government (the creation of a waste collection tax), reducing the universe to 24 programs. Since the municipal administration includes the same number of left‐wing, center‐right, and right‐wing municipal governments (three each), simple comparisons are already illustrative of the incidence of political ideology.11 As predicted by partisan politics theories, most changes in municipal policies started and/or were reanimated in left‐wing administrations: 79% of the programs, while 15% of the programs started or restarted in centre‐right governments and just 7% of them in right‐wing governments, considering all intensities of implementation.12
However, when municipal programs were already underway, the difference between governments of different ideologies did not disappear but was sharply reduced. Among the 131 urban redistributive programs implemented by São Paulo's municipal governments since the return to democracy with any intensity, 67 (51%) occurred in left‐wing governments, compared to 38 (29%) in center‐right and 26 (20%) in right‐wing administrations. In this case, then, even though the left is still more prone to develop redistributive policies,13 the center‐right and the right have also done their part. These proportions change only slightly if we include the subway (governed all the time by the center‐right) or consider other intensities of implementation. Median voter mechanisms explain this since, given the composition of the São Paulo electorate, politicians from all ideologies try at least to avoid harming the interests of the poor and the lower middle classes. The effects of policy resilience reinforce this pattern, considering policy institutionalization and the participation of external actors.
On the other hand, the policy trajectories discussed in the following chapters suggest that during center‐right and right‐wing administrations, redistribution policies are usually sharply reduced or go into latency to be reanimated under the next left‐wing government. In fact, during the period, 35 municipal programs were interrupted or strongly reduced,14 23 of them in right‐wing governments and 12 with the shift to center‐right administrations and none to left‐wing administrations. Among the interruptions, 21 impacted hard redistribution programs, while just 14 easy redistribution programs were affected. In both cases, right‐wing governments interrupted more programs, 13 hard and 10 easy redistribution ones.
There is also a strong association between easy redistribution and stable trajectories (13 of the 17 stable trajectories) and between hard redistribution and oscillating trajectories (11 of the 12 oscillating trajectories and the two failures).15 There is, therefore, an association between the kind of redistribution involved and policy resilience. Table I.2 at the end of this introduction provides essential documentation of these programs, but the chapters will discuss them in detail.
TABLE I.2 Selected information on redistributive programs/policies.
| Policy | Program/Activity | Description | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Traffic control | Prioritize bus circulation | Covas implemented the first BRT corridor while Janio, Maluf and Pitta prioritized cars. Suplicy expanded networked BRT, but Serra and Kassab stopped building busways and opened lanes for cars. Haddad considerably expanded the bus‐transit network. | Chapter 5; Chapter 4; Almeida (2019) |
| Bike lanes and bikeways | Recreational weekend‐only bikeways were created by Kassab and Haddad implemented a lengthier network of permanent bike lanes. | Chapter 5; Lemos and Wicher Neto (2014); Chapter 4; Matatesta (2012) | |
| Buses | single fare (not by distance) | Always present, since the 1970s. | Chapter 5; Vasconcelos (1999) |
| improve lines | Started with Covas (OSO), was resumed under Erundina and again with Suplicy (Interligado), to stay effective afterwards | Chapter 5; Chapter 4; Vasconcelos (1999) | |
| control over lines | This involves bus planning, monitoring and control. It started weakly with Covas, was resumed under Erundina, very weak again with Maluf and Pitta, and very strong under Suplicy and afterwards | Chapter 5; Chapter 4; Vasconcelos (1999); Hirata (2011) | |
| new dedicated lanes/corridors | Created in the Covas, Suplicy and Haddad (mainly) | Almeida (2019); Requena (2018); Vasconcelos (1999) | |
| smart card (integration) | Created and implemented in the Suplicy government and maintained afterwards | Chapter 5; Chapter 4 | |
| creation of free passes | For elderly in 1983 (but became a constitutional right in 1988), 1990 for unemployed (Erundina), 1992 for handicapped (Erundina, but from a legislative iniciative) and 2014 for students (Haddad). In 2016 Doria reduce the latter to only low‐income students. Sometimes before buses, but also after them. | Chapter 6; 1998 Federal Constitution; Municipal Laws (10.854/90; 11250/92) and decrees (28.813/90; 29709/91), State laws (5869/87; 32.144/90; 666/91) | |
| fare subsidies | Started with Erundina, were reduced under Maluf and Pitta, increased with Suplicy, maintained by Serra and Kassab and increased again under Haddad | Constanzo (2020); Chapter 5 | |
| Waste management | reduce service inequalities | Covas started and Erundina boosted. But it was the new concession format under Suplicy that established and latter maintained it. | Chapter 7; Godoy (2015) |
| control over trucks and services | Started with the new concession under Suplicy and latter maintained | Chapter 7; Silva (2010); Marin (2016); Godoy (2015) | |
| control over trucks and services |
Maluf started trucks telemetry and Pitta expanded, although with suspicions over
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