create a space for uncertainty and doubt about the truth, discouraging and preventing individuals and states from pursuing it. This space is unattended, unregulated, and ungoverned. As Shane Harris has noted, ungoverned spaces eventually fall apart,32 or are filled by another force that typically establishes its own regulations and rules that help control its narrative. Whoever controls information and whoever controls the narrative has power, and as Soviet/Russian history has demonstrated, power is a paramount consideration and concern in the Russian civilization.
Today, the world cannot complain that there is a lack of information. On the contrary, an ordinary consumer is crushed by information from all sides. Richard Stengel reminded us that the U.S. Library of Congress alone has 39 million books.33 Yet, Russian information warfare seems to have limited people’s choices of sources, persuading many that Russia has a monopoly on truth. Peter Pomerantsev has aptly noted that “[m]ore information was supposed to mean a more informed debate, but we seem less capable of deliberation than ever. More information was supposed to mean mutual understanding across borders, but it has also made possible new and more subtle forms of conflict and subversion.”34 Mutual understanding across borders, the future without conflict, and cooperation among civilizations might be possible only if international order and peace are maintained. The problem with the latter, as well as international law and order that has been consistently violated by the Russian Federation since 2014, seems to rest in cultural differences between world civilizations and their leaders’ cultural understandings of order. Huntington was convinced that in the future “the world will be ordered on the basis of civilization or not at all.”35 Those civilizations that are culturally close will come together, and those who are drastically different will come apart.
We are living in a time when this process has been accelerated, and Russia is a key player in that process. The Russian secret biochemical weapons program and laboratories function at full capacity, Novichok is being produced and used, the territories of foreign states are annexed, passenger liners are shot down by Russian BUKs, the “Kremlin’s assassination program”36 is active and has new young trainees (employees of the GRU), American students and scholars are coopted and recruited through FSB front organizations, and history is being rewritten because of Putin, for Putin, and by Putin himself. Bezmenov, who in 1984 expressed serious concerns about Russian subversive activities that, from his point of view, had been quite successful in North America, did not have an opportunity to observe the extent of Russian active measures after 2014, having died under mysterious circumstances in Canada in 1993 at the age of 54. A quarter of a century later, the veteran of Russian intelligence Oleg Kalugin was similarly concerned, stating that “current developments in Russia are highly disturbing,” referencing Zbigniew Brzezinski who foresaw the emergence of a new form of fascist nationalism in Russia.37 This volume is designed to raise public awareness of these trends and Russian active measures that beyond ideological motivations also have financial ones. As Kalugin has suggested, “the KGB was an organization. There are no organizations in Russia now, just organized crime.”38 The authors in this volume consider a discussion about Russian overt and covert operations of ideological subversion timely and necessary, as thorough analyses of the current developments in Russia and agnotological inquiries produce concerns, and thus solutions.39
While this book answers many questions about Russian active measures, it also provokes new questions. Can we all learn the skills of diagnostics or does only naturally acquired cultural knowledge help recognize subversion imposed on us? Can we map a false narrative? Can we distinguish between reality and falsehoods? Will Russia discontinue active measures, and when and where will Putin stop? Theodor Adorno once compared Nazi Germany, engaged in mass killings, with a serial killer who could not stop unless he was stopped.40 By analogy, the Russian economist, senior fellow at the CATO Institute, and former economic policy adviser to Putin Andrei Illarionov has emphasized the danger of Putin and the regime he established in Russia. Over the last decade, one can observe that the Russian Government led by Putin has become authoritarian at home with clear features of fascist ideology, as some scholars have argued, and more aggressive and destabilizing in its foreign policy.41 Illarionov has offered several suggestions about how the international community can stop Putin and his hybrid war against Russia’s neighboring states and the West.42 The initial stage includes the process of learning and understanding Russian culture and civilization.
By the time you finish reading this book, you will be able to answer some of the aforementioned questions. However, you will certainly have questions of your own. Indeed, much more should be done. Research should be continued, the former KGB archives should be mined, and studies have to be published to identify and analyze the blind spot of Russian active measures. Thus far, there are no signs of Putinism receding into the past, and hence the history of Russian active measures will be expanded. Their geography will be broadened, their tools will be perfected, and their technological support will be advanced. The world might radically change in the nearest future because of cataclysmic events, similar to COVID-19. What likely will stay permanent is Russian narratives used by “subverters.” And Russia’s battle to promote them will continue.
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Gioe,
