have to be the case. Despite its repetitive character, for instance, a ritual (such as a yearly celebration) can be experienced as unique, and in fact celebrations and rituals are the traditional prototypes of singular temporalities. In late modernity, however, there has been an increasing proliferation of one-off events. From festivals and sporting events to TED conferences, events can be experienced as singular just as much as professional or political projects.
In this case, time is not something that is habitually or routinely filled in order to achieve certain objectives beyond the present. For its participants, on the contrary, it has an intrinsic value of its own; it is experienced in the moment of its seemingly overwhelming complexity – in the presence of its presentness, so to speak.30 Whereas, in the mode of the general, temporality is desensitized to the present moment of activity and instrumentally oriented toward the future, in the mode of the particular it is present-oriented. However, such experiences might also involve references to the past: the memory of a previous event or the establishment of historical connections can serve to enrich the present. For this reason, historical narratives – which cultivate our “historical memory” of past events, moments, places, or people to the point of nostalgia – are likewise variations of temporality within the social logic of the particular.31
Singular collectives are not general, instrumentally rational associations or (idiosyncratic) “given” social milieus; rather, they are collectives that have a unique cultural value for their participants. According to one theory of modernization, they might be referred to as “particular groups,” yet in this case the semantics of the particular is meant to devalue them as insignificant elements with limited scope as compared to the vast and general organizations of modern society. In reality, however, these collectives are more than just a part of something grander; from the perspective of their members, they are, rather, complete cultural universes of their own with high degrees of communicative, narrative, and affective complexity and significance. This was already true of any family genealogy with its own collective consciousness, but also of early-modern guilds and corporations whenever they were more than just instrumentally rational institutions. In (late) modernity, the singularization of collectives might also occur, for instance, in cultural and aesthetic subcultures, in self-chosen religious collectives, as well as in nations or regional communities (though in a somewhat different way).
In general, the old distinction between community and society applies only under certain conditions to the difference between collectives in the mode of the particular and collectives in the mode of the general. Unlike traditional communities, into which one is simply born, modern “neo-communities” (as they have come to be called) are chosen. Singular collectives are thus, in general, intensively affective socialities that share not only practices but also narratives and imaginations. Unlike collectives in the mode of the general, which appear identical from the outside, the unique nature of singular collectives can appear utterly alien to outsiders and even evoke aggressive contempt. It is especially on the level of collectives that singularities become the object of culture wars.32
The kaleidoscope of singularized entities that I have presented here perhaps raises a question: can every given object, subject, collective, spatiality, and temporality be singularized? Is inherent complexity entirely a matter of social construction? This question is of little importance to sociological analysis, for here the crucial issues are that and how singularization has taken place. That said, I am inclined to adopt a social-constructivist instead of a radical-constructivist position. On the one hand, what counts or does not count as unique depends on the practices of observation, evaluation, production, and appropriation discussed above. Nevertheless, one can assume that certain entities are somewhat easier to singularize than others: objects, subjects, etc., contain varying degrees of “affordance,” which means that they can differ in what they offer.33 They contain in themselves and offer varying levels of inherent complexity, which are more or less suitable to social singularization. Hieronymus Bosch’s Garden of Earthly Delights is easier to recognize as being inherently complex than a brick, James Joyce’s Ulysses is easier to recognize as such than a novel by Rosamunde Pilcher, and the singer Madonna is easier to see as such than “the Lithuanian assistant film director in the gray coat.”34 But, of course, there is no automatic way of knowing. Under certain circumstances, even stones (as relics, for instance), cheap novels, or gray coats can become cult objects, and renowned works of art and world-famous pop stars can fall into oblivion. In any case, it is clearly insufficient to speak of singularization in sweeping terms; rather, it is necessary to examine the specific practices through which this process occurs.
Practices of Singularization I: Observation and Evaluation
The social logic of singularities encompasses not only the five aforementioned social entities but also the four practices of singularization that I have already discussed at some length: the practices, that is, of observation, evaluation, production, and appropriation. Because singularities are enacted in these ways, they are never fixed once and for all; rather, they are continuously being fabricated.
These four sorts of practices are only separated here for heuristic reasons, for at times they can be intertwined or even combined with one another (as when something is produced and received through the same practice). They can also be highly specialized and differentiated from one another, sometimes even coalescing into entire institutional complexes of their own. In general, it can be said that practices of singularization have existed in all types of society and at all times, though in late modernity their institutional scope has broadened considerably while processes of singularization (and the parallel processes of de-singularization) have become contentious and controversial to a large extent. Here, I will look specifically at these four types of practices and describe how they operate within the logic of singularities.
First, observation.35 Within a social logic of singularities, something can be interpreted, for instance, as non-interchangeable and unique. As such, it first has to be recognized or discovered. For this to happen, it is fundamentally necessary for there to have developed, in the form of practices of observation, a cultural sensitivity to the inherent complexity and density of the particular. Whereas the logic of the general requires the knowledge and competence for classifying, subsuming, and abstracting things, the ascertainment of singular objects, subjects, spaces, etc., requires a level of cultural sensitivity that has both a cognitive and a sensory dimension. Typically, someone not only has explicit knowledge about singularities but is, rather, able to understand or “get,” in an instant, the density and inherent complexity of, say, a piece of music, a person, a city, or a belief.36
A sense for the inherent complexity of singularities is not something that people are simply born with; instead, it is learned and cultivated (or neglected) in social environments.37 Without any competence for recognizing singularity – regardless of whether the specific competence in question pertains to religion or art, everyday aesthetics or architecture – the social logic of singularities cannot exist. Practices of observing singularities can be passed on through processes of imitating and associating with certain social groups (to gain a sense for classical music, a youth subculture, a religious belief, a specific world of objects, etc.), and they can also be professionalized in institutions (as is the case, for instance, with architects and scholars of art). Under certain conditions, the socio-cultural processes of attribution in which something is understood to be a singularity can be clear and uncontroversial (think of the relics in traditional society), whereas, under other conditions, understanding what is singular can be highly contentious and the object of heated debate (the classic example in modernity is the question of what counts as a work of art). Furthermore, what is recognized by participants in one socio-cultural context as having inherent complexity may be regarded by outsiders as no more than an example of a general type, or might even seem entirely unintelligible. For the uninitiated who lack the necessary observational competence, it will be difficult to identify the unique qualities of Duke Ellington’s music, Michel Serres’ texts, or the natural beauty of Loch Lomond.
Second,
