href="#ulink_13115adf-80ff-5d97-81cc-04c4e4b6ad75">94. Bacevich, New American Militarism, 73–79.
95. Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow, 191. Others, like Tony Smith and Samuel Moyn, maintain that liberal internationalism veers dangerously close to the imperialism of neoconservatism. See Smith, A Pact with the Devil, and Moyn, “Beyond Liberal Internationalism.”
96. Kagan, “Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, c. 1776.”
97. Bacevich, American Empire, 3.
98. Moyn and Wertheim, “The Infinity War.”
99. Grandin, Kissinger’s Shadow, 15.
100. Jon Sobrino characterizes this feature of American foreign policy as a metaphysical commitment, observing of the United States, “The empire decides where and when time is something real, what dates should be recognized as benchmarks in human history. It says: ‘Time is real when we say it is.’ And the reason for this is ultimately metaphysical: ‘Reality is us.’” Sobrino, Where Is God?, xi. See also Sobrino, No Salvation, 18.
101. Quoted in the preface to Bacevich, American Empire.
102. In the name of democratization neoconservatives have invoked states of “exception” that override democratic protections and procedures and have created both “spaces of exception” geographically (Guantanamo Bay; Iraq) as well as “practices of exception” (coercive interrogation, torture, and now drones). More broadly on this contradiction in American foreign policy, see Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, and Bacevich, The Limits of Power. Both Drolet and Maria Ryan make this argument: neoconservatism employs an idealist cover to legitimate its desire for American hegemony in a unipolar world. See Drolet, American Neoconservatism, and Ryan, Neoconservatism and the New American Century.
103. Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy.
104. This is not to mention the countless other military interventions, covert operations, and clandestine coup d’états—Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, and now the broader Middle East. On this point, see Kinzer, Overthrow.
105. Quoted in Williams, Understanding U.S.-Latin America Relations, 222.
106. Grandin, Empire’s Workshop.
107. Wertheim, “Return of the Neocons.”
108. Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order”; Mead, “Donald Trump’s Jacksonian Revolt”; Clarke and Ricketts, “Donald Trump and American Foreign Policy.”
109. Heilbrunn, “Neocons Paved the Way for Trump.”
110. Wendy Brown has expressed two different views of the relationship in her writings. First, in “American Nightmare,” Brown offered a version of the approach proposed by Hall, Harvey, and Wolin by arguing that neoliberalism and neoconservatism serve as two distinct political rationalities that converge as a politics of de-democratization. But, more recently, in In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, Brown endorses Cooper’s analysis by analyzing Hayek’s assault on social justice and the regulatory and distributive functions of the state as linked to his defense of traditional morality. More broadly, see Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism, 58. See also Wolin, Democracy Incorporated.
111. Cooper, Family Values.
112. Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism, 7.
113. Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism; Connolly, Aspirational Fascism; and Connolly, “Trump, the Working Class, and Fascist Rhetoric,” 34n1.
114. Connolly, “Ethos of Democratization,” 168–69, and Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism, 8.
115. Connolly, “Wolin, Superpower, and Christianity.”
116. Connolly, “Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine,” 879.
117. Connolly, Christianity and Capitalism, 48–49.
118. McGill, “The Trump Bloc,” and Kriner and Shen, “Battlefield Causalities and Ballot Box Defeat.”
119. Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, 10. See also Brown, “Neoliberalism’s Frankenstein,” 75.
120. Milanovic, Global Inequality.
121. Mounk, People vs. Democracy, 154.
122. Nancy Fraser argues the same point, observing that “having abandoned the populist politics of distribution, Trump proceeded to double down on the reactionary politics of recognition, hugely intensified and ever more vicious.” Fraser, “From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump—and Beyond.”
123. Connolly, Aspirational Fascism, 12.
124. Connolly identifies the common drive of much of the politics on the right as a form of Nietzschean ressentiment that directs its frustrated desires at its own impotence toward others. Often ressentiment is cultivated among constituencies with a sense of entitlement who experience a series of rapid changes that threaten their privilege and social standing. Connolly maintains that “the feelings of ressentiment are likely to be aimed at those constituencies and forces who have injured you most and/or opened a wound in your creed. Carriers of ressentiment typically look for vulnerable constituencies to castigate, punish, or attack” (“World of Becoming,” 228).
