typically European.
Figure 2: Social Trust in East Germany, West Germany, and Europe. Source: Zmerli (2012), p. 149.
Trust in political institutions (parties, parliament, the government, police and the judicial system) turns out to be lower than trust in other people. However, we are witnessing an upward trend over the last few years. What is more, East German trust levels align more and more with West German trust levels – in sharp contrast with the rest of Eastern Europe, where trust in the political institutions has plummeted recently due to the absence of economic successes and the disillusionment with the real economical potential of democracy and its politicians.
Figure 3: Trust in Political Institutions. Source: Zmerli (2012), p. 150.
What can clearly be appreciated in figures 4 and 5 is a trust hierarchy in Germany: “Regulative institutions” – that is the police, the courts, and the administrative body – constantly receive systematically more trust than institutions associated with parties and interests, that is the parliament, the government, and political parties.
Figure 4: Trust in “Regulative” and “Party Institutions”. Source: Zmerli (2012), p. 151.
What are the causes of this trust gap between “regulative” and “party institutions”? Rather than one single factor, a host of explanations comes into question. “Party-dominated institutions” reveal a higher degree of media coverage than regulative institutions; they are more prone to political conflict and susceptible to political controversies on the one side and compromises on the other. This is why trust in “regulative institutions” turns out to be not only higher but also more stable than trust in “party-dominated institutions” – in Germany as well as in most Western democracies. Thus, Germany is no exception. What would be problematic is constantly low trust in all political institutions, as this would lead to a shrinking legitimacy of democracy. This, however, is not the case.
Apart from this, we see a small trust gap between East and West Germany for all political institutions. Nonetheless, this should not worry us all too much, considering the fact that this gap is constantly closing. For example, the cohort born between 1972 and 1990 reveals a gap only when it comes to “regulative institutions”. And East and West Germans born after 1990 are completely identical when it comes to political and institutional trust (Gabriel et al., 2015, pp. 164–166).
Figure 5: Trust Hierarchy. Source: Gabriel et al. (2015), p. 165.
4. VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
As to the attractiveness of democracy and its alternatives, the image is mixed: Looking at the scatter plot (figure 6), there is apparently no reason for concern, as when compared with other Western societies, Germany comes off very well. The figure contrasts the share of people who think democracy is a good thing (ordinate) and the share of people who think, a dictatorship (be it a one-man rule or a a military regime) would be a good idea (abscissa).
Figure 6: Democrats and Authoritarians. Source: Dalton and Shin (2014), p. 107.
It is therefore no exaggeration to state that systemic alternatives such as a military junta or a regime with a strong leader (whatever that means) have paled into societal insignificance – even though it deserves mention that despite the longer democratic tradition in the West and despite the much-cited prevalence of authoritarian values in the East, a strong leader attains more acceptance in West German states.
Figure 7: Popularity of Alternatives to Democracy. Sources: European Values Survey 2008 (V225-V227), ALLBUS 2008, Emnid-Survey from March 2010.
The impression only alters when things are called as they are, namely a dictatorship. 5.3 percent of West Germans and 13.8 percent of East Germans prefer this kind of regime to a liberal democracy. Whether this points to an autocratic mentality in the East or a stronger social desirability effect in the West remains unclear. In any case, the most striking aspect is the strong appeal of a technocracy – that is a rule of experts, where economists, jurists, and social scientists have the say-so instead of elected politicians. This, in fact, is something we should worry about and something that might help in understanding the recent advancement of right-wing populist phenomena. On the one side, an expert rule does – as a matter of course – not qualify as a dyed-in-the-wool autocracy, a regime characterized by the lack of checks and balances. A technocracy, instead, would not come along with the abolition of free and fair elections or the monopolization of political power.
On the other side: 1) If it is a body of appointed experts, not elected politicians who exert political power over the demos, the chain of legitimacy is seriously damaged. Thus, from a normative point of view, an expert rule is a double-edged sword. 2) An expert rule converts the democratic “re-election mechanism” into a toothless tiger: Democracy rests upon the principle of accountability and the temporary use of power. In a technocracy, those who aim at being re-elected on a certain day do not exercise power, and those who exercise power – that is the experts – do not stand for re-election, which is why in this system the electorate lacks instruments to overcome irresponsive political decisions. Therefore, an expert rule is problematic with respect to its responsivity, too. 3) A technocracy cannot break the stalemate between “rational” decisions of the expert body on the one side and the public opinion on the other. Therefore, technocracies might end up in the insoluble paradoxical situation of a common good, yet unpopular policy, provoking large scale dissatisfaction and political unrest. Thus, an expert rule is also fraught with problems with respect to its persistence.
Why are technocracies so popular then? Their attractiveness is a consequence of three widespread misunderstandings. The first is: Political rule can and in fact must be freed from particular interests, from individual values, from power and irrationality. The second misunderstanding in society is that “good” political results (whatever that means) depend on the goodwill of the rulers, not the quality of political institutions. And the third challenge is the blatant lack of sound knowledge of the functional principles of representative democracy: In 1998 Germans were surveyed about their conceptions of parliamentarianism and their governmental system (Patzelt, 1998). 59 percent conceded to not know what federalism was, 14 percent made erroneous statements. 40 percent uttered mistaken ideas about the Bundesrat. 60 percent of the interviewees held the opinion that they get to hear of the Bundestag only insufficiently. 58 percent did not know where the parliament’s work takes place (besides the plenum). 33 percent favoured a presidential system over Germany’s parliamentarian one, which 21 percent deemed to be a deviation from the “normal” state. A majority of 57 percent could not come to terms with the fact that Germany’s government emerges from the parliament’s majority group. Two out of three respondents assumed that it is the opposition’s job to support the government; merely one out of two believed the critique of the government’s legislation to be a main task of the minority fractions. 54 percent of the respondents rejected party discipline categorically.
There exists another, more recent example that complements this impression. A recent survey by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IfD) revealed that about 25 percent of the Germans expect political parties to champion their political objectives without fuss and quibble, and without making any compromises
