this being vital to the existence of an island nation, particularly one which is not self-supporting in regard to food. (2) In the event of war to bring steady economic pressure to bear on our adversary by denying to him the use of the sea, thus compelling him to accept peace. (3) Similarly, in the event of war, to cover the passage and assist any army sent overseas and to protect its communications and supplies. (4) To prevent invasion of this country and its overseas dominions by enemy forces.
Chapter 3 - Awaiting the Enemy's Offensive
ON August 2 the Commander-in-Chief had summoned all the commanders of the three battleship squadrons, cruisers, destroyers and submarines to the flagship, and there explained to them the task set in the War Orders and his intentions with regard to it. Instructions had just been received from the Naval Staff that on the express wish of the Foreign Office no hostile action should be taken against English warships and merchant ships, as all hope of England's neutrality had not yet been abandoned. In his desire to keep England out of the war the Imperial Chancellor had gone so far as to enter into an obligation, through our ambassador in London, not to conduct operations in the Channel or against the north coast of France if England remained neutral. In this way she would be released from her own obligation to protect the north coast of France with the English Fleet. The same day, however, we received subsequent instructions that the English cable communications with the Continent had been broken off, and that we had to anticipate hostile action on the part of England.
How universal was the conviction that the English Navy would immediately take the offensive is illustrated by the fact that after the conference with the Commander-in-Chief the Commander of Squadron I advised me very strongly to take Squadron II to the Elbe during the night, instead of waiting till next morning as had been arranged, as otherwise we might arrive too late. However, we adhered to the original decision to take up the anchorage appointed for us in the Elbe the next day (August 3), and, as the necessary precautions were taken by sending a mine-sweeping division ahead, the movement was carried out without any mishap.
To take up its anchorage in the Altenbruch Roads, between Cuxhaven and Brunsbuttel, Squadron II had to pass through the minefield which had meanwhile been laid at the mouth of the Elbe. In this river there was a dangerous congestion of vessels which were trying to get out as fast as they could. Among them were some English steamers which would not pay attention to the warnings of the pilot ship, so that there was a dangerous crush in this difficult and narrow channel. The English steamer Wilfred paid for its temerity by running on the mines and was sunk by two explosions following closely on each other. We thus had an opportunity of observing a practical demonstration of the effect of mines. After this occurrence the Commandant of the fortress of Cuxhaven, who was responsible for the security of the estuary, gave orders that all ships were to be sent back to Hamburg so that their knowledge of the position of the minefield should not be turned to the advantage of the enemy.
The next day brought us the English declaration of war. A few hours later the first English submarine was reported in the German Bight. The security of the Heligoland Bight required prompt information of the enemy's intentions so that we could meet him in strength with our naval forces without ourselves suffering from the enemy's counter-measures on our way out. This object could be attained by submarines or mine-layers of which the latter could slip out under cover of darkness and sow the exits from the estuaries with mines. We had also to expect that floating mines would be sown in the mouths of the rivers with a view to their drifting up stream with the tide and endangering our ships lying at anchor. We knew of one type of English mine which drifted with the rising tide only, sank to the bottom when the tide ebbed and then rose again and floated farther up stream. Mines of this kind would have been able to get much farther - in fact to the anchorage of our ships - instead of drifting backwards and forwards in a limited area through the action of ebb and flow, and thereby being stranded in due course.
We had also to anticipate that enemy submarines would penetrate into the rivers. Although the depth of water was not great the passage of submarines, when submerged, was by no means impossible. It was only later, when the depth charge had been evolved, that submarines needed greater depth to escape their effect. Even if the enemy shrank somewhat from such venturesome enterprises as these, it was enough for him to haunt the neighbourhood of the estuaries to operate against our big ships the moment we attempted to gain the open sea.
It is true that we had two types of protection against these dangerous possibilities; first, the initiation of technical defence measures such as mines, nets and so forth, and secondly, the sharpest lookout on the part of the ships engaged in observation duties. If the enemy tried to bring on an action in the neighbourhood of Heligoland - and we assumed he would - we suffered from the outset under a disadvantage if we had to deploy for it out of the estuaries. The narrow exits from the Elbe and the Jade prescribed the line of deployment and compelled the ships to follow in line ahead, a formation which provides splendid opportunities for lurking submarines. For this reason prompt knowledge of the enemy's approach as well as his strength was of particular importance in enabling us to go out and meet him in the open sea with the necessary forces. In the first days of August we attained such a state of preparedness that all the big ships were kept under steam all day, ready to weigh anchor at any moment. We could not concentrate in the outer roads because the submarine obstructions had not yet been laid.
The time from the receipt of a report about the enemy to the issue of the appropriate orders, and then again from the first execution of those orders to the arrival at the appointed rendezvous at sea, was not inconsiderable. According to the state of readiness of the ships and the choice of anchorage it might take hours, during which the enemy would continue his approach unimpeded. Thus arose the necessity of getting the report as soon as possible. But the greater the distance from Heligoland of the arc which had to be covered by our reconnaissance and observation patrols, the less carefully could it be watched. The greater distance either demanded more ships or involved less reliable information when the line was held too thinly.
The use of wireless telegraphy came in extraordinarily handy for intelligence purposes. Unfortunately a large number of the older destroyers which had now been attached to the mine-sweeping division had not yet been fitted with this highly ingenious piece of equipment. The result was that in certain circumstances very valuable time might be lost.
The establishment of a protective system was entrusted to the Commander of the scouting forces, Vice-Admiral Hipper, and all the destroyer flotillas, U-boats, mine-sweeping divisions, aero- planes and airships were placed under his orders. From these forces a protective zone was formed which by day consisted of several circles at varying distances from the lightship "Elbe I." The outermost line, 35 nautical miles (of 1,852 metres) was held by destroyers. Six nautical miles behind there were submarines, and a further six miles back the inmost line was patrolled by mine-sweeping divisions. Two to four light cruisers were distributed behind the two wings of this protective zone, east and south of Heligoland. At night the U-boats and the destroyers on the outermost line were withdrawn, and only the inner one was held. The result of this was that we had all the more destroyers at hand for nocturnal enterprises.
This whole system, however, was more useful for protection than for reconnoitring. It did not extend far enough for the latter purpose. Even if the approach of serious enemy forces at a distance of fifteen miles was reported from the outermost line, these ships, by steaming at full speed, could be within range of the fortress of Heligoland in about an hour and a half. In that time only the ships lying in the outer Jade could gain the open sea. The ships lying in the Elbe at Cuxhaven or in the Wilhelmshaven Roads in the Jade needed longer. If we had depended on this system alone we should have found ourselves in the condition either of being surprised by the enemy and having to meet him in insufficient strength, or having to keep the whole Fleet in a perpetual state of readiness. The latter alternative was impossible in the long run. The duties of the destroyers and cruisers in the protective zone and the necessity of relieving them every
