a daily turn in charge, though the polemarch CALLIMACHUS retained some authority (6.109–11). Herodotus says Callimachus was chosen by LOT, while other sources say polemarchs were elected until 487/6 (Scott 2005, 378–86).
Herodotus claims (5.78) the Athenians became better fighters after overthrowing the TYRANTS. Their hoplite army grew from perhaps 1–2,000 under the PEISISTRATIDAE (Singor 2013, 592) to some 8,000 at Plataea (9.28), including 4,000 military settlers (CLERUCHS) given land on EUBOEA after the Athenian victory there in 506 (5.77; 6.100). The army also included ARCHERS (9.22) and other light infantry. Both hoplites and light troops served as marines (8.83).
The Spartan army underwent several organizational changes over time, the specifics of which remain debated (for a summary see van Wees 2004, 97–99, 243–49). Herodotus credits (1.65) LYCURGUS OF SPARTA with establishing Sparta’s military institutions including units of thirty (triakades), sworn bands (enomotiai), and common messes (syssitia). Sworn bands and common messes persisted in Spartan socio‐military organization for centuries.
In 480–479 the Spartans were probably organized into regiments (lochoi, 9.53), subdivided into sworn bands each comprising several common messes (van Wees 2004, 243–44; cf. Lazenby 1985, 67). Regiments may have mustered geographically, for Herodotus mentions (9.53.2) a lochos named after the Spartan village of PITANE. THUCYDIDES denied such a lochos existed (Thuc. 1.20; Hornblower 1991, 57–58), and the number of regiments in the army is debated (Kennell 2010, 148; Lazenby 1985, 66; van Wees 2004, 97).
An officer called a lochagos (9.53) or a taxiarchos (9.57) led each Spartan regiment. Officers called polemarchs appear once (7.173); their function at this time is uncertain. Normally one of Sparta’s two kings led the army in the field (5.75). Herodotus mentions a 100‐strong royal bodyguard (6.56) but also describes LEONIDAS’ picked detachment of 300 men with living sons (7.205; on the text see Wilson 2015, 150). A 300‐strong escort of Knights (Hippeis) appears in a non‐battle context (8.124). In later Spartan armies the 300 Hippeis fought on foot next to the king (e.g., Thuc. 5.72); either Herodotus made mistakes or the discrepancies reflect changes over time.
The Spartans took pride in martial traditions such as long HAIR (1.82; 7.209). Herodotus emphasizes their discipline and honor (7.104, 229–31) but also highlights cases of insubordination (9.53–56) and reputation‐seeking (9.71).
In 480 there were about 8,000 full Spartiates (7.234), of whom 5,000 took the field at Plataea (9.28). Five thousand picked PERIOECI joined them as hoplites (9.11). Perioeci may also have fought at THERMOPYLAE (van Wees 2004, 83–84; cf. Lazenby 1985, 107). Helots served as attendants and light troops (7.229; 8.25; 9.10, 28, 85).
Herodotus mentions other Greek militaries including the troops of POLYCRATES of SAMOS (3.39, 45), the 8,000‐strong Naxian army (5.30), and GELON of SYRACUSE’s combined arms force (7.158). The allied Ionian army (5.99–100, 112; 6.15) had city generals (5.99, 102) who may have become part of a joint Ionian command (5.109). Picked troops (logades) of Tegeans (1.82), Thebans (9.67), and others appear. Herodotus points out Greek discipline problems (1.63; 6.12–14) and disputes over positions of honor (9.26–28), but also notes the Greek coalition’s ability to organize long‐distance supply convoys at Plataea (9.39).
As for non‐Greeks, Herodotus gives no details on the Assyrian army (1.95, 102; 2.141). He says (1.103) CYAXARES the Mede was the first to organize the troops of ASIA into units and to separate spearmen, archers, and CAVALRY, and praises the Lydian army for its horsemen (1.79). His account of EGYPT’s warriors (2.141, 164–68) contains a number of inaccuracies (Fischer‐Bovet 2013, 210–19).
Herodotus emphasizes the size (4.87; 7.184–87) and diversity of Achaemenid PERSIA’s military forces. His CATALOGUE (7.60–88) of XERXES’ invasion force might draw upon an authentic troop roster, although more likely it reflects a parade or review army (Briant 1999, 118–20; Cawkwell 2005, 241–43). The Persian IMMORTALS and other picked units (8.113; 9.63) formed the core of the actual fighting force. The Persian army at Plataea included some 50,000 Greek infantry (9.32), with Thebans playing a key role (9.67–68).
Elements of the decimal unit organization Herodotus describes (7.81) appear in imperial records from PERSEPOLIS and Egypt (Briant 2002, 342, 431). On the other hand, Herodotus gives little inkling of the recruitment, maintenance, and mobilization practices known from Achaemenid documents (see Kuhrt 2007, 720–23).
Herodotus reveals Achaemenid logistical prowess, including water pipes and convoys (3.9), prepared depots (7.25), requisition procedures (7.118–20), BRIDGES (4.83–88, 97–98; 7.36), CANALS (7.22–24, 37), and support personnel (7.187). ARCHAEOLOGY corroborates some of his descriptions of Achaemenid SIEGE craft (1.162; 4.200; 6.18) and field FORTIFICATIONS (4.124; 9.15, 65, 97).
SEE ALSO: Engineering; Generals and Generalship; Warfare; Weapons and Armor
REFERENCES
1 Briant, Pierre. 1999. “The Achaemenid Empire.” In War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, edited by Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein, 105–28. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies.
2 Briant, Pierre. 2002. From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, translated by Peter T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
3 Cawkwell, George. 2005. The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4 Fischer‐Bovet, Christelle. 2013. “Egyptian Warriors: The Machimoi of Herodotus and the Ptolemaic Army.” CQ 63.1: 209–36.
5 Frost, Frank. 1984. “The Athenian Military before Cleisthenes.” Historia 33.3: 283–94.
6 Hornblower, Simon. 1991. A Commentary on Thucydides, Volume I: Books I–III. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
7 Kennell, Nigel M. 2010. Spartans: A New History. Chichester: Wiley‐Blackwell.
8 Kuhrt, Amélie. 2007. The Persian Empire. A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period. London and New York: Routledge.
9 Lazenby, J. F. 1985. The Spartan Army. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.
10 Rhodes, P. J. 1993. A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia [reprint with addenda]. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
11 Scott, Lionel. 2005. Historical Commentary on Herodotus Book 6. Leiden: Brill.
12 Singor, Henk. 2012. “War and International Relations.” In A Companion to Archaic Greece, edited by Kurt A. Raaflaub and Hans van Wees, 585–603. Malden, MA: Wiley‐Blackwell.
13 van Wees, Hans. 2004. Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities. London: Duckworth.
14 Wilson, N. G. 2015. Herodotea. Studies on the Text of Herodotus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ARPOXAÏS (Ἀρπόξαϊς, ὁ)
CHRISTOPHER BARON
University of Notre Dame
One of three brothers (the middle) whom the SCYTHIANS claim as forefathers (4.5–6). LIPOXAÏS and Arpoxaïs were prevented by flames from touching a group of golden objects which had fallen from the sky; when the FIRE abated at the approach of the youngest brother, COLAXAÏS, they acknowledged him as sole king. From Arpoxaïs are descended the Scythian tribes CATIARI and TRASPIES. Herodotus reports this foundation story (followed by two other versions) at the beginning of his Scythian ETHNOGRAPHY.
