is now to determine which individual entities – things, people, places, etc. – should be recognized as singular. To this end, entire discursive universes and valorization techniques have been developed (think of the field of art criticism). Practices of valorization identify differences, and strong differences at that. On the one hand, they identify asymmetrical differences between the singular and the profane; on the other hand, they identify absolute (that is, non-gradual) qualitative differences between various singularities, each of which seems distinct from all others. As already mentioned, however, it is characteristic of late modernity for attempts to be made to reduce such complexity and to translate the absolute difference of singularities into the gradual differences of the general-particular (in the form of rankings, for instance), so that the sphere of valorization has taken on a multifaceted form.
What is relevant is this: practices of valorization not only singularize but also de-singularize. Not only do they ascribe value, they devalue as well. It is of the utmost importance to underscore that singularization is not a one-dimensional process and that it involves aspects of dominance. Practices of valorization elevate and reject things; they distinguish things while ensuring that others remain invisible. Processes of singularization regularly operate in tandem with processes of de-singularization. Entities that were once valorized as singular can lose this status later on. Moreover, it can happen (and it often does) that entities that strive for singularity, or whose singular nature is doubted, never achieve this status and vanish in the sea of the profane (or, under certain circumstances, are singularized as something negative). In societies in which the social logic of the particular was no more than a niche phenomenon, this was less consequential than it is in the late-modern society of singularities, where de-singularization generally means devaluation (if not uselessness as well). It is little surprise, then, that processes of valorization can tend to be enormously controversial.
Practices of Singularization II: Production and Appropriation
Regarding production, singularities are an object of design and fabrication, of labor and creation, of representation and performance. In an immediate sense, they are socially engendered, manufactured, and produced. This social production – this labor of singularization – can take very different forms depending on whether objects/things, subjects, places, events, or collectives are being created as singular.
Fundamentally, it is possible to distinguish the situation in which an idiosyncrasy (or an example of the general-particular) already exists and is singularized through a process of reframing – a sort of secondary production – from those situations in which an entity is intentionally produced from the beginning and from the ground up as singular. The reframing of idiosyncrasies takes place, for instance, when a previously ignored object is discovered to be a relic, a work of art, or a valuable antique, when a reclusive person is found out to be an “original” artist, or when an overlooked geographical region is reinterpreted as a valuable site of biodiversity. In these cases, the practices of production hardly differ from those of observation and evaluation.40 On the other hand, there are intentional acts of singularization that aim to produce brand new creations of unique things, subjects, places, events, or communities. This can involve such practices as hand-crafting an object, cultivating one’s own uniqueness (by adopting certain interests or updating a Facebook account, for example), painstakingly reenacting a complicated ritual, putting on a live concert, writing, composing, or preparing a meal.
Are these manners of producing singular entities structured in a fundamentally different way from the production of general elements? Without a doubt, the fabrication of singularities also involves instrumentally rational and normative-rational practices. The production of a film, for example, requires the coordination of a number of highly specialized activities within the framework of the movie industry. In the case of the labor of singularity, however, these activities are typically associated with practices of a specific sort: arrangements. Arrangement entails compiling heterogeneous objects, texts, images, individuals (etc.) into a whole that is as coherent as possible. The labor of singularity is thus often (and especially in late modernity) a matter of managing heterogeneity. In addition to functional components, arrangements can also include narrative and hermeneutic, aesthetic (visual, for instance), and ludic elements. Despite their necessary material aspects, the narrative and aesthetic features of arrangements mean that they are essentially a form of “immaterial labor,” though in a broad sense of the term.41 Historically, the arrangement of singularities is not necessarily connected to the aim of creating something new.42 This has normally been the case in modernity, however, so that here it is a matter of arranging novelties within the framework of what could be called a “creativity dispositif.” Yet even the production of novel singularities is not without preconditions, given that it depends on already existing elements – often on idiosyncrasies or standardized elements, but also on networks of narratives and symbols. Whereas standardized productions rely on immanent criteria of utility, practicality, and functionality (and thus do not really have to take their public function into account), the production of singularity must incorporate the real or imagined perspective of the public in the creation of its entities.
Regarding appropriation,43 an element of the social is only singular if it has been singularized in the situation of its use. Unlike instrumentally rational utility and routinized social interaction, which characterize the logic of the general, the appropriation of the particular has the structure of lived experience.44 A singular object or thing, a singular subject, a singular place, a singular event, a singular collective – they are all experienced, which can only happen if they are truly experienced as unique and have a unique social reality. Experience is a mental but also physical process of appropriating the world in which objects of attention are perceived by the senses. As lived experience, sensory perception goes beyond the function of gathering information, which is the typical and essential function of perception within the framework of instrumentally rational activity. Lived experience is perception for its own sake – a sort of self-referential perception. Whereas, in the social logic of the general, appropriation involves manipulating the world in order to achieve a specific goal,
