reason why instead of taking survey results at face value (no matter where they come from), we should probably pay more attention to longitudinal trends. 3) The items and topics both studies have queried are normatively charged to a substantial degree. For this reason, some respondents might be afraid of getting isolated or stigmatised with their genuine opinion. As a consequence, they seek refuge in socially desirable answers. Therefore, the situation in Germany might not be as satisfactory as the polling data suggest prima facie. The election results of ambivalent parties such as the AfD as well as survey data concerning political taboos confirm the necessity of a cautious interpretation of survey data on delicate issues.
7. THE ROLE OF TABOOS
In 2013 and in 2015 the IfD asked German citizens for taboo issues in society – in 2015 with a special focus on the refugee crisis. What were the results? Maybe the most revealing number was 43, because no more than 43 percent took the view that you can express your opinion freely when it comes to the migration crisis. Quite the contrary, in fact: a majority of 57 percent felt a certain pressure to conform (Köcher, 2015, pp. 8–9).
In 2013, when the institute dedicated a separate survey to taboos, people were, among other things, confronted with a range of statements and asked to evaluate each of them on two dimensions: 1) Should a respective statement be forbidden (upper bars in figure 10)? 2) Does a respective statement represent a social taboo, that is: does one burn his/her tongue when he/she offers his/her opinion this way (lower bars in figure 10)? Both items focussed on the actual extent of social intolerance on the one side and the perceived extent of social intolerance on the other.
It comes as no surprise that xenophobic, anti-Semitic and sexist statements have been considered to be the “hot potatoes” by the majority of respondents. They have the sense that you get stigmatised when you say things such as “Most reports on concentration camps and the Jews in National Socialism are exaggerated.” or ”Black people are less intelligent than white people.” or “Homosexuality is a disease.” or “A woman’s place is in the kitchen.” These statements are not supported by a majority of Germans, but are regarded as morally obliging by the majority, who feels subject to a certain pressure to conform.
Figure 10: True and Perceived Intolerance. Source: Petersen (2013), p. 6.
The most problematic aspect from a democratic point of view occurs with issues where the majority only imagines political pressure, that is: they think certain statements stigmatise its speaker, whereas in fact it does not. Why is this problematic? It is problematic because these issues become systematically underrepresented in political debate since the majority is in the mistaken belief of a taboo. This holds true for five statements concerning gender roles and xenophobia, including the following phrases: “Homosexuality is a disease.”, “Women are less qualified for leading positions than men.” and “Immigrants take away national jobs.”
All these statements represent intolerant attitudes: racism, sexism, chauvinism and the like. So at the end of the day: Why should we thwart social mechanisms that put a stop to such world views by silencing illiberal persons? The point is that not only the respective statements are stigmatized, but also the attitudes and the people behind them. This, in turn, does not make resentments and prejudices disappear. It only makes people say what they think on the quiet. In the long run it prevents an open debate on such attitudes, but also on widespread fears, stereotypes, prejudices etc. As a result of this, democracy is deprived of its largest comparative advantage over autocracies: its ability to learn and to adapt.
8. GERMAN POLITICAL CULTURE AS A HABITAT OF RIGHT-WING PROTEST?
Several aspects of Germany’s political culture may serve as pieces in the puzzle of the recent right-wing upheavals in the guise of Pegida and anti-asylum marches in East Germany as well as the overall rise of the populist AfD. However, there are at least just as many pieces that fail to fit in this puzzle: Although 25 years after unification Germans still lag behind their European neighbours when it comes to national pride, over the last few years they are constantly making up ground: Germany is currently becoming a typical EU state. What is more, trust in fellow citizens and in political institutions is growing, too – even though with differences between the “regulative” and “party-dominated sphere”. Third, democracy as a whole is considered to be highly legitimate, with genuinely autocratic alternatives being far from widely popular. Finally, considering all aspects, political-cultural differences between East and West are noticeably decreasing – particularly through generational change.
What, then, explains the recently growing unrest? We see stupendous knowledge gaps, misunderstandings, and unrealistic expectations concerning parliamentarian democracy (especially in view of the necessity of political bargaining, the principle of representation, the crucial role of interests and lobbying as a cornerstone of democratic pluralism). All this facilitates illegitimate normative yardsticks as well as reservations about the values and institutions of constitutional democracy – be it that political extremists (esp. from the right) are a priori denied their participation rights (whereas left-wing extremists are not); be it that political propositions, such as the rule of experts, that allure with allegedly rational and objective politics, grow in popularity (the same, by the way, holds true for direct democracy which is also frequently brought into position against the putative failures of representative democracy).
All this speaks for the continuous spreading of vehement reservations about several elements of constitutional democracy. Elections as well as checks and balances themselves are presumably excluded from this development, but the application of participation rights, the principles of the rule of law1 as well several democratic procedural functions are not. What is gaining ground is not the classical denial of the democratic constitutional core or “extremism”, as we know it from the 20th century, but a certain “democratic scepticism”. It accepts the democratic “skeleton” (institutions) but it is at odds with its “flesh” (several procedural principles): the free mandate, lobbying, candid political controversy, pressure-group politics, and compromise solutions.
In the long run this scepticism appears to be one of the major threats to democracy as we know it, as it could alter the institutions of constitutional democracy for the worse. In the short run, it is the perceived pressure of political conformity that could damage democracy as it profits parties such as the AfD, which create the image of a taboo-buster and ventilate dubious conceptions of democracy. What is the relationship of these political-cultural developments and the recent right-wing upheaval? To cut a long story short: The mentioned developments have paved their way in the East first – just where right-wing populism has gained a foothold.
This has, of course, to do with the past before 1989/90: the socialist-authoritarian legacy in the minds, the survival of paternalistic attitudes, the lack of democratic experience, the political, social, and economic side effects of East Germany’s transformation in the 1990s. At the same time, it would be an illegitimate oversimplification to exclusively blame the socialist past for making it hard for democratic values and tolerance to immigrants to strike roots in East Germany’s political culture. There is a second factor that comes in when we talk about the attitudes towards cultural diversity, xenophobia und pluralism. And that is the substantial lack of intercultural contacts in the East: Up to the present day the share of people with a migrant background is significantly lower in the East than in the West. The roots of this – again – trace back to the time before 1989. The democratic West not only allowed immigrants to settle in Germany but promoted this kind of labour migration already in the 1950s in order to stimulate what later has become the economic miracle of post-war Germany. The socialist East instead restricted migration to the ideologically necessary minimum with socialist countries (e. g. Vietnam). What is more, it made sure to rigorously segregate the autochthonous populace from the migrants and to provide for their outbound passage. As we know from a range of sociological studies, in the long run nothing reduces racist prejudices
