the banks of the Elbe 300 yards away - and the organisation of the watches. In the further distance there was no visible sign of any change in the wonted scenes of peace, for there was still a lively movement of ships in the Elbe, and every incoming German steamer had a particularly warm welcome for having succeeded in getting safely home. But the wireless messages flashing to and fro might at any moment summon us out to meet the foe.
Preparations for the offensive were not neglected during the days in which England was making up her mind what her attitude was to be, and when at 7.47 p.m. on August 4 we received the message, "Prepare for war with England," we also heard the order to the auxiliary cruiser Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm to put to sea immediately. At 9.30 P.m. the auxiliary minelayer Konigin Luise also left the Ems on the way to the Thames estuary. Thus began the first essay in cruiser warfare and the introduction of guerilla operations on the English coast. In the wireless room of the Flagship we listened hopefully for further news of the progress of the first two enterprises against the enemy. Would the great ocean greyhound be forced back, or would she succeed in getting unchallenged into the ocean? She remained dumb, and that could justly be taken as a favourable sign.
The wireless message to the Konigin Luise had run: "Make for sea in Thames direction at top speed. Lay mines near as possible English coasts, not near neutral coasts, and not farther north than Lat 53." The task assigned to the Konigin Luise gave little ground for the hope that she could escape the watchfulness of the English; but, with a supreme contempt of death, the ship, under the command of Commander Biermann, held on her way. The steamer which usually plied in summer to the watering-places of the North Sea islands was engaged about 11 a.m. next morning by enemy cruisers and destroyers, and was sunk by a torpedo.
She had had time to sow her mines, however, with the result that the cruiser Amphion (3,500 tons, launched 1911), which was pursuing her, fell a victim to them and followed the Konigin Luise to the bottom with a loss of 131 men. Thus the first day of the war (August 5) had brought losses to both sides, and the first attack on the English coast had been a success for us.
However, the sacrifice it had involved had not been incurred in vain. It was not merely that it had cost the enemy a new cruiser. Far more important was the impression that this proof of a bold spirit of enterprise must have made on friend and foe alike. The situation at the outset thus appeared in such a light that in view of these aggressive operations the enemy thought that he could best protect himself by withdrawing to northern waters, and did not take the other alternative of closing our sally ports himself. Throughout the whole war not a single mine was sown in our estuaries, notwithstanding the thousands upon thousands which were employed in the open waters of the North Sea.
As the next few days passed without incident, and aeroplanes and airships had made no discoveries, while incoming steamers reported that English battleships were only to be seen at a great distance (by Aberdeen) from the German Bight, our business was now to discover the whereabouts of the enemy and get to close quarters with him if we were to bring about an equalisation of strength. For this purpose we had at our disposal the destroyers and submarines which could be spared from the defensive organisation of the Heligoland Bight.
Commander Bauer, in command of the U-boats, was convinced that the defensive employment of submarines in a narrow circle round Heligoland was useless, as there was only a slight probability that the enemy would approach so close, and even if he did it was doubtful whether the boats would get a chance to shoot. The necessity of perpetually coming in and going out of the harbour of Heligoland, a difficult process in view of the methods employed in the defensive system, led to a useless strain on the material and injury to the boats. He therefore represented to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet that only the offensive use of U-boats could bring about a change. The number of boats employed must certainly be larger, but the prospects of success would be greater still.
The justice of this argument was recognised, and a decision was taken which was extremely important for the further course of the war. Nor was there much hesitation in carrying it into execution, for the U-boats received orders to proceed on August 6 against English battleships, the presence of which was suspected in the North Sea. These ships were supposed to be about 200 nautical miles from Heligoland and charged with the duty of intercepting some of our battleships which ought to be on their way from Kiel round Skagen into the North Sea because the passage of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal presented too great difficulties Ten U-boats were assigned to this enterprise, and six days were allowed for it.
This cruise was to carry the ships across the entire North Sea and as far north as the Orkneys. The boats were left to their own devices, as the cruisers Hamburg and Stettin, parent ships of the U-boat flotilla, could, of course, not accompany it the whole way. They were only to cover the first run of the boats, a hundred miles or so, and endeavour to draw off any enemy light craft from the U-boats in the direction of Heligoland. The submarines themselves were not to pay any attention to such ships, as their goal was the enemy battleships. It was only for the return journey that the boats were left a free hand to do the enemy all the damage they could. The weather being thick and rainy, and the visibility poor, was not favourable for the enterprise, and indications pointed to its becoming worse. As the latter eventuality did not materialise, however, the commander gave the order to put to sea.
In so great an area, and taking into account the rapid) changes which experience shows may be expected, it is very difficult to forecast the weather in the North Sea. The decision was, therefore, a brilliant tribute to the fiery enthusiasm of the new weapon, which had never been faced with a task of such magnitude in peace. The course was to be taken in such a way that the submarines, in line ahead with seven-mile intervals between them, first negotiated a stretch of 300 nautical miles in a north-westerly direction, then turned and went back to a line directly between Scapa Flow and Stavanger, which they were to reach about seventy-two hours after putting to sea. They were to remain on this line until 6 o'clock in the evening of the next day - in all about thirty-nine hours - and then return to Heligoland. One boat had to return when 225 nautical miles from Heligoland, on account of trouble in her Diesel engines. Two others, commanded by Lieutenant-Commanders Count Schweinitz and Pohle, were lost. All the rest carried out their allotted task and were back by August 11.
Nothing was seen of the enemy, with the exception of a four-funnelled cruiser which emerged out of the mist for a short time. All that was known of the lost boats was that one of them was still in wireless communication early on August 8. On the 9th the region in which the U-boats were lying was shrouded in mist, and the wind was blowing with force 6. It was only on August 15 that we learnt that a large part of the English Fleet had been in the same area and had there destroyed six German herring-boats after taking their crews on board. Fog and the amount of sea that wind of a force 6 means are the most unfavourable conditions conceivable for a submarine, in view of the fact that the conning-tower is so low down in the water. It is to be assumed that the missing boats had been surprised by English cruisers in weather of this kind and rammed before they had time to dive.
It was certainly regrettable that at the very moment of meeting the English Fleet was protected by mist, that two of our boats had fallen victims, and that this first enterprise, so smartly carried out, had not been crowned by the success it deserved. The loss of two boats had no depressing effect whatever on the crews. It rather increased their determination to do even better.
The course of this six-day cruise cleared the way for the further exploitation of the U-boat weapon, the great importance of which lay in its power of endurance and its independence, two characteristics which appeared at their true value for the first time in this cruise under war conditions. In these two respects the U-boats were superior to all surface vessels in the Fleet. The destroyers, in particular, were not to be compared with them for their ability to remain at sea. Their fuel capacity was too small for that purpose, and when going at high speed the consumption of coal increased out of all proportion. Further, as the big ships needed the co-operation of the smaller as submarine-screens and mine-sweepers, these, too, were dependent on their smaller consorts for the length of time they could remain at sea, especially when they were in areas in which regard
