of the four-year cycle the party law foresees – were made. The weakening of party leadership at the expense of their base was expected to increase “competition for minds” within the factions. Until now, just PSOE and Podemos have held primary elections for appointing their secretary generals, the latter using a closed list system.
2. Virtually all factions in the Congreso de los Diputados agreed at the end of 2012 that the rules of procedure for the lower chamber of Parliament – in place since 1982 – should be updated to “improve democracy” (Europa Press, 2012). Several parliamentary groups filed motions to reform the rules of procedure (Congreso de los Diputados, 2012-2016), e.g. waiving the government’s veto power against legislation affecting the budget, force the PM or its ministers to answer MP questions face to face in Parliament, ease popular initiatives (Iniciativa Legislative Popular, ILP), and strengthen lobby control. It resulted that inter-party consensus crumbled when it came to detail, with all these initiatives ultimately failing.
3. Advocates of a more effective checks-and-balances system place high hopes in judicial reform. The judiciary should, in their eyes, function as a political restraint. Always in the centre of debates stands the Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ), the constitutional body that governs Spain’s judges. While the former minister for Justice, Alberto Ruiz Gallardon, seemed to favor the magistrates themselves elect their peers (as it was the rule up to 1985), at the end of 2012, a law was passed that maintained members be appointed by the Senate and Parliament. Although the 2012 regulation has been consented with the Socialist Party, frequent rows about the composition of the CGPJ remain. The same applies for Spain’s Constitutional Court.
4. At the beginning of 2012, the PP government set up a “Commission for the Reform of Public Administration (Comisión para la Reforma de la Administración Pública, CORA) aimed at reducing (political) bureaucracy, slashing positions in the public sector and controlling public spending at a regional level. After the PSOE had voiced opposition to a reform of local constitutions, eyes turned to the 17 Autonomous Regions (Comunidades Autonomas). In four years, almost 800 regional entities have been abolished or merged, saving the tax payers two billion Euros, according to the Ministry of Finance (MINHAFP, 2016). The government, however, did not manage to find allies for more ambitious proposals, such as the abolition of provincial diputaciones or the government delegates in the regions. Power sharing and the delegation of power from the national government to the regional administrations remain at the forefront of the political debate in Spain’s asymmetrical “State of the Autonomies”. Frequent rows occur over regional financing, state investments in the regions and devolution. Against the backdrop of an independence bid by Catalonia’s ruling coalition, the Socialist Party proposes constitutional reform for a redefinition of the regions’ status within the Spanish state. The PSOE proposal for federalism, however, meets strong resistance from the Conservative side due to its recognition of a “plurinational” character of the nation.
Even when an inter-party consensus on reforms exists, implementation is not secure. In August 2016, the speakers of Ciudadanos and PP in Parliament signed an agreement titled, “Anti-corruption pact. Measures for democratic regeneration and against corruption”. The document had been the precondition for Ciudadanos’ votes in the investiture of Mariano Rajoy. Both parties agreed to end legal immunity for politicians and public servants, eliminate the legal figure of government pardon, limit the PM’s time in office to two terms, oblige politicians to step down once they face formal corruption allegations, and draft a new electoral law (aimed at increasing proportionality and introducing an open-list-system). Despite the negotiations originally being limited to three months, a year down the line no substantial progress in either of the areas has been made. Whether the constitution must be changed to implement these policies – as the government party claims – or the regular legal proceedings are sufficient is the major contentious issue.
5. CONCLUSION
In the Spanish political class, as well as in academia and the public, a widespread consensus exists that amidst the fiercest economic crisis since democracy was restored in 1978, changes must be made in the nation’s institutional setting. On the one hand, the popularity of the term “Second Transition” in current-day debates indicates nostalgia for a past when politicians – regardless of their ideological camp – could agree on bold policy measures. For some, this part of the history should serve as an example to the political class in their striving to overcome current woes. On the other hand, “Second Transition” is interpreted by those who – thanks to the economic crisis – now manage to play a part in Spanish politics as chiffre for the disruptive political program that Spain (allegedly) did not experience in the late 1970s. In this view, the entire foundation for democracy in Spain must be reset. Both camps face the pressure of public opinion. Citizen’s contempt for politics stands at an all-time high.
It is thus surprising that besides a rather timid reform of the party law, no major institutional reform project has been implemented – this, despite public demand and assurance by the parties themselves. In this paper, I have suggested that a possible explanation may be the unchanged structure of party competition for government during the years of economic crisis. In this scenario, the current government (and the first opposition party) may rate the benefits of closed competition higher than adopting reforms that ultimately could open the contest for government in the future.
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Powell, C.
