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[29] E. A. LUND, War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe, 1680–1740. Westport, CT, 1999. T.C.W. BLANNING, Frederick the Great: King of Prussia. London, 2015, p. 226, escribe con toda franqueza: «Se creó un equipo del general».
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[31] Sobre la «naturaleza mimética de la Guerra», véase R. Girard, R. P. HARRISON y C. HAVEN, “Shakespeare: Mimesis and Desire”. Standpoint, Dec. 2018–Jan. 2019, p. 63.
[32] K. M. SWOPE, “Manifesting Awe: Grand Strategy and Imperial Leadership in the Ming Dynasty”. Journal of Military History, 79 (2015), p. 605.
[33] D. A. GRAFF, “Dou Jiande’s Dilemma: Logistics, Strategy, and State Formation in Seventh Century China”. En H. VAN DE VEN (ed.), Warfare in Chinese History. Leiden, 2000, pp. 77–105; D. TWITCHETT, “Tibet in Tang Grand Strategy”, ibid., pp. 106–79; P.C. PERDUE, “Culture, History, and Imperial Chinese Strategy: Legacies of the Qing conquests”, ibid., pp. 252–87.
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[36] El clásico de E.N. LUTTWAK, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third. Baltimore, MD, 1976, es criticado en B. ISAAC, The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East. 2.ª ed., Oxford, 1992, pp. 372–418, y, por el contrario, es apoyado por E. L. WHEELER, “Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy”, Journal of Military History, 57 (1993), pp. 7–41, 215–40; E. L. WHEELER, “Rome’s Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube”, Journal of Military History, 74 (2010), pp. 1185–1227, 75 (2011), pp. 191–219; M. PAVKOVIC, “Roman Grand Strategy”, Military Chronicles, 1 (2005), pp. 14–30; y K. KAGAN, “Redefining Roman Grand Strategy”, Journal of Military History, 70 (2006), pp. 333–62. Véase el más reciente texto de Y. LE BOHEC, La Guerre romaine: 58 avant J.-C.–235 après J.-C. Paris, 2014; G. TRAINA, “La Tête et la main droite de Crassus: quelques remarques supplémentaires”. En A. ALLÉLY (ed.), Corps au supplice et violences de guerre dans l’Antiquité. Bordeaux, 2014, pp. 95–8.
[37] L. LORETO, La grande strategia di Roma nell’età della prima guerra punica (ca.273–ca.229 a. C.): l’inizio di un paradosso. Nápoles, 2007. En cuanto a la situación previa en el mundo griego, véase P.A. BRUNT, “The Aims of Alexander”. Greece and Rome, 12 (1965), pp. 205–15; P. A. BRUNT, “Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War”. Phoenix, 19 (1965), pp. 255–80; J. K. ANDERSON, Military Theory and Practices in the Age of Xenophon. Berkeley, CA, 1970. Para profundizar en estos factores culturales, véase J. LENDON, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity. New Haven, CT, 2005.
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[39] Véase también A. ECKSTEIN, Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 BC. Malden, MA, 2008.
[40] S. P. MATTERN, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate. Berkeley, CA, 1999.
[41] N. TACKETT, “The Great Wall and Conceptualizations of the Border under the Northern Song”, Journal of Song-Yuan Studies, 38 (2008), pp. 99–138.
[42] J. HALDON, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204, London, 1999; J. SHEPARD (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire. Cambridge, 2008; E.N. LUTTWAK, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. Cambridge, MA, 2009; D.A. GRAFF, The Eurasian Way of War: Military Practice in Seventh-Century China and Byzantium, Abingdon, 2016.
[43] J. F. VERBRUGGEN, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. Oxford, 1977, pp. 249–300; P. Contamine, La Guerre au Moyen âge, 4.ª ed. París, 1994, pp. 365–79 (versión inglesa, War in the Middle Ages, Oxford, 1986, pp. 219–28); M. PRESTWICH, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience. New Haven, CT, 1996; F. Garcia Fitz, “¿Hubo estrategia en la Edad Media? A propósito de las relaciones castellano-musulmanas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIII”. Revista da
