which has replaced “Asia Pacific” as a preferred term by the U.S. government and which clearly reveals America’s intention to boost India’s status vis-à-vis China.8 The United States has also beefed up its alliance with Japan, South Korea, and Australia at the same time when its relations with China are experiencing some difficulties.
The United States has accentuated competition with the PRC while upgrading relations with Taiwan since Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016. In December 2017 and January 2018, the U.S. government published two documents regarding America’s overall security stance toward the world: the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Summary of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), respectively. Both documents mention China numerous times and portray China as a revisionist power and a strategic competitor that seeks to shape a world antithetical to American values and interests. In a public speech at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC on October 4, 2018, Vice President Mike Pence blasted China for undermining U.S. interests, accusing China of meddling in America’s democracy, stealing American technology, cracking down on religious freedom at home, and expanding global influence through “debt diplomacy.”9 Whereas President Bill Clinton championed Beijing as a partner and President Barack Obama accepted China as a competitor, the Trump administration has publicly identified China a national security threat. The Trump administration is particularly sensitive to “Made in China 2025,” which was unveiled by China’s State Council in 2015 to transform China from a big manufacturing country to a powerful one in a decade. The United States considers this industrial plan a direct challenge to its technological leadership.
The 2018 “Taiwan Travel Act” allows U.S. officials “at all levels” to travel to Taiwan to meet with their Taiwanese counterparts and allows high-level Taiwanese officials to enter the United States and meet with U.S. officials. Meanwhile, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the de facto U.S. embassy in Taiwan, completed its 14,934 square meter and $255.6 million new office building in Taipei in June 2018.10 Many people realize that the U.S.–Taiwan relationship is perhaps officially “unofficial,” but unofficially official. In Beijing’s view, the United States has not abandoned its Cold War-style containment policy toward China and will continue to use Taiwan as a check on the PRC.
U.S.–China relations have always been marked by both cooperation and competition. Since President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the two countries have tried to expand areas of cooperation while controlling and managing areas of differences. As the Chines power continues to grow and as China becomes more assertive in foreign affairs such as island-building in the South China Sea, the United States has become increasingly frustrated. Many Americans have become disillusioned that after so many years of engagement and cooperation with China, the interests of the two countries remain divergent, and as a rising power, China, either intentionally or unintentionally, is challenging key U.S. interests from open market and fair trade to human rights and cybersecurity. Taken together, such concerns have fueled a new consensus in Washington that China is not just a strategic competitor but very possibly America’s major long-term adversary. Even long-time advocates of strong U.S.–China relations such as Henry Kissinger and Henry Paulson have become more pessimistic. At a speech in Singapore in November 2018, Paulson remarked that unless the United States and China seriously address the broad and deep issues that separate them, they will be in for “a long winter” in the relationship.11 In the same speech, Paulson was critical of China’s current direction. Seventeen years after joining the WTO, he said, China still “has not opened its economy to foreign competition in so many areas,” using joint-venture requirements, ownership limits, technical standards, subsidies, licensing procedures and regulation to block foreign competition. “This is simply unacceptable.” Apparently China’s latest developments have even alienated moderates and some of its friends in the United States.
To a large extent, the trade war President Trump launched against China in 2018 reflects the U.S. frustration about China’s rise and its challenge to U.S. dominance in the world. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is also an indication that neither of them is fully prepared for a new world in which China has evolved into a great power that does not necessarily share the same interests and values with the West. The bilateral relationship under the administrations of Donald Trump and Xi Jinping has become more conflictual in many ways, and the underlying structural problems and tensions between the two countries are unlikely to disappear any time soon.
Key Internal Factors
Contrary to the common perception that the Chinese state is monolithically controlled by the CCP, China has become an increasingly diverse and dynamic society, in which many players are competing for influence in national politics. While the Standing Committee of the CCP’s Politburo still has the final say in Chinese politics and foreign policy decisions are made by the Leading Small Group on foreign affairs, a growing number of players — from high ranking government officials and military officers to scholars, researchers, businesspeople, media, large state companies, and Internet users — are increasingly involved in China’s policy discussions.
Various government departments and offices compete for power and influence in foreign affairs. The Foreign Ministry is now perceived as just one of the government agencies, and not necessarily a very powerful one, while other key government agencies such as the CCP Central Committee’s International Department, the People’s Bank of China, and the Ministry of Commerce are also active in dealing with political, financial, and economic relations with other countries. The CCP’s Policy Research Office, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the PLA are some of the other powerful official actors vying to influence top leadership’s decisions (Jakobson and Knox, 2010). The players that help ensure China’s domestic stability, such as the PLA, People’s Armed Police and Ministry of Public Security, often speak with a stronger voice in policy debate. The successful hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, as well as the need to maintain control in ethnic minority regions, particularly Xinjiang and Tibet, have led to more funds and prestige to these more hardline actors.
The PLA has always been a major force in Chinese politics. In fact, the PLA, together with the CCP and the state bureaucracy, is part of the powerful tripod of Chinese state apparatus. Mao Zedong cautioned that the Party must always control the gun. However, it does not mean the PLA will not attempt to influence the Party’s decision-making. On issues regarding territory and national security, PLA generals tend to be more outspoken and hawkish than civilian leaders. In recent years, a few retired PLA generals such as Wang Hongguang and Luo Yuan have become very vocal and often appear in national media to comment on current affairs and discuss China’s strategies and policy options.
China’s foreign policy-related think tanks are also active in policy debate. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China Institute of Strategy and Management, China Center for International Economic Exchanges, Institute for Strategic Studies of National Defense University, China Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Center for China and Globalization, and Pangoal Institution are just some of such prominent think tanks. In addition, scholars at foreign policy and international affairs research centers at major universities are already actively involved in policy debate. Other actors that influence China’s foreign policy include state-owned enterprises which have become part of China’s “zou chu qu” (走出去 going out) strategy by investing and purchasing abroad, state financial institutions such as the China Development Bank, large energy companies such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and local regions with booming economies or strategically important locations.12
On one hand, it is healthy to have diverse views on foreign affairs. China’s foreign policies have become more calculated today, taking into account various options. On the other hand, these different views may complicate the policymaking process and send mixed messages to the outside world. The debate over what China can do with its growing power is a case in point. Some Chinese scholars
