of aggressively defending China’s national interests, especially in its trade or territorial disputes with other countries.
Public interest in world affairs is always high in China. As a joke goes, any taxi driver in Beijing could be a sharp current affairs analyst. The Chinese netizen population had reached over 800 million by the end of 2010s, creating the largest pool of online discussions and opinions. Chinese officials reportedly often surf the Internet to get a feeling of the public’s sentiments and concerns. They need to carefully manage growing nationalism as a result of China’s patriotic education in the 1990s and its remarkable economic performance in the past 40 years. While Chinese handling of disputed territories with Japan, India and in the South China Sea may be viewed as “assertive” or even “aggressive” by foreign media and observers, Chinese netizens tend to blame Chinese leaders for not being tough enough to stand up against foreign governments. This perception gap highlights a dilemma Chinese leaders face in making foreign policy decisions.
Sometimes Chinese policy may be hijacked by the public opinion. Anger over perceived affronts to China’s national honor or encroachment on vital Chinese interests often quickly turns to criticism of the Chinese government’s failure to defend the country’s interests. For instance, in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese patrol boats in the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku area, the Chinese public got extremely agitated and nationalistic, which made the government’s calm handling of the case very difficult. Partially under heavy pressure from the Chinese public, the Chinese government took a strong approach to Japan, who was forced to release the Chinese fishing boat captain without formal charges. China also briefly imposed a ban on shipments to Japan of rare-earth metals that are crucial for Japan’s economy. Although Chinese netizens might think that China won, China’s relations with Japan and its efforts to become a peacefully rising power suffered since the international media sympathized with Japan and considered Chinese behavior to be overbearing.13
In the future, China will have to maintain a balanced foreign policy without succumbing to public pressures at home. As Asia-Pacific security expert Denny Roy comments, the greatest single foreign policy challenge for the Chinese government is to balance two objectives that easily clash: to build a reputation as a responsible, principled great power that will be a force for peace rather than a regional bully, and to satisfy demands from the Chinese public and some Chinese elites that China begin to act like a powerful country and stand up more strongly for what they see as China’s interests (Roy, 2010).
It must be pointed out that under President Xi Jinping’s forceful leadership, decision-making in China seemed to be more centralized once again after the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Xi is an assertive and ambitious leader with a strong sense of historical mission. He introduced some new concepts in China’s foreign policy such as “a new type of great power relations” and “a community with a shared future for mankind.” He ushered in a “new era” in China. If Mao made China independent (zhan qi lai), and Deng made it prosperous (fu qi lai), Xi will make it powerful (qiang qi lai). Chinese domestic and foreign policies experienced some significant transformations since Xi took power. While Deng loosened the Party’s control on China’s economy and society, Xi has resumed and strengthened the Party’s dominance and leadership over all tasks. On May 15, 2018 at the first meeting of the newly established Central Foreign Affairs Committee, Xi emphasized the central leadership role of the Party in China’s foreign affairs. At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs on June 22, 2018, Xi reminded Chinese diplomats that they were first and foremost “Party cadres.”
At the National Security Forum on February 17, 2017, Xi suggested that China should “guide the international community to jointly shape a fairer and more just new international order” and “guide the international community to jointly maintain international security.” The “two guides” (两个引导) were clearest indication that Xi was no longer content with Deng Xiaoping’s “Tao Guang Yang Hui” policy and intended to push China to the center stage of international affairs. “What we are seeing is the slow, steady emergence of a more integrated Chinese worldview which links China’s domestic vision with its international vision — and a vision which very much reflects the deep views of China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping.”14 As veteran journalist Cary Huang observed, “No Chinese leader, ancient or contemporary, has been as active as Xi in diplomacy (Huang, 2018).” No Chinese leader has done more globetrotting within such a short time: in his first 5-year term, Xi went on 28 overseas trips that took him to 56 countries across five continents. During his first term, Xi also hosted five major world summits. Chinese foreign policy will continue to be constrained by changing domestic and international conditions. The role of key internal and external factors, particularly that of President Xi, must he underscored in understanding China’s foreign policy since 2012.
New Thinking on Chinese Foreign Policy
“The world thought it could change China, and in many ways it has. But China’s success has been so spectacular that it has just as often changed the world — and the American understanding of how the world works,” remarks The New York Times’ Asia Editor Philip P. Pan (2018). China is widely seen as a major power today that is heavily involved in global affairs. As veteran China scholar David Shambaugh points out, Xi Jinping has taken a personal interest in global governance. Consequently, China is contributing much more to the United Nations operating budget, global peacekeeping, overseas development assistance and the Millennium Development Goals, and it is more active in a range of areas, from combating public health pandemics to disaster relief, energy and sea lane security, counterterrorism, and anti-piracy operations. While the BRI is encountering criticism of late, it is nonetheless illustrative of China’s new foreign policy activism under Xi (Shambaugh, 2018).
China’s expanded interests and enhanced capabilities call for new policies at home and added responsibilities abroad. New thinking is required for understanding the transformations in Chinese politics and foreign policy. International relations and foreign policy studies have long been dominated and shaped by Western scholars and Western theories. Among major international relations theories, realism and its variants still dominate international politics today with emphasis on conflict of national interests. The Chinese, however, believe countries with differences can live harmoniously (和而不同). In recent years, some scholars in China have been attempting to develop a “Chinese school of thought” in international relations. Qin Yaqing, a leading scholar at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, defines “China’s central question” as “how to peacefully integrate into international society” (Qin, 2005). According to Qin, a Chinese international relations theory is likely and even inevitable to emerge along with the great economic and social transformations that China has been experiencing. The Tianxia (天下) worldview and Tributary System in the two millennia of China’s history, the radical thinking and revolutions in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestones of China’s ideational and practical development and therefore could provide rich fodder for a Chinese international relations theory (Qin, 2007). Other Chinese scholars such as Zhao Tingyang, Ren Xiao, Yan Xuetong, Wang Yizhou, Tang Shiping, Yu Xiaofeng, and Guo Shuyong have also attempted to propose innovative Chinese perspectives of the world and international politics.15 Daniel A. Bell, Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University and professor at Tsinghua University (Schwarzman College and Department of Philosophy), suggests that China should promote Confucianism in its interactions with the outside world, especially meritocracy and a harmonious world view (Bell, 2010). In international political economy, it appears that the Chinese model of state-guided capitalism plus political meritocracy has some appeal, but whether it is sustainable is highly debatable.
Managing the complex U.S.–China relationship remains a most challenging diplomatic undertaking for both China and the United States. Many scholars have applied Western international relations theories, including variants of the power transition theory such as the “Thucydides’ Trap,” to analyze U.S.–China
