over time.
In their survey of governance styles in free and open source software, Shaikh and Henfridsson (2017) call this kind of governance autocratic clearing. “Autocratic clearing,” they explicate with the example of the Linux kernel, “is a system of management with singular coordinating points that obliges other actors to channel all work and decisions through a central ‘clearing house’ before accomplishment” (p. 124). Other modes of ordering they examined involved a more stratified regime of decision‐making and peer review of segments contributed to the Linux code. Next to such “oligarchic recursion” (p. 125) they found evidence for a more autonomous form of self‐governance where branches broke away from the main project. Yet another type of governance process embodied the negotiation of mutually agreed decisions considering divergent viewpoints, what Shaikh & Henfridsson (2017) have named “meritocratic idea‐testing” (p. 127).
The governance arrangements organizing cooperation in peer production and its outcomes are not fixed but evolve over a project’s life‐cycle. This change reflects the influx of new users and the growth of the project. It also indicates transformations in the institutional environment of a project and in the relations between contributors (Mateos‐García & Steinmueller, 2008). For Debian, O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) describe four phases of governance. Initially, the collective enterprise was organized by de facto governance. It was based on autocratic rule without any consistent involvement of the contributors. In the next phase of designing governance, a hierarchy of positions was devised that should exist apart from the actual people assuming a certain role. This plan was then set to work in the phase of implementing governance. It demanded that the execution of positional powers had to rest on the commission of fellow developers. The final stage of a stabilizing governance was achieved when elections were successfully held in order to transfer a mandate from one user to another (Schweik & Englisch, 2012).
Along these steps, Debian as a mature free and open source software project has established a “Social Contract” that codifies key principles of cooperation and the normative expectations undergirding the users’ collaboration. The responsibilities and the structural relationships of project governance are furthermore defined in a Debian Constitution and there are elections for project leadership. The many consecutive versions of this document show that it is not locked up but is an element of ongoing debate, and subject to amendments (Sadowski et al., 2008).
In Wikipedia, what has been devised as a fluid and transparent process risks petrifying into quite rigid bureaucratic configurations with counter‐productive consequences. Instead of facilitating cooperation, standardization and hierarchization block new users and hinder user retention. They complicate decision‐making procedures, promote elitism, and lead to an organizational deadlock that defies the ideas of openness and inclusivity. These implications of bureaucratization as more of a burden than a driver of peer production have especially been studied for Wikipedia (Butler et al., 2008; Carr, 2011; Halfaker et al., 2013). Despite early accounts of an ad hoc form of non‐hierarchical governance (Konieczny, 2009, 2010), in many language versions hierarchies have tended to become more pronounced (Shaw & Hill, 2014). In line with this finding, the number of links to policy pages in Wikipedia discussions has increased, in particular in reference to the rules about signing individual posts, the use of reliable published sources, and the neutral point of view (Beschastnikh et al., 2008). While the citation of policies has risen, their creation slowed down (Forte & Bruckman, 2008). The attention towards existing rules thus went hand‐in‐hand with the diminishing flexibility to change these rules and declining revision activity (Keegan & Fiesler, 2017).
6 Conclusion
The organization and governance of peer production projects has to balance the independence of individual contributors and the interdependence of a collective endeavor. In‐between the promise of autonomy and the implementation of due process, peer production projects struggle with the suitable level of provision and tolerance (Kostakis, 2010). Initiatives have fed on principles of free choice and increasing individual agency. Yet they are challenged by the reality of an increasingly vast and pervasive texture of rules and requirements which should secure the accuracy and value of the resource and respond to societal expectations.
In this ongoing transformation, standards in Wikipedia have, for instance, changed from “folksy ‘description of how we do things’” to “punitive ‘the way one must do things because otherwise they will punish me’,” Lih (2009, p. 224) claimed. Being aware of these tendencies of increasing formalization, the editors of the online encyclopedia have also devised the somewhat paradoxical rule to “Ignore all rules.” It states that if a rule hinders users from improving Wikipedia it should be willfully ignored. The call to be bold and edit thus seeks to balance mushrooming specifications with the vital commitment to openness. Interestingly, this principle is not found in all Wikipedia language versions, which points to the heterogeneity of the arrangements prevalent among the myriad endeavors that make up peer production. There are forms of isomorphism where different projects follow connate social norms and rules as well as distinct institutional settings peculiar for an individual enterprise.
A blueprint for the future design and implementation of peer governance is arguably provided by Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) principles of successful common‐property regimes. They are a key reference for analyzing the provision and allocation of shared resources in “settings in which the individuals involved have exercised considerable control over institutional arrangements” (p. 61). Sustainable, long‐term settings rest on the congruence between institutions and local conditions. They are marked by collective choice arrangements where people affected by rulings should also participate in their formulation and enforcement. This kind of reciprocal responsibility also ought to foster the monitoring and conflict resolution mechanisms. Graduated sanctions allow community members to adapt penalties in accordance with the severity of wrongdoings. Ostrom furthermore points to the need for local enforcement where communal jurisdiction is recognized by external authorities, and she underscores the importance of multiple layers of organization and governance. In effect, commons‐based projects form a type of nested enterprises where productive participation is arranged at different levels that reach from small circles to the entire community.
With these directions for successful mutual and inclusive governance beyond markets or firms, Ostrom’s work on property‐rights regimes seems to be a natural fit. Indeed, many peer production projects have sought to emulate some of her advice (Aaltonen & Lanzara, 2015; Forte & Bruckman, 2008; Keegan & Fiesler, 2017; Kiesler et al., 2011; Pentzold, 2011; Viègas et al., 2007). Yet while Ostrom deals with the allocation and provision of scarce natural resources, peer production mostly centers on information goods whose use is nonrival (Hess & Ostrom, 2011). In consequence, urgent issues revolve around the creation of common resources, not their consumption. This is unfinished business. In order to expand and reinforce the collective capability of contributors, peer production’s institutions have to be continuously aligned with the dynamically unfolding conditions and requirements of its projects.
References
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